nuclear weapons

سبيل للخروج من فوضى الشرق الأوسط

VN:F [1.9.3_1094]
Rating: 0 (from 0 votes)
VN:F [1.9.3_1094]
Rating: 0.0/10 (0 votes cast)

يناقش خالد دياب بأن انتشار الأسلحة النووية سوف يستمر طالما استمرّينا في التعامل مع ترسانة إسرائيل النووية

5 May 2010

English version

إنه لتغيير مرحّب به أن يكون الرئيس الأمريكي باراك أوباما ليس فقط ملتزم بوقف انتشار الأسلحة النووية وإنما يدرك كذلك أن عدم انتشارها يبدأ في وطنه. مقارنة مع سابقه جورج دبليو بوش، الذي مزّقت إدارته العديد من المعاهدات التي وقعتها واشنطن حول الموضوع، وأعلنت عام 2003 أن الولايات المتحدة ستبدأ بتطوير جيل جديد من الأسلحة النووية الصغيرة "التكتيكية" والتي يمكن عملياً استخدامها في ساحة المعركة، وقّع أوباما معاهدة أسلحة نووية تاريخية مع روسيا.

تتميز هذه المعاهدة بقوانين غريبة في أعداد الأسلحة، وتبقى الولايات المتحدة وطناً لأكبر ترسانة نووية في العالم، والدولة الوحيدة التي استخدمت فعلياً القنابل الذرية في حروبها. إلا أن التزام واشنطن بترتيب بيتها الداخلي كان وراء النجاح النسبي لقمة الأمن النووي هذا الشهر، والذي حضره قادة من أكثر من 47 دولة.

وقد لوحظ غياب إيران، التي عقدت اجتماعاً بديلاً خاصاً بها حول نزع السلاح. ورغم أن هذا اللقاء أبرز نفاق القوى النووية في عدم رغبتها الالتزام بوضوح بنزع الأسلحة النووية، إلا أن التجمع لم يفعل سوى القليل لإزالة مخاوف واشنطن فيما يتعلق بطموحات إيران النووية. ورغم أن طهران تدّعي أن برنامجها النووي هو للاستخدامات المدنية فقط، إلا أن الطروحات العدائية للنظام الإيراني، وبالذات باتجاه إسرائيل، شجعت مخاوف بعض ذوي العلاقة من أن إيران تنوي سراً صنع قنبلة نووية.

كان غياب رئيس وزراء إسرائيل أمراً ملحوظاً آخر في قمة أوباما. كان بنيامين نتنياهو قد رفض الحضور، مشيراً إلى مخاوف من أن تتعرض بلده لانتقادات الدول العربية والإسلامية، وبالذات تركيا ومصر. إضافة إلى ذلك، قاوم وزير الدفاع إيهود باراك نداءات متجددة لإسرائيل بالانضمام إلى معاهدة منع انتشار الأسلحة النووية. وهي الدولة الوحيدة في الشرق الأوسط التي لم توقع على المعاهدة.

لم تذكر لا مصر ولا تركيا إسرائيل، رغم أن الوفد السعودي وصف الترسانة النووية الإسرائيلية على أنها "عائق أساسي أمام تحقيق الأمن والاستقرار في الشرق الأوسط".

وهو على حق. فرغم أن إسرائيل ما زالت مصرة على تبني سياسة الغموض الرسمية، يقدّر الخبراء أن الدولة حصلت على قدرات نووية بعد حرب عام 1967 بفترة وجيزة، وأنها تملك اليوم حوالي 200 رأس نووي حربي، مما يضعها بين الدول النووية الستة الأولى، بعد المملكة المتحدة.

تشكل ترسانة إسرائيل النووية فيلاً مشعّاً في الغرفة، وتؤخّر جهود تحويل الشرق الأوسط الملتهب إلى منطقة منزوعة السلاح النووي، وتوفر لجيرانها حافزاً للحصول على قدرات خاصة بهم.

لا يحتاج الأمر لذكاء خارق لإدراك أن ترسانة إسرائيل النووية تجعل من الشرق الأوسط مكاناً أكثر خطورة وقابلية للانفجار. ويدرك حتى أصدقاء إسرائيل ذلك. على سبيل المثال توقَّع تقرير لوكالة الاستخبارات الأمريكية عام 1963 بأن إسرائيل نووية سوف تستقطب المنطقة وتزعزع الاستقرار فيها، وتجعل على الأرجح "سياسة إسرائيل مع جيرانها ... أكثر صعوبة".

