islamism

Europe’s hidden terror menace

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By Khaled Diab

The fifth anniversary of the 7 July attacks has refocused attention on Islamist terrorism, but the neo-Nazi threat goes largely unnoticed.

13 July 2010

On the fifth anniversary of the 7 July terror attacks in London, the issue of Islamist terrorism and Islamic extremism is back in the media spotlight. While the threat posed by a small number of violent Islamist extremists is very real and the danger of Islamic fundamentalism should not be downplayed or understated, the seriousness of the situation is often exaggerated into a menace of Hitlerian proportions.

In contrast, Hitler's ideological descendants, who have become increasingly emboldened in recent years, constitute a growing, if still minor, threat that largely goes unnoticed and under-reported.

An example of this menace is the Belgian neo-Nazi group Bloed, Bodem, Eer en Trouw (Blood, Soil, Honour and Loyalty), whose trial is to start soon. The group, whose members were arrested in 2006, stands accused of planning terror attacks targeting the National Bank and other institutions, plotting the assassination of a number of prominent politicians and conspiring to destabilise the Belgian state. BBET had even apparently managed to infiltrate the Belgian military and had amassed a large cache of guns and explosives.

More worryingly, perhaps, at least in terms of social cohesion, the neo-Nazi group had intended to sow the seeds of discord by carrying out a "false flag" operation to murder the popular Flemish far-right politician Filip Dewinter in the hope that the blame would be pinned on Islamists, stoking further hatred of the country's embattled and marginalised Muslim minority. During the expected outrage that would ensue, they would then seize the opportunity to assassinate the radical Lebanese-Belgian politician and activist Dyab Abou Jahjah.

Had members of an Islamist cell been planning similar outrages, news of their forthcoming trial would have grabbed headlines across Europe and enough columns to support the Karnak temple complex would have been written on the subject. As it stands, the group has elicited little to no attention outside Belgium.

Not that I feel we should deal with neo-Nazi extremism and its violent manifestations with the same level of sensationalism and mass hysteria we reserve for extremist Islam – we need to be vigilant, not vigilante about it. More attention needs to be paid to the fact that it is a growing menace. We need to build greater awareness and better understanding of the socioeconomic and cultural factors feeding this phenomenon, especially since mainstream society is, in certain ways, complicit in the emergence of this troubling current.

Some, dare I say many, will consider my last assertion as an overreaction and will dismiss BBET and other violent far-right groups as little more than the outer reaches of the 'lunatic fringe'. And at some level, this is true and can equally be applied to violent Islamist groups. But just because they're mad and bad, that does not exclude the possibility that they are the symptoms of a deeper malaise – there is some warped logic to their madness.

Just like their Islamist counterparts, many people who are drawn to neo-Nazi and other far-right ideologies feel disempowered and marginalised, and believe that the way to overcome this is to turn back the clock to an idyllic "pure" past – based on religion, in the case of Islamists, and based on race and, to a lesser extent, religion for neo-Nazis.

And, as the economic situation worsens – especially for those on the lower rungs of the social ladder, but also for the middle classes who are increasingly feeling the bite of job losses, as unemployment figures rise and government spending falls – this sense of exclusion and frustration will grow.

And minorities will continue to fill the role of convenient scapegoat, as has long been the case with far-right parties, many of which have gained a sheen of respectability in recent years. In fact, time and again, violent neo-Nazi groups and individuals have been linked to these parties. For example, there are reports that the BBET had ties to the Flemish nationalist Vlaams Belang party, as had a teenager who went on a racially motivated murder spree in Antwerp.However, this does not exonerate the rest of society. The increasingly mainstream vilification and demonisation of Europe's Muslim minority and Islam in general – based on fear, insecurity, ignorance and political expediency, as well as the worry that extremist groups will succeed in their bid to "Islamise" Europe – since the 11 September terror attacks in the US has created fertile ground for the far-right to lay down deeper roots. Some governments have been complicit in this for foreign policy purposes, while some politicians, such as Geert Wilders in the Netherlands, have skillfully manipulated the situation to enter the corridors of power.

In a bid to downplay the threat, some will play a macabre numbers game and claim that Islamic terrorism in Europe claims far more lives than far-right violence. Although it is true that there have been no spectacular, large-scale attacks, neo-Nazis are responsible for a regular and growing stream of violence against Muslims, Jews, blacks and other minorities across Europe.

For example, between 2000 and 2005, racial violence spiked dramatically in many European countries. Denmark alone reported an increase of 70% in reported racial violence and crime.

Of course, neo-Nazis have yet to pull off any attack as spectacular as those in Madrid or London. But that doesn't mean they don't want to or don't plan to, as the case of the BBET amply demonstrates. In May 2010, a British neo-Nazi father and son – who, in an worrying echo of a bygone era, had set up a group to overthrow the government because they believed it had been taken over by Jews – planned to poison Jewish, Muslim and black people with ricin.

In addition, neo-nazism seems to be going increasingly global, with groups in different European countries and the US building increasingly strong alliances. Examples of this include Combat 18 and Blood and Honour (of which BBET is a splinter group).  Could such transnational groupings become the kernel of a loose-knit global neo-Nazi network along the lines of al-Qaeda? Only time can tell, but I certainly hope not.

The most troubling threat posed by neo-nazism, and the far right in general, as opposed to Islamism, is that it is an indigenous ideology which once held powerful sway in Europe, even in countries that were not run by Nazi regimes. If we are not careful and do not learn the lessons of history, there is the future possibility that Nazi and fascist totalitarianism may rear its ugly face again.

This column appeared in The Guardian Unlimited’s Comment is Free section on 11 July 2010. Read the related discussion.

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By the book

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By Khaled Diab

Following the lead of Islamists, Egyptian Christians are trying to ban an award-winning novel because it 'insults' Christianity.

