corruption

Diagnosing the Middle East’s ills

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By Osama Diab

Author and journalist Brian Whitaker diagnoses the Arab world’s problems.

18 January 2010

When debate opens up on the problems in the Middle East, finger pointing is the first weapon in the argument. Whether it is Middle Easterners blaming contemporary problems on centuries of Western interference or the West focusing on authoritarian regimes and militant religion, the source of problems in the region can always be found in one place: somebody else’s lap.

Brian Whitaker sums this up succinctly in the first sentence of his book What’s really wrong with the Middle East: “The problems of the Middle East are always someone else’s fault.”

Whitaker should know: he spent seven years as the Middle East editor at British daily The Guardian and holds a degree in Arabic from the University of Westminster. Whitaker utilises his depth of experience in the region to diagnose the problems that plague it, conducting a series of unstructured interviews with a kaleidoscope of people to pinpoint what he believes to be the Middle East’s key problems. But don’t expect the book to be an author’s sermon on the ills of the region. What’s really wrong with the Middle East cedes the pulpit to Whitaker’s interviewees.

“I deliberately chose not to interview politicians or any of the talking heads favoured by visiting journalists,” Whitaker tells Egypt Today, adding that the people he talked to were not selected according to any agenda. “They were mostly people I had come across in the course of my work who seemed to have interesting things to say. I tried to let them shape the interviews as much as possible. I didn’t have a fixed set of questions or anything like that. I gave them a list of 10 statements — about politics, oil, the media, corruption, etc. — and asked them to choose those they wanted to talk about.”

Whitaker divides the book into nine chapters, each tackling one topic that, in his opinion, hinders reform. For example, the first chapter explains how education in the Middle East is designed to discourage free and critical thinking. Instead, it encourages “thinking inside the box” and is used by regimes to maintain power. The book moves on to explain how power is inherited and is usually driven from the father’s power. In chapter three, there is a discussion of the distance between Arab governments and their citizens, as well as the often-negative perception the public has of governments.

Although Whitaker emphasises that regime change will not immediately solve the problems of Arab countries, he spares no criticism of the region’s governments. He sees power in the region as an almost genetic inheritance that engenders all manners of nepotism, bribery and administrative corruption.

However, in Whitaker’s mind, Arab countries are more than simply repressive political regimes. Deep faults in civil society, he posits, are doing just as much damage to the region as the regimes that manage it.

“What I’m saying in the book is that the problem is a lot more complex and you have to look at Arab society as a whole, not just the regimes,” he explains. “It does mean there are no quick fixes. I’m sorry about that, but to pretend otherwise would just be deceiving ourselves.”

Whitaker similarly takes to task the censorship of the press and the internet, the lack of political expression in Arab countries, discrimination, resistance to globalization and the lack of openness to other cultures fostered in this climate.

With emphasis on interviews and real-life stories, supplemented with studies and comments from experts, What’s really wrong with the Middle East reads more like an in-depth feature article than a textbook survey of the region. “I wanted to give it a different flavour from most books about the Middle East,” says Whitaker, “so I decided to use Arab sources wherever possible — things that Arabs had written or said, but preferably available in English so that Western readers could explore them in more detail if they wanted to.”

The book took Whitaker more than a year and a half to compile and write, due in part to the legwork he felt was necessary. “To stop it from becoming too dry and academic, I wanted to include some face-to-face interviews,” he explains. “I made trips to Egypt, Jordan and Lebanon, as well as to France, Belgium and the Netherlands especially for that.”

Whitaker’s objectives in writing the book were two-fold. First, he believed that debate in the West about Arab countries and the problems plaguing them was ill-informed — especially in the United States during the Bush presidency.

“I wanted to give a more complete picture,” Whitaker says, “one that delves beyond the usual issues such as terrorism and dictatorship into areas that are less often talked about: authoritarianism within the family, corruption, social discrimination, the pressure to conform and not think outside the box.”

His other objective was to confront the culture of denial in Arab countries. “If the problems are acknowledged at all, they are usually blamed on outsiders,” he says. “Western countries certainly bear some responsibility, but that’s no excuse for Arabs to sit back and do nothing. At some point they’ll have to say: ‘OK, we’re in a mess. How are we going to get out of it?’”

In the book, Whitaker points to how the invasion of Iraq highlights the West’s belief that overthrowing tyrants is a silver bullet to address the region’s woes. He finds that ousting authoritarian regimes is not a panacea for the region as a whole. The book implies that authoritarianism exists in schools, colleges, families and the workplace, and overthrowing regimes will not and cannot instantly change that. The thread Whitaker weaves throughout the book is that political change and democracy cannot happen unless preceded by social change.

While the title implies that someone — maybe Whitaker — holds all the answers, the author’s real conclusion is that there are no quick fixes for the region’s ills.

Despite his challenging observations, Whitaker believes strongly that progress is being made: “Arab society is definitely changing, if only slowly at the moment. But the more it changes, the more it is likely to change. And I think the forces driving that change — globalization, satellite TV, the internet, foreign travel and so on — are virtually unstoppable in the long term, even if there are setbacks along the way.”