كذلك تطرّق التقرير لمخاطر حاضرة، مثل سعي عربي محتمل لقوة "ردع" خاصة بهم. ومن الأمثلة على ذلك برنامج ليبيا النووي السري، الذي وافقت طرابلس على تفكيكه في كانون الأول/ديسمبر 2003. وكان الرئيس الليبي معمر القذافي قد أعرب منذ سبعينات القرن الماضي عن رغبته في الحصول على قدرات نووية، جزئياً بهدف مجابهة إسرائيل.

وطالما تتمسك إسرائيل بترسانتها النووية فلن يذهب شبح انتشار الأسلحة النووية بعيداً. تدفع الحكومات العربية ومعها إيران منذ ثلاثين سنة على الأقل باتجاه شرق أوسط خالٍ من الأسلحة النووية. لا يمكن بالطبع تناسي أن بعض الحكومات تحفزها على ذلك عدم القدرة وليس المبادئ، أو قد تجد القضية النووية أداة دبلوماسية مفيدة ضد إسرائيل.

رغم ذلك، إذا كانت إسرائيل قلقة من إيران نووية، أو احتمالات حصول أنظمة أخرى في الشرق الأوسط على القنبلة الذريّة، فإن أفضل طريقة لتجنب ذلك هو إطلاق دائرة فعّالة بأن تعرض التخلي تدريجياً عن ترسانتها النووية وتوقيع معاهدة شرق أوسط خالٍ من أسلحة الدمار الشامل، مثلها مثل بقية الدول في المنطقة، مقابل تأكيدات إيرانية راسخة تحت إشراف دولي.

ولتحقيق ذلك، يمكن إنشاء منبر إقليمي يسبق المعاهدة، برعاية الوكالة الدولية للطاقة النووية والأمم المتحدة، وربما الاتحاد الأوروبي والولايات المتحدة للاتفاق على آلية شفافة ثابتة عادلة لفتح المرافق النووية في المنطقة أمام إشراف دولي محايد. تقوم هذه المبادرة بالتفاوض على برنامج زمني للإلغاء التدريجي للترسانة الإسرائيلية وأي برنامج ثنائي الاستخدام مشكوك فيه، وفي الوقت نفسه توفير دعم دبلوماسي وأمني لإزالة مخاوف الإسرائيليين وغيرهم من اللاعبين الإقليميين.

This article was written for the Common Ground News Service and was published on 29 April 2010.

VN:F [1.9.3_1094]
Rating: 0.0/10 (0 votes cast)
VN:F [1.9.3_1094]
Rating: 0 (from 0 votes)

Post to Twitter Tweet This

Tags: , , , , , , , , , , , ,

Related posts

A way out of the Middle East’s critical mess

VN:F [1.9.3_1094]
Rating: +2 (from 2 votes)
VN:F [1.9.3_1094]
Rating: 9.5/10 (2 votes cast)

By Khaled Diab

As Barack Obama seeks to tackle the proliferation of nuclear weapons, it is high time for Israel to dismantle its nuclear arsenal.

5 May 2010

Arabic version

It is a welcome change that US President Barack Obama is not only committed to halting the spread of nuclear weapons but realises that non-proliferation begins at home. In contrast with his predecessor, George W Bush – whose administration tore up many of the treaties Washington signed on the subject and announced, in 2003, that the US would start developing a new generation of small ‘tactical’ nuclear weapons which could actually be used during battle – Obama has already signed a landmark nuclear arms treaty with Russia.

This treaty has peculiar counting rules and the United States does remain home to the world’s largest nuclear arsenal and is the only country to have actually used atom bombs in warfare. Yet Washington’s renewed commitment to get its own house in order were behind the relative success of the Nuclear Security Summit earlier this month, which was attended by leaders from more than 47 countries.

Noticeably absent was Iran, which held its own alternative meeting on disarmament. Although this meeting highlighted the hypocrisy of the nuclear powers in their unwillingness to commit clearly to nuclear disarmament, the gathering did little to alleviate Western fears regarding Iran’s nuclear ambitions. Though Tehran claims that its nuclear programme is exclusively for civilian use, the strident rhetoric of the regime, particularly towards Israel, has fuelled fears among some actors that Iran is clandestinely trying to build a bomb.