18 May 2010

I am no fan of fanaticism and I wish fundamentalists would just have some fun, or at the very least learn to live and let live. But, in Egypt, they have gone from being a nuisance to becoming a real threat, not only to freedom of speech and expression but also to the country's very cultural heritage.

This was demonstrated in recent weeks when a group calling itself (without a hint of irony) Lawyers Without Shackles tried to shackle the reading choices of Egyptians by calling for a ban of a newly released version of the classic One thousand and one nights saga, with its ensemble of popular and ageless characters, including Aladdin, Ali Baba and Sindbad. Their reason? The centuries-old collection is "obscene" and could lead people to "vice and sin".

Luckily, Egyptian intellectuals have rallied to defend the classic tales, warning against the increasing "Bedouinisation" of Egyptian culture. This is, perhaps, the most ridiculous example of the recent trend towards, what I call, the retroactive condemnation of published works.

Not to be left out of the banning fad, Christians have also joined the fray. A group of Copts in Egypt and abroad have filed a complaint with the public prosecutor against the controversial novel Azazeel (Beelzebub) by Youssef Ziedan, which won the 2009 International Prize for Arabic Fiction, an award backed by the Booker Prize Foundation. As insulting any of the 'heavenly faiths' is illegal in Egypt, Ziedan could face up to five years behind bars.

"He insulted priests and bishops and said many things with no proof or evidence from books or history," said Mamdouh Ramzi, a Coptic lawyer involved in the action, adding that Ziedan was "not a Christian man, what does he know about the Church?".

In his own defence, Ziedan told the Guardian: "Many Orthodox bishops and monks welcomed the novel, and some of them wrote positively of Azazeel, whether in Egypt, Syria or Lebanon." He has previously described his novel as "not against Christianity but against violence, especially violence in the name of the sacred".

But even if it were insulting to the Christian clergy, my natural reaction is: "So what?" Not only do we all have differing definitions of what constitutes an insult, everyone is free to express insulting views, if they so wish, and if you don't like it, then don't read it and, by all means, encourage others not to.

As to Ramzi's second assertion, is he seriously suggesting that, in order to write about a faith, you need to belong to it? This is nonsense on so many levels, not least because it stifles freedom of inquiry and speech, and also because most religions do not require their followers to be knowledgeable of the history and philosophy of their faith. Besides, Ziedan is a renowned professor of philosophy and the director of the manuscript centre at the Bibliotheca Alexandrina.

So, what in Ziedan's award-winning novel has specifically irked the Coptic establishment?

The events of Azazeel take place around the turbulent and troubled period of the Nestorian schism in the Orthodox church, and the book highlights, through the eyes of a fictional Egyptian monk, not only the tensions between different Christian factions, but also between the new official faith of the Roman empire and the "pagan" religions that preceded it.

The Coptic church has denounced the novel as offensive for its violent portrait of one of the church's founding fathers, St Cyril, the so-called 'Pillar of Faith'. The trouble for the Coptic church is that, its reverence for Cyril of Alexandria notwithstanding, the historical evidence does strongly suggest that he was violent.

Cyril was involved in the expulsion from Alexandria of Jews and of newly declared 'heretical' Christian movements, such as the Novatians, not to mention the persecution of adherents of the old-world polytheistic faiths, and the murder of the Alexandrian philosopher and first notable female mathematician, Hypatia, one of my favourite Ancient Geeks.

With all this fuss about Ziedan's novel, I wondered what Ramzi and the other Copts involved in this legal action would make of Alejandro Amenábar's wonderfully evocative Agora – in which Rachel Weisz portrays Hypatia beautifully – and whether they'll also be calling for its banning.

Agora, which I had the pleasure of seeing last weekend, covers the same historical period as Azazeel and dramatises the clash of ideals and ideas between Cyril and Hypatia, as well as the power struggle between by the Patriarch of Alexandria and the city's Roman prefect.

Although Amenábar perhaps over-romanticises the rationality and tolerance of the Greek tradition and exaggerates Hypatia's achievements, we saw clearly the parallels he was drawing between that ancient clash between rationality and dogma, as well as tolerance and intolerance, and our own times. More specifically, the Egypt he portrays is eerily familiar – what with its huge socio-economic inequalities, an elite far removed from the populace, foreign meddling from a distant great power that often makes matters worse, and religious puritans and fundamentalists taking care of the neglected and hungry populace in return for their blind obedience.

Both Azazeel and Agora are timely works of art because, by contrasting past and present tragedies, they may help us understand our times better and realise the possible consequences of our actions. Egyptian Copts are justifiably nervous about their worsening status on the back of the rising wave of Islamic fundamentalism but dialogue, not stifling freedom of expression, is the answer.

As Brian Whitaker has observed, Egyptian law and how it is interpreted is giving fanatics increasingly free rein. In order to avoid the abuse of Egyptian law by the government and religious reactionaries to shutdown debate and silence dissent, Egyptians need to band together to change Egypt's antiquated laws and protect freedom of expression for all.

This article appeared in the Guardian newspaper's Comment is Free section on 12 May 2010. Read the full discussion here.

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Egypt’s uneasy political truce

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By Osama Diab

Egypt's secularists and Islamists agree on one thing: Mubarak must go. But when he does, how long will they stand united?

3 April 2010

The current political debate in Egypt can be summed up in one sentence: parties and activists of all political colours are campaigning to end almost 30 years of President Hosni Mubarak's rule and stop his son, Gamal, from inheriting power and returning Egypt to the dynastic era. 

For the time being, the opposition is united by anti-Mubarakism, despite comprising elements that have traditionally been fierce rivals, such as Islamists, liberals and Nasserists. Umbrella movements like Kifaya and the 6 April Youth Movement are a good example of broad-based groups which draw Egyptians from different political, religious and social backgrounds. 