This review first appeared in the January 2010 edition of Egypt Today. Republished here with the author's consent. ©Osama Diab. All rights reserved.

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Is Mubarak really a force of stability?

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By Osama Diab

Providing more legitimate access to power should be the way to guarantee security and stability in Egypt.

23 September 2009

In the speech he gave in Cairo in June, US President Barack Obama said, "I do have an unyielding belief that all people yearn for certain things: the ability to speak your mind and have a say in how you are governed; confidence in the rule of law and the equal administration of justice; government that is transparent and doesn't steal from the people; the freedom to live as you choose. Those are not just American ideas, they are human rights, and that is why we will support them everywhere."

Obama linked the application of these ideas with stability and security. Then in August, during Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak's visit to Washington, Obama described Mubarak as a force of stability. As a man of courtesy, Obama may have just been trying to be a good host and show respect. It’s difficult to believe Obama is simply unaware of the Mubarak regime’s horrid human rights record or Egypt's poor ranking in international corruption reports. I hope that Obama is not just turning a blind eye to Mubarak's practices because he relies on him as an important ally in our troubled region — which is probably much nearer the mark.

The praise Mubarak has received from the US president illustrates America's double-standard politics that basically say: an important ally in the region, and a friend of Israel, is a force of stability, regardless of the regime's domestic policy.

Mubarak is a force of instability and unrest. In Arab pop culture, the term korsi (chair) holds a political significance, referring to political rule or authority. In the Middle East, rulers get attached to this chair, and as time passes, the attachment gets stronger. Death, and only death, can put an end to this union, kind of like a Catholic marriage. This has become so much the norm that the term "ex-president" sounds very bizarre to the Arab ear.

Consequently, access to power using legitimate means becomes unattainable, which is why political parties and groups resort to means that ultimately cause political turbulence and social unrest. In recent years, many political movements have challenged Mubarak's power, such as Kifaya, the Egyptian movement for change, and the April 6 Youth Movement. These movements organise protests, sit-ins and strikes that are usually crushed by riot police, leading to even more public dissent. A large number of students and activists have been detained and are being systematically harassed by the Egyptian police.

In the 20th century, Egypt saw many attempts to challenge authority outside the system and the law. The country witnessed the assassination of many political figures. In 1990, Rifaat el-Mahgoub, speaker of the Egyptian parliament, who was also a member of the ruling National Democratic Party, was assassinated in his car in Cairo by an Islamic group. Anwar Sadat, the Nobel Peace Prize winner and Egyptian president, was also killed by Islamic militant groups for signing a peace treaty with Israel. A few hours after his death, Asyut, one of Egypt's major southern cities, fell under the control of Islamic groups for a few days and tens of police officers were killed. For more than a decade after Sadat's death, Egypt suffered from a very strong wave of terrorism that claimed the lives of hundreds of civilians and police officers.

Besides assassinations and terrorism, Egypt saw at least one military coup in 1952, a revolution in 1919, and a nationwide student uprising in 1936 where hundreds of protestors were killed by the police. Recently, civil disobedience has been commonplace, labour strikes are turning into some sort of a national sport, clashes between riot police and students are becoming standard to see on news programmes, and deaths are reported daily during election time.

The more that access to power is denied, the more people will look for alternatives and be willing to challenge power outside the system. When power is inaccessible by legitimate means, the ground is fertile for coups, revolutions, assassinations and non-peaceful methods of power transition. This is something Obama and his advisers seem to have failed to understand when they called Mubarak "a force of stability in the region".

Moreover, trying to convince the public that presidents don't age or get sick like common humans has also been a widely used strategy in the Egyptian regime. In 2007, Ibrahim Eissa, editor of independent daily al-Dostour, was sentenced to prison because he published an article questioning the then-79-year-old Mubarak's health. The court found him guilty of "publishing false information of a nature to disturb public order or security". Due to numerous protests and public dissent, President Mubarak pardoned Eissa after one of the most contentious court cases related to freedom of the press.

After so long in the top seat, one would think Mubark's hunger for power would be sated. He has ruled Egypt for 28 years, not to mention his years as vice-president and a high-ranking military officer. Mubarak can make history by resigning the presidency and supervising free and fair elections to select a successor.

As someone who is known to care for his legacy, gaining credit as the founder of democracy in the Arab world and ending the military's monopoly on power (and not by transferring it to his civilian son) should appeal to him. Mubarak can set an example in the region that democracy is attainable. He could possibly get credit for being the founder of democracy in the Middle East.

Supporting Mubarak's regime might seem to the Obama administration like an easy way to keep the Arab world's most populous, and arguably most influential, country from turning into an Islamic regime, but in the long term, it will achieve the opposite. If the administration wants to help contain extremism and decrease support for groups that threaten the region's stability, such as the Muslim Brotherhood, it needs to work on making power more accessible by legitimate means.

This article was first published by WorldPress.org on 13 September 2009. Republished here with the author's permission. ©Osama Diab. All rights reserved.

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