muslim brotherhood

Make Ramadan torture-free in Egypt

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By Osama Diab

It's Ramadan, but the Egyptian police continue to practise brutality and torture. This year, they should set a better example.

19 August 2010

Ramadan is the month during which the Qur'an was first revealed more than 1,400 years ago. Muslims are supposed to wash away their sins during this month because the reward for good deeds at this time is believed to be bigger. People are not only expected to abstain from eating and drinking during daylight, but also from malicious behaviour. Charity is also encouraged. The most visible signs of this in Egypt are the mawa'ed ar-rahman (tables of mercy) which are scattered all over the country offering poor people free food to break their fast.

Given the altruistic nature of Ramadan, we can only hope that torture and beating people to death are on the police's list of sins to wash away this month.

One thing is for certain: Egypt's police has a long list of sins for which they need to repent. News of police brutality and torture have dominated the pages of independent and opposition news outlets over the past two months. Khaled Said's killing, among other incidents of police brutality, has made Egyptians more furious than ever. Anti-brutality protests took place on an almost daily basis for a few weeks after Said's death. Unsurprisingly, the government responded to its accusers by claiming brazenly that it was just an isolated incident. But its decision to extend the emergency law a few months ago made clear that law enforcement is probably not going to get any less brutal.

These supposedly "isolated" brutal acts have been called "systematic" by human rights organisations. "Torture in Egypt has become epidemic, affecting large numbers of ordinary citizens who find themselves in police custody as suspects or in connection with criminal investigations", reads a Human Rights Watch report from September 2009.

Despite having such a poor record on human rights, the Egyptian police still feels righteous enough to conduct occasional morality raids. Last Ramadan, I wrote that the Egyptian police took a pious stand by arresting more than 150 people who publicly ate and smoked during fasting hours. I argued back then that the increasing religiosity of society, driven by the Muslim Brotherhood and Salafi movements, had put pressure on Egypt's relatively secular regime to act more "Islamic". This time around, a wholesale police campaign has been launched and endorsed by the interior ministry.

Many Muslims, including those in the police, think Ramadan is only about refraining from food, water, smoking and sex, and actually behave in a way that is completely antithetical to the principles of the month. For example, over-indulgence is common during iftar (the meal which breaks the fast), but part of the point of refraining from food is to experience its lack in order to sympathise with the poor. Restraint and self-discipline are the pillars of Ramadan, but many people still completely lose their temper during the hour before iftar when traffic is at its craziest and people are at their hungriest and thirstiest.

This Ramadan, the Ministry of the Interior should give strict orders to its men regarding the ill-treatment of citizens. Rather than giving orders to arrest people for eating and smoking publicly, it should declare Ramadan a torture-free month. In my opinion, it would be more "Ramadanic" to stop torturing people than forcing them to fast. Ramadan's philosophy is about forgiveness and tolerance, not the wielding of absolute authority over citizens who have committed no crime.

This column appeared in The Guardian Unlimited’s Comment is Free section on 11 August 2010. Read the related discussion. Reprinted here with the author's permission. © Osama Diab. All rights reserved.

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Egypt’s uneasy political truce

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By Osama Diab

Egypt's secularists and Islamists agree on one thing: Mubarak must go. But when he does, how long will they stand united?

3 April 2010

The current political debate in Egypt can be summed up in one sentence: parties and activists of all political colours are campaigning to end almost 30 years of President Hosni Mubarak's rule and stop his son, Gamal, from inheriting power and returning Egypt to the dynastic era. 

For the time being, the opposition is united by anti-Mubarakism, despite comprising elements that have traditionally been fierce rivals, such as Islamists, liberals and Nasserists. Umbrella movements like Kifaya and the 6 April Youth Movement are a good example of broad-based groups which draw Egyptians from different political, religious and social backgrounds. 

In fact, the unity of the opposition is not a sign of love or matching ideologies but merely reflects the realisation that breaking Mubarak's stranglehold on power requires the kind of broad-based popular alliance last seen during Egypt's resistance to foreign occupation. The different parties also understand that the emergence of democracy in Egypt is their only realistic chance of reaching power through legitimate means and by way of a smooth transition. 

This means that the current alliance's shelf-life is linked to the emergence of democracy. Once that is achieved, the gloves will come off and the traditional rivalries will float, once again, to the surface. 

This poses an important question: when the time comes, what kind of post-Mubarak political scene will emerge? 

Egypt's increasing religiosity has coincided with a globalised society in which modern concepts of human rights are being adopted by more and more Egyptians. This discrepancy will make it harder for secularists and Islamists to find common ground. 

The negative view of secularism in the mind of the majority of Egyptians would be central to the future debate. In our religious society, people confuse secularism with Ataturk-style anti-religiosity and sometimes with atheism. Ironically, many practicing Muslims believe in the separation of religion and state without calling it secularism or even recognising that this makes them secular.

This misguided understanding of secularism in Egypt is a barrier to democracy. This is because, although most Egyptians profess to being religious, many fear the intolerance and potential totalitarianism of Islamic rule if Islamists, including the ostensibly "moderate" Muslim Brotherhood, gain power. For that reason, they prefer authoritarian secularism to a democratically elected Islamic government which they fear would transform Egypt into a radical theocracy. 

Ismail Sherif, who is studying to become a filmmaker, thinks some people are resistant to change out of the fear that it might lead to unfavourable consequences. "Even though most people in the film industry would prefer a secular authoritarian regime to an elected Islamic government, we have to accept that risk in order for democracy to happen," he says.

 How can we overcome all this fear and resistance to change? In order for change in Egypt to be broadly supported, it should not be radical. While it is still fighting dictatorship and a state of emergency, the opposition in Egypt should keep one eye on the future and agree the framework they all want to work under. 

The huge popular support for Mohamed Elbaradei, former chief of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and Nobel peace prize winner, gives hope that change in Egypt doesn't have to be led by Islamists with questionable democratic credentials. In fact, it reveals that, despite the government's better efforts in recent decades to crush viable secular alternatives and present the Muslim Brotherhood and Islamists as the only alternative to frighten secularists and the international community, secularism is far from dead in Egypt.