In fact, the unity of the opposition is not a sign of love or matching ideologies but merely reflects the realisation that breaking Mubarak's stranglehold on power requires the kind of broad-based popular alliance last seen during Egypt's resistance to foreign occupation. The different parties also understand that the emergence of democracy in Egypt is their only realistic chance of reaching power through legitimate means and by way of a smooth transition. 

This means that the current alliance's shelf-life is linked to the emergence of democracy. Once that is achieved, the gloves will come off and the traditional rivalries will float, once again, to the surface. 

This poses an important question: when the time comes, what kind of post-Mubarak political scene will emerge? 

Egypt's increasing religiosity has coincided with a globalised society in which modern concepts of human rights are being adopted by more and more Egyptians. This discrepancy will make it harder for secularists and Islamists to find common ground. 

The negative view of secularism in the mind of the majority of Egyptians would be central to the future debate. In our religious society, people confuse secularism with Ataturk-style anti-religiosity and sometimes with atheism. Ironically, many practicing Muslims believe in the separation of religion and state without calling it secularism or even recognising that this makes them secular.

This misguided understanding of secularism in Egypt is a barrier to democracy. This is because, although most Egyptians profess to being religious, many fear the intolerance and potential totalitarianism of Islamic rule if Islamists, including the ostensibly "moderate" Muslim Brotherhood, gain power. For that reason, they prefer authoritarian secularism to a democratically elected Islamic government which they fear would transform Egypt into a radical theocracy. 

Ismail Sherif, who is studying to become a filmmaker, thinks some people are resistant to change out of the fear that it might lead to unfavourable consequences. "Even though most people in the film industry would prefer a secular authoritarian regime to an elected Islamic government, we have to accept that risk in order for democracy to happen," he says.

 How can we overcome all this fear and resistance to change? In order for change in Egypt to be broadly supported, it should not be radical. While it is still fighting dictatorship and a state of emergency, the opposition in Egypt should keep one eye on the future and agree the framework they all want to work under. 

The huge popular support for Mohamed Elbaradei, former chief of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and Nobel peace prize winner, gives hope that change in Egypt doesn't have to be led by Islamists with questionable democratic credentials. In fact, it reveals that, despite the government's better efforts in recent decades to crush viable secular alternatives and present the Muslim Brotherhood and Islamists as the only alternative to frighten secularists and the international community, secularism is far from dead in Egypt.

The Mubarak regime has a long history of stifling the emergence of a viable and popular secular opposition. Prior to ElBaradei, Ayman Nour, despite all the hurdles placed in his path, gave Mubarak a respectable run for his money during the 2005 presidential elections. Afterwards, he was thrown into jail on trumped-up charges. In addition to allaying the fear of Egyptians that the only alternative to Mubarak is an Islamist theocracy, secular Egyptians need to correct the misconceptions ordinary Egyptians have about secularism.

They need to explain that ilmaniya (Arabic for secularism) is different from antipathy to religion. For instance, Barack Obama is a proud Christian, yet he is also the president of a multifaith secular country.

Egyptian secularists also need to remind people that Egyptians were never as united as they were when they fought occupation and a monarchy under the slogan "Religion is for God, and the nation is for everyone". Moreover, in order for Egypt's opposition to gain support and win ground internally and internationally, it has to be based on universal human rights and not discriminate on the basis of religion, gender, etc. An Islamic regime won't provide this, but secularism based on e equality for all will.

This column appeared in The Guardian Unlimited’s Comment is Free section on 29 March 2010. Read the related discussion.

Published here with the author's permission. ©Osama Diab. All rights reserved.

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Should America fear a democratic Egypt?

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Osama Diab

The depiction of Egypt as a country of religious fanatics who await a breeze of freedom to turn Egypt into a radical regime is far from accurate.

14 January 2010

A senior Muslim Brotherhood leader Abdel Moniem Aboul Fotouh, who is known for his moderation, recently said that the party is not as popular as people think.

“If there was a real partisan life in Egypt and the wheel of democracy started turning and election were held without fraud, the brotherhood won’t come to power and won’t get more than 25% of the seats and not 90% like some people think. Egypt is not just the Muslim Brotherhood,” Aboul Fotouh told al-Shorouk newspaper.

This comes in stark contrast to how the Islamist group is typically viewed in the media, especially the Western media, as the most powerful political alternative to the ruling National Democratic Party (NDP). It is a little ironic how the media thinks the brotherhood is more powerful than some of its members, such as Aboul Fotouh, do.

The conviction that the Muslim Brotherhood is Egypt’s most serious and organised opposition movement is relatively new and is closely linked to their 2005 parliamentary success. The brotherhood managed to win 20% of the seats.

This took place just a few months after former US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice openly embarrassed the regime’s undemocratic practices. "Throughout the Middle East, the fear of free choices can no longer justify the denial of liberty," Rice said. "It is time to abandon the excuses that are made to avoid the hard work of democracy."

But it wasn’t long before the US feared democracy in Egypt and backed away. A foreign policy article published this year commenting on Bush’s push for democracy in Egypt stated, “For a brief moment, the policy seemed to be showing results […] Unfortunately, as the deteriorating situation in Iraq drew away its attention, and when elections produced results that were not to its liking, the Bush administration essentially gave up on democracy in Egypt in 2006.”

Many political analysts believe that the brotherhood was ‘allowed’ to win that many seats. The regime perhaps wanted to send an indirect message to the Bush administration implying that it’s either us or them (in this case, the brotherhood). A fifth of the seats in parliament was the price Egypt was willing to pay in order to pass on the message.

