Israel and Gaza: When attack is the worst form of defence

 
VN:F [1.9.22_1171]
Rating: 0 (from 0 votes)
VN:F [1.9.22_1171]
Rating: 0.0/10 (0 votes cast)

By Khaled Diab

As the fog of war distort people’s vision and compassion, can Israeli and Palestinian reject the strategy of violence offered by their leaderships?

Wednesday 21 November 2012

Just days before the current escalation in violence, I encountered a young Gazan art student living “illegally” in the West Bank because Israel would not allow her to change her address.

With her precarious existence as a kind of fugitive in her own land, which had made her unable to visit her besieged hometown for over seven years, and in light of Israel’s blockade of Gaza and its 2008-9 invasion, I asked her how she felt about Israelis.

“I am a human and believe in humanity, regardless of religion, nationality or race. We are all humans. I will not let this affect me,” the art student said, surprising me with the simple intensity of her conviction, as her Jewish-American friend listened in, even though she did not understand a word of what we were saying.

As I watch with rising alarm the fog of imminent war distort people’s vision and compassion, I cannot help but recall this conversation. I wonder whether this young woman is managing to cling on to her admirable compassion and humility, when those around her are losing theirs, or has it too fallen victim to this senseless confrontation?

The first victim of war, it is rightly said, is truth, but its second casualty is humanity. The demonisation, hatred, vitriol and jingoism that has been fired indiscriminately and disproportionately in recent days has been troubling. Personally, though I have felt fury at Israel’s vicious “send Gaza back to the middle ages” military offensive against a captive civilian population – not to mention anger with Palestinian militants for also targeting civilians – I am determined not to allow this to darken my view of ordinary Israelis.

This latest conflagration confounded me but it did not surprise me.

It did not surprise me because we have been here before – in 2006 in Lebanon and 2008-9 in Gaza, to name just two examples, when the Cain of senselessness murdered the Abel of sensibility. The timing was also no big surprise. The smokescreen of military confrontation is a powerful political ploy because it can turn political villains into heroes and discontented citizens into loyal soldiers, silencing growing dissent in the ranks – although it can backfire or blow up in its user’s hands, as discovered by Israeli prime ministers Shimon Peres in 1996 and Ehud Olmert in 2009.

Although this brewing war is ostensibly about the security of Israel, it is, in reality, more about the insecurity of the Israeli government at the ballot box, faced as it has been with growing social unrest, economic dissatisfaction, widening inequality and increasing public fury at the fiscal black hole opened up by settlement subsidies. How else can we explain Israel’s infuriating decision to murder its “subcontractor” in Gaza, Ahmed Jabari, who was, reportedly, on the verge of sealing a permanent truce with Israel?

On the other side of the fence, Hamas has been facing growing popular discontent – with a recent poll suggesting that it would receive just 31% of the popular vote in Gaza, and considerably less in the West Bank, if suspended elections were held – particularly since the eruption of the ‘Arab Spring’, and especially amongst young people. Although it was elected for its apparent lack of corruption and cronyism, now that Hamas is the uncontested master of Gaza, it has been guilty of severe abuses of power and human rights violations. Hamas is also far less tolerant of dissent than Fatah.

Though the current fighting does not surprise me, it does confound me. It confounds me because if Israeli and Gazan leaders are truly sincere in their claims that they seek to defend their people, then why have they not yet recognised that attack is the worst form of defence, at least in this conflict?

What have Israel’s many long campaigns of violence against Hamas achieved? The previous Gaza war did not accomplish its intended objective of destroying Hamas, nor did it halt the flow of rockets into Israel. All it succeeded in doing was to increase the quotient of human misery in Gaza, and with it the measure of hostility and distrust towards Israel among Palestinians and Arabs. This current campaign is about restoring “deterrence”, we’re told, but the greatest deterrent effect it is likely to have is to deter even more of the world from viewing Israel with sympathy or compassion.

More broadly, Israel’s other attempts to destroy Hamas by other means have backfired spectacularly, and though they may serve the interests of extremists, they do little to enhance the security and well-being of ordinary Israelis.