The Mubarak regime has a long history of stifling the emergence of a viable and popular secular opposition. Prior to ElBaradei, Ayman Nour, despite all the hurdles placed in his path, gave Mubarak a respectable run for his money during the 2005 presidential elections. Afterwards, he was thrown into jail on trumped-up charges. In addition to allaying the fear of Egyptians that the only alternative to Mubarak is an Islamist theocracy, secular Egyptians need to correct the misconceptions ordinary Egyptians have about secularism.

They need to explain that ilmaniya (Arabic for secularism) is different from antipathy to religion. For instance, Barack Obama is a proud Christian, yet he is also the president of a multifaith secular country.

Egyptian secularists also need to remind people that Egyptians were never as united as they were when they fought occupation and a monarchy under the slogan "Religion is for God, and the nation is for everyone". Moreover, in order for Egypt's opposition to gain support and win ground internally and internationally, it has to be based on universal human rights and not discriminate on the basis of religion, gender, etc. An Islamic regime won't provide this, but secularism based on e equality for all will.

This column appeared in The Guardian Unlimited’s Comment is Free section on 29 March 2010. Read the related discussion.

Published here with the author's permission. ©Osama Diab. All rights reserved.

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Splitting Egypt’s political atom

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By Khaled Diab

Can Mohamed ElBaradei's campaign for the Egyptian presidency save a country close to political meltdown?

Monday 15 March 2010

Mohamed ElBaradei is no stranger to explosive – even nuclear – situations. As head of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), he managed, using his legal and diplomatic expertise, to diffuse tensions over Iran's nuclear programme between the bomb-ho George Bush in Washington and the hot-headed radical President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in Tehran. His astute diplomacy even earned him the Nobel peace prize in 2005.

Now, having given up the helm of the IAEA, he is being propelled forward by an unexpected and spontaneous wave of popular support that is breathing new life into Egypt's staid political landscape. In an unprecedented contrast to the typical, top-down politics of Egypt's ruling and mainstream opposition parties, ElBaradei has been persuaded, through grassroots activism, to come home and launch a campaign to clean up the country's radioactive political decay after nearly three decades of toxic rule by the Hosni Mubarak regime.

His return to Egypt has felt more like a state visit by a world leader than the coming home of a senior international diplomat. At the airport, he was treated to a hero's welcome, with jubilant supporters cheering him on, as if he had already been elected president. The crowd included ordinary Egyptians from across the country, as well as opposition figures, actors and novelists.

And if ElBaradei is allowed to run in the 2011 elections and manages to win – two very big 'ifs' indeed – he will be Egypt's first ever democratically elected leader, four presidents and almost 60 years after the 1952 revolution promised to bring democracy and freedom to Egyptians.

But for the time being, this accidental hero of Egypt's profound desire for change is being cautiously daring. His feet had hardly touched the ground when he was elevated by Egypt's diverse and broad-based anti-Mubarak movement to head a coalition for political change, the establishment of which he had reportedly wanted to put off for a few months. Its mission is to lobby the government to make the constitution more democratic and to promote social justice. ElBaradei has even indicated his willingness to enter the presidential race but only if he can run as an independent candidate and if free and fair elections can be guaranteed.

His potential candidacy is a sad condemnation of the Egyptian regime's unspoken policy of stifling meaningful opposition and engineering the political landscape so that Mubarak appears to be the only show in town. In addition, ElBaradei's meteoric rise to the upper echelons of the opposition movement is a reflection of the disarray of opposition parties and their failure to tap into popular discontent and mobilise the population to take effective action.

But how has a lawyer from a family of distinguished lawyers, who is not a career politician and who has worked outside Egypt for decades, become the face of reform in Egypt?

Part of the reason is his international standing, which has earned him a great deal of respect and admiration at home. More profoundly, it is a sign of the ageing Mubarak's failing grip on power, popular frustration at the rotten state of Egyptian politics, socio-economic inequality and widespread opposition to the idea of Gamal Mubarak inheriting the presidency (with a little behind-the-scenes help from his father). This desperation is reflected in the names of grassroots opposition efforts, such as Kifaya (Enough), the Egyptian Campaign against Inheritance of Power, and in the increasingly popular refrain: "Anything but Mubarak".

The decision to rally around ElBaradei is born of the realisation by activists and the opposition – with the notable exception of the Muslim Brotherhood – that they lacked a charismatic figure to represent people of all classes and political stripes. They are also gambling that ElBaradei's international standing will protect him from the wrath of the regime and spare him the fate of the previous challenger to Mubarak's hegemony, Ayman Nour.

So far, the regime has been doing its best to ignore the new pretender's return and downplay the extent of Baradei Fever. As one blogger put it: "I'm going to enjoy sitting back and watching how the Mubaraks deal with this wildcard."

But what are ElBaradei's chances? Many experts are doubtful that ElBaradei will be able run as an independent candidate and time is running out for him to attach himself to a political party. Moreover, joining a party would rob him of his unifying appeal. Amr Hashim Rabie of the Ahram Centre for Political and Strategic Studies believes that the best ElBaradei can hope for is to embarrass the regime at home and abroad and to galvanise popular opposition in 2011.

But perhaps it's too early to write off ElBaradei's chances. Several months ago, few would've suspected the Nobel laureate would be in the situation he's in today. Besides, we should never underestimate the power of the people, even in a semi-authoritarian regime.

And therein lies ElBaradei's most powerful weapon. He is a popular figure in Egypt – with over 122,000 members of a Facebook group supporting him in a country where internet penetration is still fairly low. And he understands the power of the people and the need to win their support and backing. A reflection of this savvy is that he wasted no time in meeting the young advocates who first floated the idea of his candidacy and even recorded a Facebook message to them. In recognition of Egypt's youth bulge and the power of the young to change and innovate, he has also invited young people to become active members of his coalition.

Of course, even if ElBaradei becomes the next president, Egypt will not be magically transformed into a prosperous democracy. That, as I pointed out in my vision for a democratic Egypt, will take generations of concerted effort. Encouragingly, many of his aspirations correspond with other reform-minded Egyptians' views – and he has indicated that he would not seek re-election if he failed to deliver results. I would go one step further and urge him only to seek a single term in office during which he can democratise the country's institutions and then hand over the baton to new generations of elected leaders.

This column appeared in The Guardian Unlimited’s Comment is Free section on 1 March 2010. Read the related discussion.