For the same reason, Egypt’s government never ‘allowed’ a similar scenario to happen to liberal secular political parties that showed signs of popularity and could be to America’s liking. Ayman Nour, a popular liberal opposition figure that seemed like a favorable option to the Bush Administration, was thrown into jail for challenging Mubarak and achieving a considerable success as Mubarak’s runner up in the 2005 elections.

The brotherhood might not be really as popular as the media make us believe and is just used by the current regime to delay calls for democracy in Egypt. Studies and research on the popularity of political groups are usually conducted to serve political goals. Therefore, there are no reliable figures on how well-liked political groups really are. But there are signs, other than Aboul Fotouh’s statement, that it is not a foregone conclusion that the brotherhood will sweep up the votes if offered the opportunity to run in a fair election.

Now that the talk about who will succeed President Hosni Mubarak is more heated than ever, opposition groups have been trying to suggest qualified names to run for presidency. The point is to counter the belief of some that Egypt has no competent alternatives for the top seat outside the Mubarak family.

All the names suggested to rival the NDP’s candidate in the 2011 presidential elections did not include a single Islamist, which implies that even if some people are sympathetic toIslamist politicians, they don’t necessarily trust their ability to take control of the top job. Some might argue that the brotherhood decided not to offer a candidate, but most of the suggested name never expressed willingness to compete either.

Also, in a poll carried out by Zogbi International, 58% of Egyptians considered their primary identity to be citizens of their country, while 20% said Arab was their primary identity. Only 17% defined their primary identity as Muslim and 5% fell under the “not sure” category. Out of the six countries surveyed, only Egypt and Lebanon did not tick “Muslim” as their primary identity.

Above all, Egyptians are also more often than not very proud of their pre-Islamic and ancient Egyptian history. In Egypt, the number of shops, products and companies named after ancient Egyptian figures, such as Cleopatra, Sphinx, Nefertiti and Ramsis is striking, including the Egyptian football team – the Pharaohs.

Moreover, many of Egypt’s critical industries that contribute massively to the country’s GDP and employ tens of millions have a liberal bent, and people dependent on them might not feel secure about the future of their livelihoods under Islamic rule.
Such industries include the media and tourism sectors. For example, the Egyptian tourism sector represents 11.3% of Egypt’s GDP and 19.3%  of the total investment made in foreign currencies, according to the Egyptian tourism ministry.
Egypt also has a thriving banking sector that dates back to 1856. Egypt, along with South Africa, has the biggest and most advanced financial markets on the continent. The concept of riba (lending with interest) is traditionally prohibited in Islam, which makes the whole concept of banking and investment undesirable if not forbidden in some Islamic schools.

In addition to its modern economy with a thriving business sector and a large tourism industry, the country has also long been the regional centre of the arts, culture and the media, as well as a melting pot for people from many different cultures and backgrounds throughout its history. With all these factors and a significant religious minority, no one can claim with any certainty that Egyptians will embrace Islamic rule with arms wide open.

Published with the author's permission. ©Osama Diab. All rights reserved.

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A brother and a scholar

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By Osama Diab

Prominent Muslim Brotherhood member Kamal Helbawy talks about his research and ending the misconceptions that tie terrorism to Islam.

21 December 2009

For 58 years, Kamal Helbawy has been a member of the Muslim Brotherhood, making him one of the oldest members of the Islamic movement. He joined the MB when he was 12 - in 1951 - and since then the Brotherhood, Islam and political Islam have been the centre of his life.

Helbawy has established several organisations, associations and research centres with a focus on Islam as a religion and as a political ideology. In the early 1970s, he took part in founding the World Assembly of Muslim Youth (WAMY) in Saudi Arabia and served as its executive director until 1982.

Dr Helbawy was then in charge of Muslim Brotherhood activities in Afghanistan from the late 1980s until 1994. He then moved to the United Kingdom and has been based there ever since. Upon his arrival in London, he established the Muslim Council of Britain (MCB) and the Muslim Association of Britain (MAB), which have helped establish him as one of the leaders of the Islamic community in the UK.

The last official position Helbawy had with the Brotherhood was as their official spokesman to the West, from 1995 to 1997. Since his resignation, Helbawy has focused on his research and proudly describes himself as a researcher.

Building on this, in 2006 he established the Centre for the Study of Terrorism, to separate terrorism and Islam in people's minds. Helbawy, known for his moderation, is keen to denounce terrorism and stop the West from linking it to Islam.

In addition to his research, Helbawy owns a nursing home in the Wembley Park area of North London. He jokes that his nursing home accepts people from all races, religions and genders, so people should stop accusing him and other Islamists of discrimination.

Helbawy explains his efforts to break the mental linkage between terrorism and Islam, the possibility of holding an official position in the Brotherhood again and the MB's illegal status. He also gives his opinion on sensitive topics, such as the MB's stance on minority rights, women rights, secularism, foreign relations and democratic reforms. Edited excerpts:

What is the idea behind the Centre for the Study of Terrorism?

We thought of establishing the centre for many reasons: first, since 2001, the Muslim world and Islam have been constantly accused of being linked in whatever capacity with extremism, violence and terrorism. That was why we started to think that there should be someone in the Muslim world to do research on terrorism from the 'other' perspective. George W Bush divided the world into the West and the 'rest', and I say that this 'rest' might have an opinion on terrorism.

The goal of the centre is to fill the void the West has when it comes to understanding Islam and falsely accusing us of terrorism, and also make it clear that there are other fields of terrorism unrelated to the Muslim world, like in India, Britain and Ireland. We, at the Centre, try to prove that terrorism has no home and no specific culture. Terrorism is simply not confined to a certain land, culture or religion.

Second, the centre also gives consultancy about terrorism. For example, through our research and studies, we clarified some points the West was not previously aware of. First is that the person who commits the crime of terrorism and is a Muslim is doing that for two reasons: not just because they hate the West, are unemployed, or live in a dictatorship. If they are an Islamist, there is also another motive, which is going quickly to paradise (al-shihada). He doesn't just want to die or kill others, but most importantly please God and go to paradise.