Take the blockade on Gaza. While it has been very effective at increasing the destitution and despair of the average Gazan, it has done very little to weaken Hamas’s hold on power. In fact, tightening the screws on the Strip has led us from a situation in which Hamas had to share power with Fatah – and signal its willingness, now that it was actually in power, to act more pragmatically – to one in which the Islamist movement became the only show in town in Gaza and its position has re-hardened.

Hamas’s violence has also paid precious few dividends to the people of Gaza and the Palestinian people in general. Though some see Hamas’s behaviour as a heroic form of resistance against the humiliation and oppression of occupation, what good has this supposed heroism done Gazans or the Palestinian cause? Ever since Hamas tacitly joined forces with extremists Israelis to assassinate the (admittedly flawed) peace process, Israel has seen to it that the situation of Gazans has deteriorated immensely.

That is not to say that resistance is futile. On the contrary, if Palestinians are to secure their human rights, resistance is necessary. But in a situation where they are by far the weaker party militarily, they will never be able to match Israeli firepower, so they need to unleash the most potent weapon in their arsenal: peaceful people power, which is more suited to the political nature of the conflict.

The relative potency of this weapon can be seen when you compare the peaceful first intifada with the violent second intifada: the first uprising effectively brought Israel to its knees, while the second brought the Palestinians to theirs. And since the second intifada died down Palestinian peace activists have been rediscovering and reasserting the power of non-violent resistance.

While non-violence has received a lot of attention in the Palestinian context, when it comes to Israelis, it has received precious little. This is reflected in the fact that while most Israelis agree, and urge, the Palestinians to abandon violence, they cling on to the right to use it themselves, as illustrated by the overwhelming support for the previous Gaza war among the Israel public.

But the rejection of violence is as important a creed for Israelis as it is for Palestinians, even if they are militarily the more powerful. In this asymmetric conflict, there can be no winners because the more Israel destroys, the more it bolsters Palestinian determination to resist and the more it isolates itself internationally. More importantly, since the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is ultimately political, and not military, it cannot and will not be decided on the battlefield, no matter how long the hawks deny this basic law of nature.

Recognising this important truth, a  resident of a kibbutz near the border with Gaza urged the Israeli government, despite the rockets which have landed in her backyard: “If you want to defend me… try to negotiate until white smoke comes up through the chimney.”

In my view, the best way to defend the Palestinian and Israeli peoples is through a complete rejection by the public of violence, not only that committed by the other side, which is easy, but also, more significantly, that perpetrated by your own. Once the cycle of violence is broken for long enough, the two sides can gradually shift from resistance of the other to coexistence with one another.

Follow Khaled Diab on Twitter.

This is the extended version of an article which first appeared in Haaretz on 18 November 2012.

 

 

VN:F [1.9.22_1171]
Rating: 0.0/10 (0 votes cast)
VN:F [1.9.22_1171]
Rating: 0 (from 0 votes)
Tags: , , , , , , , , , , , , ,

Related posts

The stick of boycott v the carrot of recognition

 
VN:F [1.9.22_1171]
Rating: 0 (from 0 votes)
VN:F [1.9.22_1171]
Rating: 0.0/10 (0 votes cast)

By Khaled Diab

The targeted boycott of Israel should be complemented with Arab recognition of the Jewish state and grassroots engagement with ordinary Israelis.

Monday 1 October 2012

In a YouTube video, Chili Peppers express their excitement about their imminent Tel Aviv gig.

It is a mark of the phenomenal success of a certain band from Los Angeles that the words Red Hot Chili Peppers are primarily associated in the minds of millions with a unique flavour of funky sounds that has all the spice and kick of the piquant fruit they are named after. The Chili Peppers were an important and integral part of the soundtrack to my youth.

Appealing to the band’s sense of justice, many Palestinians and supporters of the cultural boycott against Israel called on the Chili Peppers to cancel their recent concert in Tel Aviv but to no avail.

“Art alone cannot break down a wall that appropriates Palestinian land and resources,” Palestinian-American poet, writer and activist Remi Kanazi, who is a member of the US Campaign for the Academic and Cultural Boycott of Israel, wrote in an article for al-Jazeera calling on the band to cancel their Israel gig. “But artists and their art can inspire millions to take conscientious action against occupation and discrimination.”

In ignoring this outcry, were Kiedis and his crew guilty of putting profit over principle and of hypocrisy?