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My plan for a democratic Egypt

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By Khaled Diab

With the right leadership, Egypt could rid itself of nepotism and inequality to become a prosperous and egalitarian society.

22 January 2010

While in most countries, even the most democratic, becoming president or prime minister is a far-fetched dream for almost everyone, in Egypt, the prospect exists mostly in the realm of fantasy. In the six or so decades since the 1952 revolution, Egypt has had just four leaders, none of whom were elected – at least not in free and fair elections.

The current president, Hosni Mubarak, has held the top seat for the past three decades or so. This means that the majority of Egyptians, given the country's 'youth bulge', have known no other leader.

Next year, Mubarak's current term will end and, given his age and health, most Egyptians don't expect him to seek a sixth term. Egyptians dream of massive positive change in 2011, fear terrible instability and disruption, and some might even settle for 'business as usual' in the form of Mubarak's son, Gamal – at least for a few years.

Reform-minded Egyptians hope that Mubarak will step aside honourably and take the unprecedented step of calling free and fair elections to find a replacement. The most popular potential candidate at the moment is former IAEA chief and Nobel peace laureate Mohamed ElBaradei, despite the fact that he has lived and worked outside Egypt for decades.

ElBaradei's popularity is not only a sign of his international standing but also indicates the Egyptian regime's unofficial policy of engineering the political landscape so that Mubarak appears to be the only show in town. Personally, I fear that, rather than undergo a democratic rebirth, Egypt will either get a second Mubarak or a period of instability until another dictator takes the helm, though I doubt that Islamists are ready in the wings to take over. Nevertheless, I cannot help but hold out hope that 2011 will mark the birth of true Egyptian democracy.

This dream has got me contemplating, although I've never entertained political ambitions, what changes I would instigate if I were president. Since I stand about as much chance of being elected to that office as I have of being teleported to Mars, I don't have to limit myself to the realm of the possible and pragmatic and can let my imagination run loose. Surveying the troubled and dysfunctional typography of Egypt's society and economy, one is sadly spoilt for choice as to where to begin.

Upon taking office, and to avoid the temptations of power that have led so many initially well-meaning Egyptian leaders astray, I would probably begin with strengthening and shoring up Egypt's institutions, from the parliament to the judiciary, to ensure an effective separation and balance of powers. But top-down reforms can, at best, only play the role of a catalyst, and not bring about lasting change in themselves. In order to harness Egypt's massive grassroots potential, I would end the culture of fear and intimidation – at least, the state-sponsored side of this – that keeps Egyptians down.

I would strive to remove all the unconstitutional and undemocratic laws, such as those hindering freedom of expression and conscience, and dismantle Egypt's enormous police and state security apparatus.

In order to counteract and reverse growing religious fundamentalism and communal strife I would dig up the roots, rather than chop violently away at the outgrowth. A fish rots from the head down, so it is important to launch a serious campaign to root out corruption, first from the highest echelons of society.

More generally, it is essential to challenge the widespread practice of wasta – which permeates all levels of society and causes widespread cynicism and disenchantment – by strictly enforcing the rule of law, without making exceptions for the well-connected. This will be no mean feat, given how deeply ingrained the notion is, but if Egypt is to become a true meritocracy it is a crucial battle that must be won.

Then there's the economy, which is often erroneously viewed as somehow separate from society. Seeking political and social justice is meaningless if their economic counterpart continues to be denied – in fact, rather than more growth, Egypt needs more economic justice. Egypt's economy needs not only to continue to develop, but to do so sustainably and equitably.

In a country where economic inequality has grown to chronic proportions, the chasm between the have-alls and the have-nots needs desperately to be bridged. This should be done through a fair, effective and enforced progressive taxation system, as well as the reinstatement and further development of the country's dismantled social safety net and concerted government investment directed at stimulating Egypt's impoverished rural hinterland and neglected south.

This requires not just internal reform but also a revamping of the global economic system to make it fairer for developing countries. In addition, the strong arm with which the US-led west imposes its hegemony could foil such efforts if my "pinko" reforms are deemed somehow to be antagonist to US interests in the region.

In parallel with promoting economic justice, competitiveness also needs to be stimulated in order to generate the necessary wealth to boost everyone's wellbeing. This requires robust and enforceable regulations that level out the economic playing field and weed out the de facto monopolies and cartels that plague the Egyptian economy, as well as reforming the country's bloated and inefficient bureaucracy.

One reason why superstition reigns and people hark back to a mythical and glorious past is because they feel they lack a future. To give the coming generations a sense of purpose and to allow current generations to build a better future, I would slash military spending and abolish conscription, then use the released resources to invest heavily in education and scientific research.

Of course, I realise that my vision is but a dream untainted by political realities. Even a well-meaning, democratically elected president would have his or her work cut out simply steering Egypt away from the rocks towards which it is currently heading. The kind of transformation I dream of cannot be implemented by any one leader but will take generations of patient and careful change. But with the right political and civil leadership, Egypt can reinvent itself as a prosperous, modern and egalitarian society.

This column appeared in The Guardian Unlimited’s Comment is Free section on 17 January 2010. Read the related discussion.

While in most countries, even the most democratic, becoming president or prime minister is a far-fetched dream for almost everyone, in Egypt, the prospect exists mostly in the realm of fantasy. In the six or so decades since the 1952 revolution, Egypt has had just four leaders, none of whom were elected – at least not in free and fair elections.

The current president, Hosni Mubarak, has held the top seat for the past three decades or so. This means that the majority of Egyptians, given the country's "youth bulge", have known no other leader.

Next year, Mubarak's current term will end and, given his age and health, most Egyptians don't expect him to seek a sixth term. Egyptians dream of massive positive change in 2011, fear terrible instability and disruption, and some might even settle for "business as usual" in the form of Mubarak's son, Gamal – at least for a few years.

Reform-minded Egyptians hope that Mubarak will step aside honourably and take the unprecedented step of calling free and fair elections to find a replacement. The most popular potential candidate at the moment is former IAEA chief and Nobel peace laureate Mohamed El Baradei, despite the fact that he has lived and worked outside Egypt for decades.