Israel’s leader was another noticeable absentee from Obama’s summit. The Israeli premier Binyamin Netanyahu had refused to attend citing fears that his country would be singled out for criticism by Arab and Muslim nations, especially Turkey and Egypt. In addition, Defence Minister Ehud Barak resisted renewed calls for Israel to join the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. It is the only country in the Middle East that is not a signatory.

In the event, neither Egypt nor Turkey mentioned Israel, although the Saudi delegate did describe the Israeli nuclear arsenal as “a fundamental obstacle to achieving security and stability in the Middle East”.

And he has a point. Although Israel still maintains an official policy of ambiguity, experts estimate that the country acquired a nuclear capability shortly after its 1967 war and today possesses up to 200 nuclear warheads, putting it among the top six nuclear nations, just behind the UK.

Israel’s nuclear arsenal stands like the radioactive elephant in the room, hindering efforts to transform the potentially explosive Middle East into a nuclear weapons-free region, and provides its neighbours with a motive to acquire their own capabilities.

In fact, it’s not exactly rocket science figuring out that Israel’s nuclear arsenal makes the Middle East a more dangerous and explosive place – even Israel’s friends recognise this. For example, a 1963 CIA report predicted that a nuclear Israel would polarise and destabilise the region and would probably make “Israel’s policy with its neighbours … more, rather than less, tough”.

The report also touched on the attendant dangers, such as a possible Arab quest for their own “deterrent”. An example of this dynamic in action is Libya’s clandestine nuclear programme, which Tripoli agreed to dismantle in December 2003. As early as the 1970s, Libyan leader Muammar al-Gaddafi expressed his desire to obtain a nuclear capability partly in order to counteract Israel’s.

And, as long as Israel holds on to its nuclear arsenal, the shadow of proliferation will not go away. For at least 30 years, Arab governments, as well as Iran, have been pushing for a nuclear weapons-free Middle East. Of course, it cannot be dismissed that some governments are motivated by a lack of ability rather than principle,  or may find the nuclear question a useful diplomatic tool against Israel.

Nevertheless, if Israel is concerned about a nuclear Iran, or the possibility that other regimes in the region will acquire the bomb, the best way it can avert this is to set in motion a virtuous circle by offering to phase out its nuclear arsenal and to sign up, along with all the other countries in the region, to a WMD-free Middle East Treaty, in return for cast-iron Iranian assurances under international supervision.

Towards this end, a pre-treaty regional platform – under the auspices of the International Atomic Energy Agency, the UN, and possibly the EU and the US – could be set up to agree a transparent, consistent and fair mechanism for opening up the region’s nuclear facilities to impartial international supervision. This initiative would  negotiate a timetable for the phasing out of the Israeli arsenal and any other suspect dual use programmes, while providing diplomatic and security support to assuage the fears of Israelis and other regional actors.

This article was written for the Common Ground News Service and was published on 29 April 2010.

VN:F [1.9.3_1094]
Rating: 9.5/10 (2 votes cast)
VN:F [1.9.3_1094]
Rating: +2 (from 2 votes)

Post to Twitter Tweet This

Tags: , , , , , , , , , , , ,

Related posts

Disarming the bomb in the basement

VN:F [1.9.3_1094]
Rating: 0 (from 0 votes)
VN:F [1.9.3_1094]
Rating: 0.0/10 (0 votes cast)

By Khaled Diab

Israel’s weapons policy jeopardises the country’s own security and undermines efforts to create a nuclear-free Middle East.

August 2008

Israel’s interior minister Meir Sheetrit – who is vying to take over the reins from outgoing prime minister Ehud Olmert – has struck a welcome note of caution on Iran in his campaign for the ruling Kadima party’s leadership.

On Wednesday, he said: “Israel must on no account attack Iran, speak of attacking Iran or even think about it… Israel must defend itself only if attacked by Iran, but attacking Iran on our own initiative is a megalomaniacal [and] reckless idea.”

Earlier, former Mossad chief Ephraim Halevy also struck alarm bells against calls to bomb Iran. He warned that an attack could hurt Israel’s interests for a century. “It will have a negative effect on public opinion in the Arab world.”