In the past, I might have responded with an unqualified, “Yes, they were”, and advocates of the boycott against Israel see the Chili Peppers as having sold out the Palestinians by coming here and behaving as if there were no occupation. And to their discredit and shame, the band which has dedicated so many memorable lyrics to the racism and segregation suffered by African-Americans and the plight of Native Americans, despite expressing strong love for Israel, did not seem able even to spare a single word for the Palestinians of the West Bank and Gaza who live in enforced segregation.

That said, the situation is not entirely black and white. The Chili Peppers have a special emotional link with Israel, because the group’s original guitarist Hillel Slovak was Israeli, and Kiedis and crew may have decided that Israelis cannot be held collectively responsible for the crimes and injustices committed by their state.

For myself and the majority of Arabs, the idea of boycotting Israel is almost second nature, given that it has been an integral part of Arab political culture for decades. Even in Egypt, which has had a peace treaty with Israel for most my life, those who deal with Israel or Israelis are often depicted as unscrupulous opportunists who are out to profit from the misery of their Palestinian brethren.

Prior to moving here, I did not buy any Israeli products and, given my commitment to ethical spending, I still believe that a targeted economic boycott is justified to ensure that people do not bankroll the occupation and the subjugation of the Palestinians. In fact, in addition to the popular boycott, Western governments should not effectively be rewarding Israel for its intransigence and there is a case to be made for the United States to suspend military aid and the EU to downgrade relations with Israel – which the EU’s former foreign policy chief Javier Solana once described as an EU member in all but name – until a peace deal is reached.

However, I do have serious misgivings about the cultural and academic boycott. Although institutions which perpetuate the occupation, such as military research centres or universities on occupied land, should rightly not be dealt with, the Palestinian Campaign for the Academic and Cultural Boycott of Israel (PACBI) effectively calls for a blanket boycott, arguing that, “unless proven otherwise”, all Israeli academic and cultural bodies “are complicit in maintaining the Israeli occupation and denial of basic Palestinian rights”. But presuming guilt until innocence is proven is unjust, and this is a form of collective punishment, albeit not on the scale of the Gaza blockade.

On a more pragmatic level, it is also counterproductive. Take the case of the German documentary about Jerusalem which was set to feature both Palestinian and Israeli residents to show the reality of life in the divided city. Pressure from campaigners caused many Palestinians to pull out of the project, the upshot of which will be that the film is more likely to show only Israeli perspectives.

The veteran Palestinian journalist Daoud Kuttab – who co-founded the now-defunct Bitter Lemons journal where Palestinian and Israeli intellectuals engaged in oft-heated dialogue – described the furor as a form of “intellectual terrorism”. Other activists who advocate joint action and dialogue I have spoken to have complained of a growing rejection of their approach.

“Some regard any encounter with an Israel as ‘normalization’. I am against normalization… but dialogue is not normalization,” a prominent activist who has spent years promoting Israeli-Palestinian dialogue told me. “Peace is too precious to be left only to politicians,” she emphasised.

Part of the reason for this hardening of positions appears to be disillusionment and scepticism at the entire apparatus – which put some emphasis on dialogue and collaboration between the two sides – put in place as part of the failed and discredited “peace process”.

“The aim of most of these so-called dialogues is to give the impression that there is an exchange going on,” one young activist involved in the BDS movement told me. “But this happens without the recognition of our rights, without the acknowledgement that there is a people being oppressed.”

But by punishing sympathetic Israelis along with hostile ones, this kind of unenlightened boycott alienates the doves more than it isolates the hawks. Although the cultural boycott claims to target institutions and not individuals, individuals who work for these bodies more often than not fall prey to the boycott, regardless of their politics.

“They will not invite me to Ramallah because I teach at Tel Aviv University,” complained Shlomo Sand, the maverick Israeli historian and one-time friend of the Palestinian national poet Mahmoud Darwish, warning that the Palestinians were boycotting “the most liberal segment of the Israeli political culture”.

“It’s a very, very closed-minded tactic,” he told me.

