fragile state

Congo’s colonial ghost

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By Khaled Diab

As we approach the 50th anniversary of independence, how successful has Congo's post-colonial experience been?

28 April 2010

Preparations are under way in the Democratic Republic of Congo for celebrations to mark 50 years of independence in June. The Congolese government has reportedly set aside $2 million for the festivities. Guests of honour will include a high-level Belgian delegation, headed by King Albert II, who will be on his first official visit to the former colony.

With these festivities in the air, how has the first half-century of independence been for the Democratic Republic of the Congo?

While it’s difficult to sum up the past 50 years, one thing that can be said with some confidence is that they have been troubled – from the western-backed murder of independence leader Patrice Lumumba, through the long and repressive Mobutu dictatorship, to the Second Congo War, known as Africa’s World War, not only because of its being the deadliest conflict since the second world war but also because it involved seven foreign countries.

Today, a stability of sorts has descended upon the country with its elected dictator, Joseph Kabila, although fighting continues in a number of provinces of this vast country, particularly in the east.

Despite its enormous mineral wealth, the DRC is one of the poorest countries in the world, largely due to the uncontrolled plundering of its resources. With a per-capita GDP of around $100 per year, it comes close to the bottom of the well-being league, though its human development index is constantly rising.

In fact, Congo is a classic example of the fragile African state. So, what lies behind this fragility?

A key factor is a failure of leadership on a monumental scale. Political corruption, coupled with weak state institutions, has ensured that the main function of Congolese politics, like in many other African countries, is to serve the private ends of the ruling elite.

"The political class in Congo is shit," Joseph Nzau, a 55-year-old Congolese professional based in Brussels, told me in no uncertain terms. "Politicians don't have the common good in mind. They want to enrich themselves first and their clans second."

Whereas political corruption may skim some of the cream off the top of the pie in countries with effective governance, in places like the DRC, it gobbles up the lion's share of the cake, as attested to by the vast fortunes Mobutu and his cronies accumulated or squandered.

But should Congo's political class cop the entire blame? Well, there are certainly other factors at play. The DRC is about the size of western Europe, but the country has a population that is smaller than Germany's and yet is divided into some 250 ethnic groups speaking an equivalent number of languages. Governing such a huge and diverse land mass, with a relatively low population density, not to mention poor infrastructure and a state that is weaker than probably even the smallest European states, is no easy matter.

Much as apologists for Europe's colonial legacy and those afflicted with selective amnesia would like to believe, the reality is that Congo's colonial experience, as in so many other post-colonial states, has caused deep and lasting scars, and very much handicaps the modern state. "The situation of Congo today is a consequence of Belgian colonisation," Nzau says, expressing a common Congolese perception.

But this link between European colonialism and the current turmoil in much of sub-Saharan Africa is not just a case of Africans looking for someone else to blame, as is so often claimed. In fact, the same link was explicitly made in last year's European Report on Development. "The scramble for Africa ... is a natural candidate for the historical origin of the fragility plaguing many sub-Saharan African countries," the report stated.

But why should such a relatively short sojourn have such a profound impact? In the case of Congo, part of the reason is that there was a centuries'-long prelude. Prior to direct rule, most of central Africa was depopulated as a consequence of the European slave trade to the west and, to a lesser extent, the Arab slave trade to the east. This, for example, helped accelerate the eventual collapse of the once-powerful indigenous kingdom of Kongo (which had different borders to the contemporary DRC).

The ruler, Nzinga Mbemba Affonso, an early convert to Christianity, wrote regularly to the king of Portugal to complain about the effects of the slave trade on his subjects:

Each day the traders are kidnapping our people – children of this country, sons of our nobles and vassals, even people of our own family. This corruption and depravity are so widespread that our land is entirely depopulated. We need in this kingdom only priests and schoolteachers, and no merchandise, unless it is wine and flour for mass.

Undoubtedly, the worst chapter in Congo's history was when the country became the personal property of King Leopold II, who wanted a domain to match his ego. The king infamously described Belgium as "petit pays, petits gens" ("small country, small people") due to his subjects' lack of appetite for empire – unsurprising given that they had been ruled for centuries by foreign powers, including the Spanish, the Habsburgs, the French and the Dutch.

Jealous that he did not preside over an empire like his cousin, Queen Victoria, across the Channel, Leopold spent years in search of a land that he could transform into his personal fiefdom. With the help of the dodgy Welsh-born American explorer and journalist Henry Stanley (born John Rowlands), Leopold set his sights on a part of Africa unclaimed by the other European powers which he eventually gave the name Congo Free State. During his private rule, an estimated 2-15 million Congolese died through forced labour and other forms of exploitation.

International outrage and one of the first major human rights campaigns in modern history led to the Belgian government taking Congo off Leopold's hands and annexing it. Although the worst human rights abuses ended, the main priority of the Belgian Congo, despite Belgium's earlier reluctance to enter the colonial game, remained the exploitation of the country's mineral wealth for the benefit of the Belgian economy.

During the period of direct rule, the European institutions and structures that were brought in took little account of local culture and conditions. After independence, rather than reform the state, local leaders simply took it over, alienating themselves from the population.

The 50th anniversary of independence should give Belgians and Congolese pause for thought. In the coming half-century, the Congolese need to overcome the legacy of the past and take command of their future. For their part, Belgians need to recognise that their colonial legacy is not just an issue for historians but that it helped create the current mess.