The centre also carries out in-depth studies about Islamic movements in response to the misconception the West has about movements like the Muslim Brotherhood. I am always invited to seminars in universities [in the UK] to talk about political Islam. Media people, journalists and photographers still stand outside, point at me and say that I'm the man who is accused of violence.

Your name has been cited in some news reports as one of Mahdi Akef's successors as the supreme guide of the Muslim Brotherhood. Are you interested in such a position?

This conflicts with my principles. I've been saying that as soon as you reach 65 years of age, you shouldn't have executive responsibilities. I always tell the leaders of the Ikhwan (the Brotherhood) that once you reach 65 years of age, you shouldn't do executive work and leave it for younger people. They should go on the street and tell people their story in coffee shops, on public transport and in mosques. They should do things that will have an impact on societ, instead of working from an office. I will never accept such a position. I used to be a member in the Irshad (guidance) office and resigned 10 years ago. I wanted to free myself from the executive responsibility that doesn't give space for thinking and research, which is what I like to do.

Will we see the Brotherhood working lawfully with an official party soon?

Under the current Mubarak regime, there's no way the Muslim Brotherhood would be able to establish a political party, no matter what they do. We applied to establish a party called el-Wasat four times and have been rejected each time. Is there any country in the world that has a committee called the political parties affairs committee (a committee that approves the establishment of new political parties) headed by the secretary-general of the ruling party? How can you be the judge and the opponent at the same time?

Will the Brotherhood be able to score as many seats as they did in the last elections?

The Brotherhood will never be 'allowed' to win as many seats on the parliamentary level or the municipal level. This is why I think the Brotherhood should seek change not the so-called 'reform'. The Brotherhood must study how to change this regime rather than how to fix it. The current regime cannot be reformed. It is irreparable.

The Muslim Brotherhood has been accused by some opposition movements of being passive at times and reluctant to push for change and democratic reform.

According to my understanding, there are two things the Brotherhood should perceive differently. First, the perception that opposition parties are weak in Egypt, even if it's true. Second is that the opposition is not effective in what they do. I think that the Brotherhood should work in every way possible, and preferably in collaboration with other opposition movements, to curtail the current regime. However, there are rules in Islam on how, when and if you should revolt against the ruler. The rules for the promotion of virtue and prevention of vice in Islam say that if trying to end corruption will lead to more harm, then trying to change is considered a sinful act.

Would the Muslim Brotherhood accept operating in a secular framework like the Justice and Development Party (AKP) in Turkey?

We always had ties with the Islamic movement or the political party with the nationalistic and Islamic background in Turkey since its inception, even before the formation of the AKP. We had ties with the Islamic movement since the inception of the national order party formed by Erbakan and then the National Salvation Party. But let me tell you the difference between Egypt and Turkey: if the Muslim Brotherhood accepted what the AKP has accepted, with regards to foreign relations, they [the MB] would've been in power a long time ago and with support from the West. First, the AKP accepted having strategic relations with Israel, which is something the Brotherhood will never do or accept. Second, the AKP allows American military bases in Turkey, which again is something the Brotherhood will never accept, and even if they did accept it, the Egyptian people won't accept that.

Regardless of foreign relations, would the MB ever accept being part of a secular state?

The MB has sacrificed a lot throughout the course of its history, and consequently has achieved huge gains and an increased popularity. Therefore, the concept of secularism will be very difficult for the Brotherhood to accept. But the core of secularism that allows the freedom of all is appreciated and valued by the MB and is something that it wishes for. This is why I say that the MB has its own agenda that it can only apply when it comes to power and when it is chosen by the people, but now the things that should be first on the MB's agenda are freedoms and not the [application] of Shari'a (Islamic) law. If the programme is chosen, then it's the people's choice, the majority's choice.

Democracy also protects minority rights, and is not just about the majority vote. Would the MB protect minority rights? Would they allow Copts, for example, to run for president?

Of course, I personally say, of course. If the people chose a Copt, then what you need to do is to reassess your programme and ask yourself why you were not chosen. I don't have the 'women's complex' either and also think they should have the right to run for president. Minority rights are protected completely and no one can protect the rights of minorities like Islam does. Secularism didn't protect Christians' rights in the West. In fact, secularism in the West tore down Christianity. As for the Muslim Brotherhood and Islam in Muslim countries, it protects the rights of the Christian minority. Christianity is disappearing now in the West.

If the people choose a Copt, it's their choice. If they choose someone from the Brotherhood, it's also their choice. It's their choice even if they choose a woman.

I have said a million times that a woman like [former UK Prime Minister Margaret] Thatcher is a hundred times better than any man.

What do you think of Egypt's constitution and the amendments made to it since 2005?

Do you even call this a constitution? A constitution that had 34 articles amended in just a few days cannot even be described as a constitution.

So the Brotherhood doesn't plan on changing the constitution if they come to power?

Constitutions always change, but it's important that the change is for the better, and doesn't aim to restrict freedoms - any freedoms. It has to aim for the respect of religious beliefs, mankind, freedom of expression, the right to life, and the right to education. There are many rights that Islam protects that modern Western civilisation still [does not].



This article first appeared in the November 2009 issue of Egypt Today. Republished with the kind permission of the author. © Copyright Osama Diab. All rights reserved.

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Is Mubarak really a force of stability?

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By Osama Diab

Providing more legitimate access to power should be the way to guarantee security and stability in Egypt.

23 September 2009

In the speech he gave in Cairo in June, US President Barack Obama said, "I do have an unyielding belief that all people yearn for certain things: the ability to speak your mind and have a say in how you are governed; confidence in the rule of law and the equal administration of justice; government that is transparent and doesn't steal from the people; the freedom to live as you choose. Those are not just American ideas, they are human rights, and that is why we will support them everywhere."