Moreover, the Arabs have little to show for their decades of boycott, beyond perhaps the emotional satisfaction of not dealing with the enemy. Some suggest that it has even strengthened Israel. “I think that the reason for Israel’s prosperity is, ultimately, an unexpected result of the boycott,” believes Iraqi-Israeli poet Sasson Somekh, who was a close friend of Egyptian Nobel laureate Naguib Mahfouz.

“I am against boycotts, even of your worst enemies,” he told me. “If you want to influence them and change the status quo, you need to have dialogue with them, not boycott them.”

Counterintuitive as it may sound to many Arab ears, the best way forward is for ordinary Arabs, not just Palestinians, to engage more with ordinary Israelis – both in dialogue and joint action – because there can be no resolution to this conflict without an Israeli partner, and gaining that partner requires the empowering of Israel’s increasingly marginalized and embattled peace movement.

Moreover, the blanket Arab boycott belies a profound and damaging misunderstanding of the Israeli psyche and the existential angst Jews have suffered following the deadly pogroms of the previous century and the Holocaust. The majority of Israelis do not see the boycott as a principled stand in solidarity with the Palestinians, but as a manifestation of Arab rejection of Israel’s right to exist.

To allay such fears and deprive Israeli hawks of their intellectual and emotional prey, I think that the majority of Arab countries who have not yet done so, perhaps through the Arab League, should immediately recognize Israel within its pre-1967 borders. This simple, highly symbolic act – which actually costs the Arabs nothing and does no harm to the Palestinian cause – can help the Arab world, rather like Anwar Sadat once did, to go over the intransigent Israeli leadership’s heads and appeal directly to the Israeli public.

Sadat believed that a psychological barrier existed between Arabs and Israelis – a “barrier of suspicion, a barrier of rejection; a barrier of fear, or deception” – which constituted “70% of the whole problem”. While the percentage is open to question, in this, Sadat, for all his failings, was largely right.

Follow Khaled Diab on Twitter.

This article first appeared in Haaretz on 19 September 2012.

VN:F [1.9.22_1171]
Rating: 0.0/10 (0 votes cast)
VN:F [1.9.22_1171]
Rating: 0 (from 0 votes)
Tags: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,

Related posts

Principle and pragmatism demand end to Gaza blockade

 
VN:F [1.9.22_1171]
Rating: +1 (from 1 vote)
VN:F [1.9.22_1171]
Rating: 10.0/10 (1 vote cast)

By Khaled Diab

Both humanity and self-interest should compel Israel to end its inhumane siege of Gaza.

Thursday 21 June 2012

Last Thursday marked the fifth anniversary of Israel’s imposition of a complete siege on the Gaza Strip. Although the land, sea and air blockade has not made Israelis any safer or enhanced Israel’s security, it has had a clear humanitarian and economic impact on Gazans.

Take Khaleel Zaanin, 45, a once-thriving Palestinian farmer who has been reduced to subsistence farming because most of his land (37 out of almost 45 acres) falls within the buffer zone, or access restricted area, which Gazans are not allowed to enter.

“I had a great business in citrus, my life was very good. I used to employ 30 workers and export to Israel, Jordan, and the West Bank,” recalls Zaanin, who is one of a number of Gazans profiled by a coalition of international development agencies. “Now, I work by myself, just planting vegetables for local sale.”

Zaanin’s situation is hardly unique. In fact, an estimated 35% of Gaza’s already limited arable land and most of its fishing waters lie within the buffer zone. In addition, the Israeli blockade, through severe restrictions on imports and exports, has triggered the almost complete collapse of Gaza’s industrial sector.

One study estimates that the blockade costs Gaza’s 1.6 million residents, over half of whom are children, nearly $2 billion a year. This has created a dependence on aid where little existed before. A decade ago, only one in ten Gazans required assistance from UNRWA, the UN agency tasked with caring for Palestinian refugees. Today, some three-quarters are dependent on aid for their survival.

The service sector has been affected just as badly as manufacturing, with perhaps the only people turning a handsome profit being those who run the smuggling networks. Small businesses have been hit hard, with many going under and even the most resourceful entrepreneurs struggling to stay afloat.

Consider Hind Amal, a divorcee and mother of four, who runs a beauty supply store as part of her grand plan to “move forward” and “be a provider and role model for my children”. Her business was such a roaring success after she first set it up in 2006 that she was able to pay back the loan she had taken out to set it up and turn a profit.