This is the extended version of an article which appeared in the Guardian newspaper's Comment is Free section on 21 April 2010. Read the full discussion here.

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Pakistan: stifled from birth

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By Khaled Diab

Why does India, despite its size and diversity, seem so much more stable than Pakistan?

The rivalry between India and Pakistan goes back to partition. Photo ©Copyright - Khaled Diab

The rivalry between India and Pakistan goes back to partition. Photo ©Copyright - Khaled Diab

Last week, I was in Barcelona attending a conference on the challenges to development posed by countries defined as "fragile" – which is the focus of the first-ever European Report on Development. The focus was sub-Saharan countries, but I was led to ponder Pakistan's chronic instability as I viewed the images of hundreds of thousands of civilians fleeing the fighting between the army and the Taliban.

One expert at the gathering described Pakistan's fragility as a paradox and an anomaly, given the size of the country's economy and its level of income and development. The current flare-up aside, some of the differences are more ones of perception than reality.

For instance, according to the Human Development Index – which, incidentally, was developed by two economists from India and Pakistan – these two countries are at similar levels of development (132nd and 139th respectively). For the past few years, India has been experiencing extraordinary economic growth – fuelled by its knowledge boom – but until the 1990s Pakistan performed consistently better and had a significantly higher per-capita GDP.

As for civil strife, sectarian conflict and secessionist struggles, India has its fair share, too. For instance, in the two weeks we were in India last year, there were Islamist bombings, the killing of Christians and Muslims by Hindu mobs, and the complete shutting down of the Kashmir valley. Still, despite its significantly larger population and dizzying ethnic and religious mix, India appears, impressively, to be more stable, viable and democratic than Pakistan. Why is this? Well, one reason could be that India's very size and diversity are actually serving the country well.

Far more than Pakistan, post-independence India has needed a political culture of compromise and consensus-building based on an understanding that no one group would be able to completely dominate the others – what Brian Whitaker calls "stability through stalemate". However, the well-worn adage of the "bigger they are, the harder they fall" could well apply in the case of India. If the wrong combination of factors emerges, the resulting chaos could make the instability in Pakistan look like a children's picnic.

India's diversity is a good incubator for scientific and intellectual excellence – at least among a certain elite – and its size means it can tap into economies of scale and markets that other developing countries can only dream of.

With Pakistan being a majority Muslim country and the Taliban on the rampage, what role has Islam played in the country's demise? In recent years, it has been popular to link Islam to underdevelopment, but the evidence does not really back this up.

"No clear conclusion emerges from the study of the impact of Islam on economic growth and development," observes Jean-Philippe Platteau, professor of ­economics at the University of Namur in Belgium. "If anything, the effect is positive rather than negative (at least, when the sample consists only of developing countries)."

He goes on to say that the "influence of Islam seems to be much clearer on politics than on economics", pointing to geo-political factors, interstate conflict and the resource curse to explain this democratic deficit. "[However], it is difficult to determine to what extent Islam hampers politics or politics subverts Islam."

On Cif recently Whitaker explored how Arab leaders exploit Islam to silence dissent and legitimise their questionable authority. A similar process has been at play for much of Pakistan's history, with secular dictators such as Ayub Khan and Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq, and democratically elected leaders such as the Bhuttos all employing religion to impose their rule or veil their corruption.

But looking at Pakistan's problems solely through the prism of religion is intellectually lazy and counterproductive. This approach fails to appreciate the uniqueness of the country's circumstances, as well as the huge amount it has in common – both positive and negative – with neighbouring India.

To properly understand Pakistan, one must go back to its birth. The country was "conceived in a hurry and delivered prematurely", as Tariq Ali puts it. The Indian independence movement matured over decades and had the chance to build enduring democratic and civil institutions, and much of what we call India today had been a recognisable political entity, first under the Mughals and then the British.

In contrast, Pakistan had no precedent and was created almost as an afterthought by the British to reward the loyal Muslim League, which had split away from the Congress party out of fear of post-independence marginalisation or persecution.

Much more than the rest of the subcontinent, Pakistan was rocked to the core by the massive population shake-ups – with a huge influx of Muslims from all over India and an almost complete exodus of Hindus and Sikhs. However, Pakistan's apparent religious uniformity masks major ethnic and cultural tensions.

The dominance of the Punjabis and muhajirun (migrants or refugees) is resented by the native Sindhis, Pashtuns and, earlier, Bengalis, who broke away to form Bangladesh after Pakistan's bloody invasion in 1971.

So, despite Pakistan's original conception as a secular democracy, its leaders, faced with the prospect of territorial disintegration and a lack of legitimacy (particularly among non-Punjabis), fell back on the only common denominator, Islam, to try to keep the fragile country together and cement their hold on power – with disastrous consequences.

Regional geopolitics has also been a major factor in Pakistan's instability. India has never been able to forgive Pakistan for breaking away, and Pakistan has always sought to outshine India and is bitter about not being awarded Kashmir. In a parallel with cold war, the India-Pakistan standoff has been far more costly for Pakistan than India, given the disparity in the size of their economies.

In addition, the volatility in neighbouring Afghanistan – and Pakistan's role as a staunch US ally in the cold war, training mujahideen and the Taliban – has been the cause of one of the most spectacular cases of blowback in recent history: with the monster returning to consume the hand that shaped it.

This column appeared in The Guardian Unlimited’s Comment is Free section on 13 May 2009. Read the related discussion.

This is an archive piece that was migrated to this website from Diabolic Digest

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