Obama linked the application of these ideas with stability and security. Then in August, during Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak's visit to Washington, Obama described Mubarak as a force of stability. As a man of courtesy, Obama may have just been trying to be a good host and show respect. It’s difficult to believe Obama is simply unaware of the Mubarak regime’s horrid human rights record or Egypt's poor ranking in international corruption reports. I hope that Obama is not just turning a blind eye to Mubarak's practices because he relies on him as an important ally in our troubled region — which is probably much nearer the mark.

The praise Mubarak has received from the US president illustrates America's double-standard politics that basically say: an important ally in the region, and a friend of Israel, is a force of stability, regardless of the regime's domestic policy.

Mubarak is a force of instability and unrest. In Arab pop culture, the term korsi (chair) holds a political significance, referring to political rule or authority. In the Middle East, rulers get attached to this chair, and as time passes, the attachment gets stronger. Death, and only death, can put an end to this union, kind of like a Catholic marriage. This has become so much the norm that the term "ex-president" sounds very bizarre to the Arab ear.

Consequently, access to power using legitimate means becomes unattainable, which is why political parties and groups resort to means that ultimately cause political turbulence and social unrest. In recent years, many political movements have challenged Mubarak's power, such as Kifaya, the Egyptian movement for change, and the April 6 Youth Movement. These movements organise protests, sit-ins and strikes that are usually crushed by riot police, leading to even more public dissent. A large number of students and activists have been detained and are being systematically harassed by the Egyptian police.

In the 20th century, Egypt saw many attempts to challenge authority outside the system and the law. The country witnessed the assassination of many political figures. In 1990, Rifaat el-Mahgoub, speaker of the Egyptian parliament, who was also a member of the ruling National Democratic Party, was assassinated in his car in Cairo by an Islamic group. Anwar Sadat, the Nobel Peace Prize winner and Egyptian president, was also killed by Islamic militant groups for signing a peace treaty with Israel. A few hours after his death, Asyut, one of Egypt's major southern cities, fell under the control of Islamic groups for a few days and tens of police officers were killed. For more than a decade after Sadat's death, Egypt suffered from a very strong wave of terrorism that claimed the lives of hundreds of civilians and police officers.

Besides assassinations and terrorism, Egypt saw at least one military coup in 1952, a revolution in 1919, and a nationwide student uprising in 1936 where hundreds of protestors were killed by the police. Recently, civil disobedience has been commonplace, labour strikes are turning into some sort of a national sport, clashes between riot police and students are becoming standard to see on news programmes, and deaths are reported daily during election time.

The more that access to power is denied, the more people will look for alternatives and be willing to challenge power outside the system. When power is inaccessible by legitimate means, the ground is fertile for coups, revolutions, assassinations and non-peaceful methods of power transition. This is something Obama and his advisers seem to have failed to understand when they called Mubarak "a force of stability in the region".

Moreover, trying to convince the public that presidents don't age or get sick like common humans has also been a widely used strategy in the Egyptian regime. In 2007, Ibrahim Eissa, editor of independent daily al-Dostour, was sentenced to prison because he published an article questioning the then-79-year-old Mubarak's health. The court found him guilty of "publishing false information of a nature to disturb public order or security". Due to numerous protests and public dissent, President Mubarak pardoned Eissa after one of the most contentious court cases related to freedom of the press.

After so long in the top seat, one would think Mubark's hunger for power would be sated. He has ruled Egypt for 28 years, not to mention his years as vice-president and a high-ranking military officer. Mubarak can make history by resigning the presidency and supervising free and fair elections to select a successor.

As someone who is known to care for his legacy, gaining credit as the founder of democracy in the Arab world and ending the military's monopoly on power (and not by transferring it to his civilian son) should appeal to him. Mubarak can set an example in the region that democracy is attainable. He could possibly get credit for being the founder of democracy in the Middle East.

Supporting Mubarak's regime might seem to the Obama administration like an easy way to keep the Arab world's most populous, and arguably most influential, country from turning into an Islamic regime, but in the long term, it will achieve the opposite. If the administration wants to help contain extremism and decrease support for groups that threaten the region's stability, such as the Muslim Brotherhood, it needs to work on making power more accessible by legitimate means.

This article was first published by WorldPress.org on 13 September 2009. Republished here with the author's permission. ©Osama Diab. All rights reserved.

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The audacity to dream

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By Khaled Diab

If we suspend scepticism and take up Barack Obama’s invitation to dream of change, what Middle East can the audacity of hope help to forge?

November 2008

Since Barack Obama’s victory, I have been somewhat at odds with myself. The realist and sceptic tells me that, despite the euphoria, it may well be back to business more or less as usual once the president elect actually takes office.

 Still, the dreamer and romantic urges me to savour the symbolism of Obama’s victory, with the way it has energised US voters and inspired people around the world, and allow myself the luxury of dreaming that change really can happen. This leads me to wonder about my native Middle East, one of the world’s most troubled regions, and what kind of change there could I and would I believe in.

 The most immediate dream I have – and one that is probably shared by most of the region – is to dispel the spectre of conflict which has destroyed Iraq and locked Israelis and Palestinians in a spiralling death dance. Although there is much more to the Middle East than the wars and disputes that grab the headlines, the threat of the spread of conflict – to Iran, Syria and Lebanon – or the shadow ongoing conflicts cast on the entire region has a massive destabilising effect.

 Peace will encourage stability, and stability will trigger change and progress. But what change does the Middle East need?

 Well, the region is a diverse and complex place, and there is no general panacea. But to take up Obama’s challenge for people to have the audacity to hope, I will suspend my disbelief and allow myself the luxury to flesh out my own Middle Eastern dream.