ElBaradei's popularity is not only a sign of his international standing but also indicates the Egyptian regime's unofficial policy of engineering the political landscape so that Mubarak appears to be the only show in town. Personally, I fear that, rather than undergo a democratic rebirth, Egypt will either get a second Mubarak or a period of instability until another dictator takes the helm, though I doubt that Islamists are ready in the wings to take over. Nevertheless, I cannot help but hold out hope that 2011 will mark the birth of true Egyptian democracy.

This dream has got me contemplating, although I've never entertained political ambitions, what changes I would instigate if I were president. Since I stand about as much chance of being elected to that office as I have of being teleported to Mars, I don't have to limit myself to the realm of the possible and pragmatic and can let my imagination run loose. Surveying the troubled and dysfunctional typography of Egypt's society and economy, one is sadly spoilt for choice as to where to begin.

Upon taking office, and to avoid the temptations of power that have led so many initially well-meaning Egyptian leaders astray, I would probably begin with strengthening and shoring up Egypt's institutions, from the parliament to the judiciary, to ensure an effective separation and balance of powers. But top-down reforms can, at best, only play the role of a catalyst, and not bring about lasting change in themselves. In order to harness Egypt's massive grassroots potential, I would end the culture of fear and intimidation – at least, the state-sponsored side of this – that keeps Egyptians down.

I would strive to remove all the unconstitutional and undemocratic laws, such as those hindering freedom of expression and conscience, and dismantle Egypt's enormous police and state security apparatus.

In order to counteract and reverse growing religious fundamentalism and communal strife I would dig up the roots, rather than chop violently away at the outgrowth. A fish rots from the head down, so it is important to launch a serious campaign to root out corruption, first from the highest echelons of society.

More generally, it is essential to challenge the widespread practice of wasta – which permeates all levels of society and causes widespread cynicism and disenchantment – by strictly enforcing the rule of law, without making exceptions for the well-connected. This will be no mean feat, given how deeply ingrained the notion is, but if Egypt is to become a true meritocracy it is a crucial battle that must be won.

Then there's the economy, which is often erroneously viewed as somehow separate from society. Seeking political and social justice is meaningless if their economic counterpart continues to be denied – in fact, rather than more growth, Egypt needs more economic justice. Egypt's economy needs not only to continue to develop, but to do so sustainably and equitably.

In a country where economic inequality has grown to chronic proportions, the chasm between the have-alls and the have-nots needs desperately to be bridged. This should be done through a fair, effective and enforced progressive taxation system, as well as the reinstatement and further development of the country's dismantled social safety net and concerted government investment directed at stimulating Egypt's impoverished rural hinterland and neglected south.

This requires not just internal reform but also a revamping of the global economic system to make it fairer for developing countries. In addition, the strong arm with which the US-led west imposes its hegemony could foil such efforts if my "pinko" reforms are deemed somehow to be antagonist to US interests in the region.

In parallel with promoting economic justice, competitiveness also needs to be stimulated in order to generate the necessary wealth to boost everyone's wellbeing. This requires robust and enforceable regulations that level out the economic playing field and weed out the de facto monopolies and cartels that plague the Egyptian economy, as well as reforming the country's bloated and inefficient bureaucracy.

One reason why superstition reigns and people hark back to a mythical and glorious past is because they feel they lack a future. To give the coming generations a sense of purpose and to allow current generations to build a better future, I would slash military spending and abolish conscription, then use the released resources to invest heavily in education and scientific research.

Of course, I realise that my vision is but a dream untainted by political realities. Even a well-meaning, democratically elected president would have his or her work cut out simply steering Egypt away from the rocks towards which it is currently heading. The kind of transformation I dream of cannot be implemented by any one leader but will take generations of patient and careful change. But with the right political and civil leadership, Egypt can reinvent itself as a prosperous, modern and egalitarian society.

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Should America fear a democratic Egypt?

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Osama Diab

The depiction of Egypt as a country of religious fanatics who await a breeze of freedom to turn Egypt into a radical regime is far from accurate.

14 January 2010

A senior Muslim Brotherhood leader Abdel Moniem Aboul Fotouh, who is known for his moderation, recently said that the party is not as popular as people think.

“If there was a real partisan life in Egypt and the wheel of democracy started turning and election were held without fraud, the brotherhood won’t come to power and won’t get more than 25% of the seats and not 90% like some people think. Egypt is not just the Muslim Brotherhood,” Aboul Fotouh told al-Shorouk newspaper.

This comes in stark contrast to how the Islamist group is typically viewed in the media, especially the Western media, as the most powerful political alternative to the ruling National Democratic Party (NDP). It is a little ironic how the media thinks the brotherhood is more powerful than some of its members, such as Aboul Fotouh, do.

The conviction that the Muslim Brotherhood is Egypt’s most serious and organised opposition movement is relatively new and is closely linked to their 2005 parliamentary success. The brotherhood managed to win 20% of the seats.

This took place just a few months after former US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice openly embarrassed the regime’s undemocratic practices. "Throughout the Middle East, the fear of free choices can no longer justify the denial of liberty," Rice said. "It is time to abandon the excuses that are made to avoid the hard work of democracy."

But it wasn’t long before the US feared democracy in Egypt and backed away. A foreign policy article published this year commenting on Bush’s push for democracy in Egypt stated, “For a brief moment, the policy seemed to be showing results […] Unfortunately, as the deteriorating situation in Iraq drew away its attention, and when elections produced results that were not to its liking, the Bush administration essentially gave up on democracy in Egypt in 2006.”

Many political analysts believe that the brotherhood was ‘allowed’ to win that many seats. The regime perhaps wanted to send an indirect message to the Bush administration implying that it’s either us or them (in this case, the brotherhood). A fifth of the seats in parliament was the price Egypt was willing to pay in order to pass on the message.

For the same reason, Egypt’s government never ‘allowed’ a similar scenario to happen to liberal secular political parties that showed signs of popularity and could be to America’s liking. Ayman Nour, a popular liberal opposition figure that seemed like a favorable option to the Bush Administration, was thrown into jail for challenging Mubarak and achieving a considerable success as Mubarak’s runner up in the 2005 elections.

The brotherhood might not be really as popular as the media make us believe and is just used by the current regime to delay calls for democracy in Egypt. Studies and research on the popularity of political groups are usually conducted to serve political goals. Therefore, there are no reliable figures on how well-liked political groups really are. But there are signs, other than Aboul Fotouh’s statement, that it is not a foregone conclusion that the brotherhood will sweep up the votes if offered the opportunity to run in a fair election.