In fact, the ex-intelligence chief’s opinion is that, without doing anything, Israel wins anyway. “Ahmadinejad is our greatest gift,” he told the US-sponsored Arabic-language network al-Hurra on Tuesday. “We couldn’t carry out a better operation at the Mossad than to put a guy like Ahmadinejad in power in Iran.”

According to Time magazine, another senior Mossad official opined that: “Iran’s achievement is creating an image of itself as a scary superpower when it’s really a paper tiger.”

Although these statements, as well as reported US opposition and murmurs of dissent in Tehran against the regime’s posturing on Israel, reduce the possibility of a military confrontation for the time being, tensions could flare up at any time.

“Paper tiger” or not, Tehran’s strident rhetoric is fuelling public fear in Israel, which plays into the hands of hardliners. In addition, Israel may not trust Iran’s reassurances about its civilian nuclear intentions because Israel itself gave similar assurances but, nevertheless, went on to acquire a nuclear weapons capability.

In fact, Israel’s quest to become a nuclear power started shortly after independence, and the main driving force behind it was the country’s founding father, David Ben Gurion. The Israeli leader – who admitted to having nightmares about “a combined attack by all the Arab armies”, despite Israel possessing more firepower than all the Arab countries combined – saw nuclear weapons as the main way of ensuring Israel’s strategic security. Like Iran, he was also lured by the prestige factor of joining the nuclear club.

Following the Suez fiasco, Ben Gurion became more adamant. However, many senior officials opposed his nuclear designs for a number of reasons: they feared it would spark a dangerous escalation, draw resources away from conventional forces and cripple the struggling Israeli economy.

Despite this opposition, Ben Gurion, whose status allowed him to circumvent the cabinet and the Knesset, struck a landmark deal with France in 1957 to build a large reactor that could separate plutonium. Concerned at where this was leading, all but one of the members of the Israeli Atomic Energy Commission resigned in protest at the growing military orientation of the programme.

Although the Dimona reactor was constructed in great secrecy, with not even a whisper in the Israeli press, word leaked out and, in December 1960, rumours spread in the western press and were confirmed by U2 spy planes. This triggered concern in Washington and Moscow, and fear and condemnation in the Arab world. The news also took the Israeli public by complete surprise. Ben Gurion assured the world that the reactor was “designed exclusively for peaceful purposes”.

It was around this time that Israel formulated its policy of nuclear ambiguity. Faced with international criticism and internal opposition, the legendary military leader Moshe Dayan developed the concept of what he ominously called “the bomb in the basement”.

Israel began its line that it would not be the first to “introduce” nuclear weapons into the region. Pressed on what exactly that meant, the then ambassador to Washington, Yitzhak Rabin, vaguely responded that Israel would not be the first to “test” such weapons.

Israel resisted international supervision under the IAEA and only grudgingly agreed to pre-arranged American inspections to limited sections of the Dimona facility which, critics argued, allowed it to hide the military activity at the reactor behind false walls.

Experts estimate that Israel acquired a nuclear capability shortly after the 1967 war and today possesses up to 200 nuclear war heads, putting it among the top six nuclear nations, just behind the UK.

Interestingly, a 1963 CIA report predicted that a nuclear Israel would polarise and destabilise the region and would likely make: “Israel’s policy with its neighbours… more, rather than less, tough”. The report also touched on the attendant dangers, such as a possible Arab quest for their own “deterrent”, as well as the damage to western interests in the region.

And, as long as Israel holds on to its nuclear arsenal, the shadow of proliferation will not go away. For at least thirty years, Arab governments, as well as Iran, have been pushing for a nuclear weapons-free Middle East. If Israel is concerned about a nuclear Iran, or the possibility that other regimes in the region will acquire the bomb, the best way it can avert this is to offer to phase out its nuclear arsenal in return for cast-iron Iranian assurances under international supervision.

This column appeared in The Guardian Unlimited’s Comment is Free section on 24 August 2008. Read the related discussion. This is an archived article from Diabolic Digest.

VN:F [1.9.3_1094]
Rating: 0.0/10 (0 votes cast)
VN:F [1.9.3_1094]
Rating: 0 (from 0 votes)

Post to Twitter Tweet This

Tags: , , ,

Related posts