 The Middle East I dream of is one of greater equality and empowerment, where the fruits of economic development are shared more equally among citizens, where people have more power to make a difference and where governments better reflect the will of their people.

 I dream of societies that have the self-confidence to look to the future, and take assured strides into the unknown, rather than fixating on the past, whether in terms of glories or grievances. I desire societies that put more trust in innovation, and less in tradition, and where change is something to be striven for and not just emulated. I wish people would realise just how inappropriate, counterproductive and indecorous it is for them to let religion out on to the streets to make a nuisance of itself and intimidate others, when its rightful place should be at home and in the heart, where it can engage in private affairs with the faithful.

 I hope that the failed dream of pan-Arabism can be resurrected in a more inclusive form to build a loose trans-national union between all the peoples of the region: Arabs, Persians, Turks, Israelis, etc. I aspire to a future in which national and ethnic identity become less important and more blurred, so that a non-Muslim can become the leader of a Muslim majority country, or a non-Jew the prime minister of Israel.

 These prospects seem like fantasy at the moment, but, after much blood, sweat and suffering, what was once deemed impossible, sometimes does become possible. Pre-Obama who would’ve thought that America could overcome the legacy of slavery and segregation to elect a president with some African blood? Who would’ve thought apartheid or Soviet communism would end so suddenly and unceremoniously? In the wake of the Second World War, who would have thought that a borderless union in which Germany and France are the strongest allies would have emerged out of the wreckage?

 Since Obama triggered this train of thought and since we shouldn’t get too carried away with dreaming, let’s start with the United States. What can America do to improve the Middle East?

 There are hopes that, under Obama’s tutelage, America will become more positively and benignly engaged in the region. My wishes are rather different. Instead of wanting America to play a more positive role, I merely wish for it to play less of a negative one.

 Given America’s own aversion to foreign meddling in its affairs and the clear evidence that the most enduring change is that which comes from within, why do so many Americans believe that other countries need or welcome American interference?

 The major difference America can truly make is to withdraw from Iraq and offer Iraqis support through international mechanisms to clean up the mess the American invasion has caused. In addition, the best way the United States can serve the cause of political reform and peace in the Middle East is to phase out its support for authoritarian and semi-authoritarian regimes that oppress their own citizens or other peoples, such as Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Israel.

 Left to its own devices, the shaky regime of the ageing Hosni Mubarak in Egypt would soon buckle to growing grassroots pressure for reform. Similarly, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict would sooner be resolved if Israel did not benefit from such excessive American largesse and almost unconditional support.

 Nevertheless, the outlook of the Pax Americana empire is unlikely to change all that much, and the United States is likely to continue to believe that its narrow imperial interests are served by continued support for forces that are ultimately not in the interests of the Middle East and its people.

 Of course, America, whose citizens possess a strong and admirable sense of idealism, can make a positive contribution to the region and the world by mobilising the US’s significant ‘soft power’ in concert with the international community and through multilateral mechanisms. This can help meet global challenges and create a sense that there is an international order that no one stands above or outside, even a superpower. Luckily, this is something Obama is more likely to do than his predecessors.

 

This column appeared in The Guardian Unlimited’s Comment is Free section on 30 November 2008. Read the related discussion.

This is an archive piece that was migrated to this website from Diabolic Digest

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Egypt: a society of taboos

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By Osama Diab

Rather than encouraging people to make moral choices, religious groups in Egypt are imposing their values by law.

June 2009

"Haram, Hara-a-am" ("It's forbidden") shouted the conservative Coptic dad when his son asked if he could go to the cinema across the street. The young boy was never able to watch a film, despite living next to a theatre, because art destroys family values, wastes one's time and you end up burning in hell, according to the father.

This was part of the controversial Egyptian film Bahib el-Sima (I love cinema), the first movie that had the guts to show how religious zeal can have an ugly side and lead to lies, pedantry, hypocrisy and may be even perversion in society.

I remembered Bahib el-Sima when a court issued a ruling this month to block "venomous and vile" pornography websites in a case filed by Islamist lawyer Nizar Ghorab, who argues that porn destroys Egypt's social values. AFP quoted the court as saying, "Freedoms of expression and public rights should be restricted by maintaining the fundamentals of religion, morality and patriotism."

Ghorab is also confident that the government won't appeal because it will put the state in the awkward position of defending pornography. "Thank God we won. Now the government should stop these electronic dens of vice immediately," the Islamist lawyer told the BBC.

This came just a week after some of Egypt's emo community were arrested and also accused of destroying the country's social values, an accusation that seems to be used by the authorities to hinder any social change or reform.

People who are against the ruling can't really express it in Egypt because of the taboo that surrounds anything sex-related. It's still hard to imagine protesters in front of the court house chanting "keep the porn".

Ghorab insulted not only his religion but the entire Egyptian population by taking this issue to court. His action implies that Egyptian people need to be treated like kids and be told what they are allowed to see and what they are not by people like Ghorab, who apparently knows better than everyone else. It also implies that Egyptian people have reached the point where they can't find out for themselves if porn is good or evil. This ban will only bring back the days when a schoolboy with a sex tape can have more authority than the school principal, rather than convince people porn is bad. This case also raises a vital question, are Egyptian social values so vulnerable that they need a law to protect them?

Imposing the moral values of a segment of society on the rest of the people is the real threat, not porn. Self-righteousness and the inflicting of one's values by law is what should be banned, not videos showing the naked body. People should be able to decide for themselves if they want porn or not.

The fear of many is that rather than develop values through education and debate, the government will increasingly use media bans to control thought and quash dissent and debate in the name of protecting a susceptible population.

Magi, an Egyptian blogger, is afraid of just such an eventuality. "I am not pro-porn sites but I am worried that one thing would lead to the other; today they block porn sites and tomorrow they will turn to blogs," she writes on her blog ...