Now that the talk about who will succeed President Hosni Mubarak is more heated than ever, opposition groups have been trying to suggest qualified names to run for presidency. The point is to counter the belief of some that Egypt has no competent alternatives for the top seat outside the Mubarak family.

All the names suggested to rival the NDP’s candidate in the 2011 presidential elections did not include a single Islamist, which implies that even if some people are sympathetic toIslamist politicians, they don’t necessarily trust their ability to take control of the top job. Some might argue that the brotherhood decided not to offer a candidate, but most of the suggested name never expressed willingness to compete either.

Also, in a poll carried out by Zogbi International, 58% of Egyptians considered their primary identity to be citizens of their country, while 20% said Arab was their primary identity. Only 17% defined their primary identity as Muslim and 5% fell under the “not sure” category. Out of the six countries surveyed, only Egypt and Lebanon did not tick “Muslim” as their primary identity.

Above all, Egyptians are also more often than not very proud of their pre-Islamic and ancient Egyptian history. In Egypt, the number of shops, products and companies named after ancient Egyptian figures, such as Cleopatra, Sphinx, Nefertiti and Ramsis is striking, including the Egyptian football team – the Pharaohs.

Moreover, many of Egypt’s critical industries that contribute massively to the country’s GDP and employ tens of millions have a liberal bent, and people dependent on them might not feel secure about the future of their livelihoods under Islamic rule.
Such industries include the media and tourism sectors. For example, the Egyptian tourism sector represents 11.3% of Egypt’s GDP and 19.3%  of the total investment made in foreign currencies, according to the Egyptian tourism ministry.
Egypt also has a thriving banking sector that dates back to 1856. Egypt, along with South Africa, has the biggest and most advanced financial markets on the continent. The concept of riba (lending with interest) is traditionally prohibited in Islam, which makes the whole concept of banking and investment undesirable if not forbidden in some Islamic schools.

In addition to its modern economy with a thriving business sector and a large tourism industry, the country has also long been the regional centre of the arts, culture and the media, as well as a melting pot for people from many different cultures and backgrounds throughout its history. With all these factors and a significant religious minority, no one can claim with any certainty that Egyptians will embrace Islamic rule with arms wide open.

Published with the author's permission. ©Osama Diab. All rights reserved.

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A brother and a scholar

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By Osama Diab

Prominent Muslim Brotherhood member Kamal Helbawy talks about his research and ending the misconceptions that tie terrorism to Islam.

21 December 2009

For 58 years, Kamal Helbawy has been a member of the Muslim Brotherhood, making him one of the oldest members of the Islamic movement. He joined the MB when he was 12 - in 1951 - and since then the Brotherhood, Islam and political Islam have been the centre of his life.

Helbawy has established several organisations, associations and research centres with a focus on Islam as a religion and as a political ideology. In the early 1970s, he took part in founding the World Assembly of Muslim Youth (WAMY) in Saudi Arabia and served as its executive director until 1982.

Dr Helbawy was then in charge of Muslim Brotherhood activities in Afghanistan from the late 1980s until 1994. He then moved to the United Kingdom and has been based there ever since. Upon his arrival in London, he established the Muslim Council of Britain (MCB) and the Muslim Association of Britain (MAB), which have helped establish him as one of the leaders of the Islamic community in the UK.

The last official position Helbawy had with the Brotherhood was as their official spokesman to the West, from 1995 to 1997. Since his resignation, Helbawy has focused on his research and proudly describes himself as a researcher.

Building on this, in 2006 he established the Centre for the Study of Terrorism, to separate terrorism and Islam in people's minds. Helbawy, known for his moderation, is keen to denounce terrorism and stop the West from linking it to Islam.

In addition to his research, Helbawy owns a nursing home in the Wembley Park area of North London. He jokes that his nursing home accepts people from all races, religions and genders, so people should stop accusing him and other Islamists of discrimination.

Helbawy explains his efforts to break the mental linkage between terrorism and Islam, the possibility of holding an official position in the Brotherhood again and the MB's illegal status. He also gives his opinion on sensitive topics, such as the MB's stance on minority rights, women rights, secularism, foreign relations and democratic reforms. Edited excerpts:

What is the idea behind the Centre for the Study of Terrorism?

We thought of establishing the centre for many reasons: first, since 2001, the Muslim world and Islam have been constantly accused of being linked in whatever capacity with extremism, violence and terrorism. That was why we started to think that there should be someone in the Muslim world to do research on terrorism from the 'other' perspective. George W Bush divided the world into the West and the 'rest', and I say that this 'rest' might have an opinion on terrorism.

The goal of the centre is to fill the void the West has when it comes to understanding Islam and falsely accusing us of terrorism, and also make it clear that there are other fields of terrorism unrelated to the Muslim world, like in India, Britain and Ireland. We, at the Centre, try to prove that terrorism has no home and no specific culture. Terrorism is simply not confined to a certain land, culture or religion.

Second, the centre also gives consultancy about terrorism. For example, through our research and studies, we clarified some points the West was not previously aware of. First is that the person who commits the crime of terrorism and is a Muslim is doing that for two reasons: not just because they hate the West, are unemployed, or live in a dictatorship. If they are an Islamist, there is also another motive, which is going quickly to paradise (al-shihada). He doesn't just want to die or kill others, but most importantly please God and go to paradise.

The centre also carries out in-depth studies about Islamic movements in response to the misconception the West has about movements like the Muslim Brotherhood. I am always invited to seminars in universities [in the UK] to talk about political Islam. Media people, journalists and photographers still stand outside, point at me and say that I'm the man who is accused of violence.

Your name has been cited in some news reports as one of Mahdi Akef's successors as the supreme guide of the Muslim Brotherhood. Are you interested in such a position?

This conflicts with my principles. I've been saying that as soon as you reach 65 years of age, you shouldn't have executive responsibilities. I always tell the leaders of the Ikhwan (the Brotherhood) that once you reach 65 years of age, you shouldn't do executive work and leave it for younger people. They should go on the street and tell people their story in coffee shops, on public transport and in mosques. They should do things that will have an impact on societ, instead of working from an office. I will never accept such a position. I used to be a member in the Irshad (guidance) office and resigned 10 years ago. I wanted to free myself from the executive responsibility that doesn't give space for thinking and research, which is what I like to do.

Will we see the Brotherhood working lawfully with an official party soon?

Under the current Mubarak regime, there's no way the Muslim Brotherhood would be able to establish a political party, no matter what they do. We applied to establish a party called el-Wasat four times and have been rejected each time. Is there any country in the world that has a committee called the political parties affairs committee (a committee that approves the establishment of new political parties) headed by the secretary-general of the ruling party? How can you be the judge and the opponent at the same time?

Will the Brotherhood be able to score as many seats as they did in the last elections?

The Brotherhood will never be 'allowed' to win as many seats on the parliamentary level or the municipal level. This is why I think the Brotherhood should seek change not the so-called 'reform'. The Brotherhood must study how to change this regime rather than how to fix it. The current regime cannot be reformed. It is irreparable.

The Muslim Brotherhood has been accused by some opposition movements of being passive at times and reluctant to push for change and democratic reform.

According to my understanding, there are two things the Brotherhood should perceive differently. First, the perception that opposition parties are weak in Egypt, even if it's true. Second is that the opposition is not effective in what they do. I think that the Brotherhood should work in every way possible, and preferably in collaboration with other opposition movements, to curtail the current regime. However, there are rules in Islam on how, when and if you should revolt against the ruler. The rules for the promotion of virtue and prevention of vice in Islam say that if trying to end corruption will lead to more harm, then trying to change is considered a sinful act.

Would the Muslim Brotherhood accept operating in a secular framework like the Justice and Development Party (AKP) in Turkey?

We always had ties with the Islamic movement or the political party with the nationalistic and Islamic background in Turkey since its inception, even before the formation of the AKP. We had ties with the Islamic movement since the inception of the national order party formed by Erbakan and then the National Salvation Party. But let me tell you the difference between Egypt and Turkey: if the Muslim Brotherhood accepted what the AKP has accepted, with regards to foreign relations, they [the MB] would've been in power a long time ago and with support from the West. First, the AKP accepted having strategic relations with Israel, which is something the Brotherhood will never do or accept. Second, the AKP allows American military bases in Turkey, which again is something the Brotherhood will never accept, and even if they did accept it, the Egyptian people won't accept that.

Regardless of foreign relations, would the MB ever accept being part of a secular state?

The MB has sacrificed a lot throughout the course of its history, and consequently has achieved huge gains and an increased popularity. Therefore, the concept of secularism will be very difficult for the Brotherhood to accept. But the core of secularism that allows the freedom of all is appreciated and valued by the MB and is something that it wishes for. This is why I say that the MB has its own agenda that it can only apply when it comes to power and when it is chosen by the people, but now the things that should be first on the MB's agenda are freedoms and not the [application] of Shari'a (Islamic) law. If the programme is chosen, then it's the people's choice, the majority's choice.

Democracy also protects minority rights, and is not just about the majority vote. Would the MB protect minority rights? Would they allow Copts, for example, to run for president?

Of course, I personally say, of course. If the people chose a Copt, then what you need to do is to reassess your programme and ask yourself why you were not chosen. I don't have the 'women's complex' either and also think they should have the right to run for president. Minority rights are protected completely and no one can protect the rights of minorities like Islam does. Secularism didn't protect Christians' rights in the West. In fact, secularism in the West tore down Christianity. As for the Muslim Brotherhood and Islam in Muslim countries, it protects the rights of the Christian minority. Christianity is disappearing now in the West.

If the people choose a Copt, it's their choice. If they choose someone from the Brotherhood, it's also their choice. It's their choice even if they choose a woman.

I have said a million times that a woman like [former UK Prime Minister Margaret] Thatcher is a hundred times better than any man.

What do you think of Egypt's constitution and the amendments made to it since 2005?

Do you even call this a constitution? A constitution that had 34 articles amended in just a few days cannot even be described as a constitution.

So the Brotherhood doesn't plan on changing the constitution if they come to power?

Constitutions always change, but it's important that the change is for the better, and doesn't aim to restrict freedoms - any freedoms. It has to aim for the respect of religious beliefs, mankind, freedom of expression, the right to life, and the right to education. There are many rights that Islam protects that modern Western civilisation still [does not].



This article first appeared in the November 2009 issue of Egypt Today. Republished with the kind permission of the author. © Copyright Osama Diab. All rights reserved.

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Beyoncé: saint or sinner?

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By Khaled Diab

As the singer prepares to visit Egypt, Christian and Muslim fundamentalists agree: Beyoncé is the root of all evil.

4 November 2009

Is the 'Booty-shaking believer' a saint or a sinner?

Is the 'Booty-shaking believer' a saint or a sinner?

You can imagine my surprise when I learned that Beyoncé was not just another nauseating platinum-plated R&B diva, but has been lured to perform in Egypt, for the first time ever, as part of the Mubarak regime's cunning plan to corrupt society.

"The government is trying to make people indulge in sin and licentiousness to cover up the other crimes it is committing against them," fumed a member of the Muslim Brotherhood.

Despite being a "booty-shaking believer" and her expressed disappointment that she can't go to church any more because of her fame, Beyoncé is no stranger to religious controversy. In fact, it would seem that Muslim and Christian conservatives, in spite of their conviction that they are worlds apart, actually share a lot of common ground when it comes to female pop stars.

"Beyoncé is NO Christian. She is satanic, serving the Devil!" the website jesus-is-savior.com self-righteously and surreally proclaims.

More moderately, the Yuinon, a movement that seeks, in its own words, "to reach, rescue and redeem youth and young adults", complains that the R&B star is a bad role model for impressionable youth: "Young girls that look up to Beyoncé will think it's acceptable to be in church worshipping teary-eyed on Sunday then frolicking, bootyliciously for a video shoot in some Daisy Dukes the next day."

Personally, I am not too excited about Beyoncé performing in Egypt, but that's entirely on artistic merit – I simply do not like her style of music. If I have any deeper objections, they centre more on how her overpriced, exclusive concert will throw into stark relief the gaping chasm between the have-loads and have-nots in Egypt. In a country where the official minimum wage is still stuck in 1984 – at a paltry 35 Egyptian pounds a month (about £3.90) – and many Egyptians are forced to survive on tip-based and street jobs, I wonder how people will react to the news that tickets to the concert are reportedly fetching as much as $400 a pop.