Gihan Abou Zeid, a human rights researcher, compares what is happening in Egyptian society to a mother who holds on to her kids more tightly when they are under threat. According to her, Egyptian society is reeling from the threat of opening up even more to other cultures in the age of globalisation, which is why people are sticking more than ever to their traditions.

I don't claim that watching women and men having sex is an essential part of freedom of expression, but the ban is a clear indicator that religious groups are trying to impose their beliefs on others. Creating more taboos and sensitive topics is what I think poses a threat to freedom of expression and thought. Ghorab and his ilk should focus on their own individual lives and morals instead of bothering with what people see on their computer screens or do with their hands behind closed doors.

This column appeared in The Guardian Unlimited’s Comment is Free section on 31 May 2009. Read the related discussion. Reprinted here with the author's permission.

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The Middle East must look to the future

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By Khaled Diab

A secular society confines religion to the spiritual sphere where it belongs, and leaves worldly affairs to human resourcefulness.

April 2009

In my previous piece on Arab secularism, both overt and veiled, I promised to consider ways of advancing progressive secularism in the Arab world.

The question of bringing the Arab and Muslim worlds into the 'modern age' has occupied some of the greatest minds of the past two centuries. It has been approached by natives of the region and foreigners, by friends and foes, by those with an honest desire for reform and those with their own agenda.

Some may question why Arab and Muslim societies need to secularise, while others will argue it is a doomed project because Islam and secularism are apparently incompatible beasts.

Well, it is my conviction that secularism is the bedrock of enlightenment because it confines religion to the individual spiritual sphere where it belongs, and leaves the ever-shifting reality of worldly affairs to human resourcefulness. The compelling proof of this is that Europe and the west's success has been largely secular, as was the Muslim world's before that, by the standards of the time. So, what can be done to speed up the train of secularisation and modernisation?

The Guardian's Brian Whitaker explores this question thoroughly in his new book – which I was interviewed for and had the pleasure of reading and commenting on in pre-publication – and in a series of articles for Comment is free.

"The Middle East will only be convinced by Islamic arguments for a secular state," he argues. "Secularists have to be prepared to engage with religious arguments – something they are often reluctant to do."

Since enduring reform comes from within and is usually gradual and incremental; this has also been my position. In self-defined 'Islamic' states, especially those with a vibrant political landscape and nascent democratic institutions, such as Iran, this can empower reformers. While in Arab and Muslim states which are already secular, Islamic arguments for secularism can help steal the thunder of the Islamists and neutralise them intellectually.

This also broadly corresponds with what generations of Muslim reformers have attempted, beginning with the 'Islamic modernists'. The founder of that movement, Muhammad Abdu, sought to "liberate thought from the shackles of imitation/tradition [taqlid]" and to prove that "religion must be accounted a friend to science". Abdu lamented the closing of the gates of ijtihad and that through this manner of reasoned (re)interpretation Islamic morality and law could be adapted to suit the modern world.

However, placing secularism in an Islamic shell is not enough. It needs to regain its credibility by delivering concrete results. Many Arab and Muslim societies seem to be caught between the rock of repressive regimes, often with western backing, and the hard place of the Islamists, who are likely to take authoritarianism to a new level if they gain power.

Secular opposition needs to find a way of offering a viable alternative to the Muslim Brotherhood and other mainstream Islamists in the eyes of the disenchanted. There are early signs of this occurring in places like Egypt where secularists have been regrouping in recent years.

As Whitaker points out in his book, one of the key appeals of the Muslim Brotherhood is not so much their religious identity but their promise – whether honest or not – to stamp out corruption and restore the rule of law. To highlight that Islamism is not the only show in town, secularists need to demonstrate that their efforts to promote democratic freedom and limit the political powers of leaders is driven by a desire to protect the dignity and rights of the individual.

Dressing secularism up in Islamic garments is a useful stepping stone, but will eventually come up against the brick wall of what I term the "God veto" on issues where religious and cultural beliefs are too strong to be reasoned with effectively. A good example of this is the status of women.

In Egypt, for example, although the legal, social and economic status of women has improved significantly over the past century, efforts to create true equality are often derailed or watered down, as occurred during the revamping of the country's personal status laws, by an unholy alliance between religious and conservative circles.

There are also limitations on the ideological plane. Muhammad Abdu's back to fundamentals "salafiyya" was interpreted by secular reformers as an opportunity to jettison Islam's historical baggage and create a new, modern future-oriented society. However, by the likes of Hassan al-Banna, the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood, it was interpreted as an invitation to re-create the "glorious" past of the "pious ancestors".

To overcome this kind of inertia requires a society not to seek guidance from the past but from the future, and this requires the culture to shift away from the tendency to 'emulate' – whether the Islamic past or the western present – and move towards 'innovation', a challenge many ancient societies in decline have faced in the modern age.

Contemporary western societies possess both the confidence and resources to future-orient their perspectives. I don't believe it is an accident that the west's "golden age" has coincided with its domination of the global trading system, and the Middle East's terminal decline coincided with the loss of its monopoly on east-west trade.

Today, the pursuit of knowledge and development is such a resource intensive undertaking that, what had been in the mid-18th century a relatively small qualitative gap, has widened to almost unbridgeable proportions. Most Arab and Muslim societies, as well as many other developing countries, are trapped in a vicious cycle of poverty, domestic and global inequality, ignorance, and systematic disadvantage in the global balance of economic and political power.

To overcome this requires reform in every sphere, from decent education to political freedom, not to mention efforts to promote equality not just between individuals within a society, but between countries in the global trading and political system.

This column appeared in The Guardian Unlimited’s Comment is Free section on 21 April 2009. Read the related discussion.

This is an archive piece that was migrated to this website from Diabolic Digest

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