One thing that stumps me with the Muslim Brotherhood's allegations is that, with Beyoncé's concert taking place at an exclusive Red Sea resort hundreds of miles away from any major Egyptian population centre, I can't help thinking that even if the government was out to "corrupt" the morals of the people, there are easier and cheaper ways to do so.

For example, Egypt is the cradle of one of the world's oldest and most suggestive dances, the belly dance, which has been traced by historians back to Pharaonic times, was transformed into a high art by the Ottomans, was reinvented as an erotic image of the Orient by the west and was reclaimed by Egyptians and Arabs and fused with other modern dances. Its practitioners are reviled and admired, even idolised in a way that reflects the contradictions of society's attitudes to women at ease with their sexuality. The persona of the 'alma, with her strong personality, rebelliousness and native decency, good sense and wisdom, is semi-legendary.

Despite the Brotherhood's better efforts, Egypt remains the capital of the Arab pop music industry and is a base for the region's sexiest and most airbrushed pop stars, such as Ruby – although admittedly, most of them come from Lebanon.

One of these, Haifa Wehbe, managed both to win a best song of 2006 award and to cause outrage among those conservatives who have active imaginations with her video Boos el-Wawa ("Kiss the Boo-boo"), a silly dance number featuring her entertaining a child. To add insult to wawa, her latest film has angered some Egyptian Sufis because it apparently features a scene in which her bare legs distract a group of mystics from their prayers.

Many may rightly wonder why, with all the major challenges facing Egypt – poverty, corruption, authoritarianism, overpopulation and environmental degradation – religious conservatives, and even secular Arab activists, are so obsessed with sexy women.

This tendency has an ancient pedigree. "From the fall of al-Andalus to the debacle of the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, dancers are depicted in Arab lore as the critical distraction of Arab leaders that caused the demise of Arab glory," writes Andrew Hammond in Popular Culture in the Arab World.

But this is mistaking the symptom for the malady. Arab leaders may have traditionally been able to surround themselves with female entertainers and concubines, but it is not the dancers who weakened the leader and, by extension the system, it is the authoritarian system in which the ruling elite lives, in many ways, above the law and cannot easily be held to account by the people.

There is also the fear, in a male-dominated society, of the suppressed potential power of women. An example of this is Tawfiq el-Hakim. Crowned as the father of modern Arabic drama, he was also known as aduw al-mar'a (the enemy of women) for his opposition to female emancipation. For instance, in what could have been a great allegorical play about vanity, individualism, collectivism and the pursuit of power, his Fate of a Cockroach descends into a barely veiled attack on the modern, professional woman who dons the proverbial trousers and oppresses her husband.

But El-Hakim is wrong: strong, independent, empowered women do not make cockroaches of men, rather they make humans of us all.

This column appeared in The Guardian Unlimited’s Comment is Free section on 29 October 2009. Read the related discussion.

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Is Mubarak really a force of stability?

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By Osama Diab

Providing more legitimate access to power should be the way to guarantee security and stability in Egypt.

23 September 2009

In the speech he gave in Cairo in June, US President Barack Obama said, "I do have an unyielding belief that all people yearn for certain things: the ability to speak your mind and have a say in how you are governed; confidence in the rule of law and the equal administration of justice; government that is transparent and doesn't steal from the people; the freedom to live as you choose. Those are not just American ideas, they are human rights, and that is why we will support them everywhere."

Obama linked the application of these ideas with stability and security. Then in August, during Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak's visit to Washington, Obama described Mubarak as a force of stability. As a man of courtesy, Obama may have just been trying to be a good host and show respect. It’s difficult to believe Obama is simply unaware of the Mubarak regime’s horrid human rights record or Egypt's poor ranking in international corruption reports. I hope that Obama is not just turning a blind eye to Mubarak's practices because he relies on him as an important ally in our troubled region — which is probably much nearer the mark.

The praise Mubarak has received from the US president illustrates America's double-standard politics that basically say: an important ally in the region, and a friend of Israel, is a force of stability, regardless of the regime's domestic policy.

Mubarak is a force of instability and unrest. In Arab pop culture, the term korsi (chair) holds a political significance, referring to political rule or authority. In the Middle East, rulers get attached to this chair, and as time passes, the attachment gets stronger. Death, and only death, can put an end to this union, kind of like a Catholic marriage. This has become so much the norm that the term "ex-president" sounds very bizarre to the Arab ear.

Consequently, access to power using legitimate means becomes unattainable, which is why political parties and groups resort to means that ultimately cause political turbulence and social unrest. In recent years, many political movements have challenged Mubarak's power, such as Kifaya, the Egyptian movement for change, and the April 6 Youth Movement. These movements organise protests, sit-ins and strikes that are usually crushed by riot police, leading to even more public dissent. A large number of students and activists have been detained and are being systematically harassed by the Egyptian police.

In the 20th century, Egypt saw many attempts to challenge authority outside the system and the law. The country witnessed the assassination of many political figures. In 1990, Rifaat el-Mahgoub, speaker of the Egyptian parliament, who was also a member of the ruling National Democratic Party, was assassinated in his car in Cairo by an Islamic group. Anwar Sadat, the Nobel Peace Prize winner and Egyptian president, was also killed by Islamic militant groups for signing a peace treaty with Israel. A few hours after his death, Asyut, one of Egypt's major southern cities, fell under the control of Islamic groups for a few days and tens of police officers were killed. For more than a decade after Sadat's death, Egypt suffered from a very strong wave of terrorism that claimed the lives of hundreds of civilians and police officers.

Besides assassinations and terrorism, Egypt saw at least one military coup in 1952, a revolution in 1919, and a nationwide student uprising in 1936 where hundreds of protestors were killed by the police. Recently, civil disobedience has been commonplace, labour strikes are turning into some sort of a national sport, clashes between riot police and students are becoming standard to see on news programmes, and deaths are reported daily during election time.

The more that access to power is denied, the more people will look for alternatives and be willing to challenge power outside the system. When power is inaccessible by legitimate means, the ground is fertile for coups, revolutions, assassinations and non-peaceful methods of power transition. This is something Obama and his advisers seem to have failed to understand when they called Mubarak "a force of stability in the region".

Moreover, trying to convince the public that presidents don't age or get sick like common humans has also been a widely used strategy in the Egyptian regime. In 2007, Ibrahim Eissa, editor of independent daily al-Dostour, was sentenced to prison because he published an article questioning the then-79-year-old Mubarak's health. The court found him guilty of "publishing false information of a nature to disturb public order or security". Due to numerous protests and public dissent, President Mubarak pardoned Eissa after one of the most contentious court cases related to freedom of the press.

After so long in the top seat, one would think Mubark's hunger for power would be sated. He has ruled Egypt for 28 years, not to mention his years as vice-president and a high-ranking military officer. Mubarak can make history by resigning the presidency and supervising free and fair elections to select a successor.

As someone who is known to care for his legacy, gaining credit as the founder of democracy in the Arab world and ending the military's monopoly on power (and not by transferring it to his civilian son) should appeal to him. Mubarak can set an example in the region that democracy is attainable. He could possibly get credit for being the founder of democracy in the Middle East.

Supporting Mubarak's regime might seem to the Obama administration like an easy way to keep the Arab world's most populous, and arguably most influential, country from turning into an Islamic regime, but in the long term, it will achieve the opposite. If the administration wants to help contain extremism and decrease support for groups that threaten the region's stability, such as the Muslim Brotherhood, it needs to work on making power more accessible by legitimate means.

This article was first published by WorldPress.org on 13 September 2009. Republished here with the author's permission. ©Osama Diab. All rights reserved.

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Secularism in a veil

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By Khaled Diab

An outward appearance of Islamism disguises the increasingly secular reality of some Arab and Muslim societies.

April 2009

In a series of recent articles, Brian Whitaker explored the role of Islam in Arab politics, the decline of secularism and what can be done to reinvigorate it. He describes how "the decline of Muslim secularism reflects the rise of Islamism and the more generalised religious revival that has swept across the Middle East since the 1960s".

I agree with the basic outline of this analysis, but would hazard to say that secularism is far from dead. It continues to make gains, albeit disguised for modesty's sake under an Islamic veil or pious beard.

In fact, there has been a trend over the past century which has seen many Muslim societies go from thinly veiling their traditional Islamic character in modern western cultural clothes, to dressing up their internalised modernism and increasingly secular reality in a reassuring and personalised Islamic garb.

The Secular party (later known as al-Wafd or Delegation) Whitaker refers to in his article, which was established in the interwar years to guide the struggle for Egyptian independence, provides an interesting case in point. He observes that today no one "would be foolhardy enough to set up a political party with such a name or platform".

Perhaps many Arab and Muslim secularists, on the back foot, do shy away from an overtly secular label nowadays. But, with the exception of the Muslim Brotherhood, pretty much all the main parties in Egypt – left, right and centrist – are secular in nature.

However, the original Wafd and Egypt's experiment with 'liberal democracy', viewed from nearly a century on, represent a deceptive mirage of modernity and secularism. The Wafd, and most of the other parties, were aristocratic and elitist in nature and had little connection with common people, while the Egyptian parliament was more like a 'salon democracy' because its power was massively curtailed by the British, on the one side, and the king, on the other.

In fact, most of the politicians of the time who enjoyed democratic or popular appeal were exiled by the British to places such as Malta or Ceylon, or were sidelined or removed through palace intrigues. Nevertheless, many Egyptians, inspired by the Europhile thinkers of the so-called Egyptian renaissance, continued to believe in the liberating possibilities of democracy and secularism. The failure of this toothless democratic experiment to empower the Egyptian people planted the seedsofa widespread cynicism: today, these abstractions are seen as little more than hollow words bandied about by imperial powers or self-serving political elites.

Despite these inauspicious beginnings, modern secularism was to see its star soar in the 1950s and 1960s before it began to fizzle out in the late 1970s. Egypt's revolutionary president Gamal Abdel Nasser did more than any other person both to give Arab secularism mass appeal and sow the seeds of its demise. His personal charisma, progressive ideas, unwavering belief in modernity and desire for social justice propelled socialism and secularism out of the wings of Egyptian and Arab politics and straight on to centre stage.

However, his and his successors' failure to hand over power to the people, their corruption, their failure to deliver on their promises and their ruthless persecution of the secular opposition empowered the Islamists and wonthem many converts, especially following the crushing defeat of 1967. In addition, despite being aggressively secular, the post-revolutionary Egyptian regime preferred to ignore or repress, rather than challenge, the ideas of the Islamic reactionary rearguard, which gave Islamists a powerful weapon.

Although the Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamist groups have, since the late 1970s, Islamised the political landscape, they have also been secularised by the die-hard socialists and liberals who refused to roll over. In addition, the secular ideas of the past few decades have put down deep roots in society that the Islamists are incapable of reversing.

The more progressive wing of the Brotherhood is gradually evolving into something akin to the Christian Democrat tradition in Europe: conservative and culturally Islamic, but increasingly pluralistic. A small sign of the changing times is that the Brotherhood not only takes the presence of women in the public arena more or less for granted, something it was once adamantly opposed to, it even fields some female candidates in parliamentary elections.

There are growing signs that the appeal of Islamism is on the wane, as Egyptians realise that the Muslim Brotherhood, beyond declaring that the Quran is their "constitution" and "Islam is the solution", have no real political programme of their own. In addition, the ugly reality of the modern theocracies and their failure to revive the 'golden age' of Islam are shattering many people's illusions about political Islam.

The struggle between 'secularism' and 'Islamism', which is almost as old as Islam itself, has been a long and bitter one, and has revolved around challenging the omnipotent temporal power of the caliph, sultan, king or president from the clashing vantage point of rationality and faith.

This conflict's modern vestige was personifed memorably by the Egyptian Nobel laureate Naguib Mahfouz in his Cairo trilogy as the standoff between two radical brothers, Ahmed (the communist) and Abdel-Moneim (the Muslim Brother), both of whom wind up in jail for opposing the tyranny of the status quo.

In my next piece, I will consider ways of advancing progressive secularism and overcoming the powerful "God veto" of religious conservatives.

This column appeared in The Guardian Unlimited’s Comment is Free section on 16 April 2009. Read the related discussion.

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