However, the blockade meant that she was unable to import the cosmetics her business sold and her customers could no longer afford them. With necessity driving this mother to invention, Amal started producing her own homemade cosmetics in a bid to keep her head above water and provide for her family.

Though the Israeli public tends to associate Gaza with dangerous men in beards and blood-curdling fanaticism, the vast majority of the Strip’s residents are very ordinary people living under the extraordinary circumstances of almost complete isolation from the outside world.

In fact, the hopes, fears and aspirations of the average Gazan are so mundanely human that it would be difficult for Israelis not to be able to relate to them. “My dream is for the Gaza airport to open again, to have open borders so we can travel,” admits Alaa al-Najjar (23), and not because he wishes to go on holiday or see the world, but “to get treatment for my brother whom I love very much”.

Like for Israelis, family is foremost in the minds of Palestinians in Gaza. “My dream was to give [my five children] a good and decent life. But I couldn’t do any of that,” says Jamal al-Za’aneen (60) who regrets that he was unable to help his children get married and find homes for themselves.

On the back of the blockade and following the pummelling Gaza received during what Israel calls Operation Cast Lead, the Strip is suffering a severe housing crisis. International organisations estimate that Gaza needs at least 71,000 additional housing units, mainly to accommodate natural population growth, but also to rebuild homes destroyed during Israeli military operations. For example, one recent survey found that 15,000 people who lost their homes during Operation Cast Lead remain displaced.

And it is this very tragic human impact of the blockade that should appeal to the common humanity that stretches across even enemy lines and awaken Israelis from their lethargy towards the crimes being committed in their name in Gaza.

Since Israel imposed its blockade, there has been a heated debate over whether or not it is illegal. Questions of legality aside, the real question should be whether or not it is just. As someone who opposes collective punishment, including the blanket Arab cultural boycott of Israel, I believe the blockade is unethical and immoral.

Of course, there will be those who will immediately raise objections and say that the embargo is only in place to protect Israel’s security. Though Israeli concerns over the safety of communities bordering Gaza are valid, how exactly does banning tinned fruit while permitting tinned meat and tuna protect Israel? Is the mighty IDF worried that Palestinian militants, short on rockets, will start firing expired peach chunks across the border?

There are those who argue that the blockade is in place to contain or even destroy Hamas. If that is the intention, then the plan has dramatically backfired. Tightening the screws on Gaza led from a situation in which Hamas won 44.45% of the votes and had to share power with Fatah to one in which it became the only show in town in Gaza. This is partly because, as Israelis well know from personal experience, a people which feels that it is unfairly under attack tends to close ranks and band together.

Additionally, economic destitution and despair usually lead to greater radicalisation and extremism, not the opposite. It is in Israel’s interest to live next door to Palestinians who are materially comfortable and in contact with the outside world.

Moreover, Israel has imposed severe restrictions on Gazans since at least 1991, when it began its permanent closure policy in the Strip, yet what effect have these had? Far more productive, as even a growing number of Israelis are now arguing, would be to engage with Hamas and empower the pragmatists within the movement who are willing to accept a Palestinian state on the pre-1967 borders.

Israelis pride themselves on their sense of morality, which they believe the world unfairly ignores. Well, it is time for them to display this sense of Jewish integrity and demand en masse that their government lift the blockade. It’s the only principled thing to do – and it is in Israel’s own self-interest to boot.

In a short story by an Israeli boy from Sderot, he imagined accidentally flying his remote-controlled plane over Gaza where he inadvertently bombed – or, more accurately, bon-bonned – the Palestinians with his payload of sweets, which led to such joy that everyone dropped their weapons, and peace reigned.

Though this may appear “naïve” to seasoned and cynical adults, this boy had the right idea: the key to this conflict lies in human kindness not inhumane hostility.

This article first appeared in The Jerusalem Post on 20 June 2012.

VN:F [1.9.22_1171]
Rating: 10.0/10 (1 vote cast)
VN:F [1.9.22_1171]
Rating: +1 (from 1 vote)
Tags: , , , , , , , , , ,

Related posts

Civil rights and wrongs in the Palestinian struggle

 
VN:F [1.9.22_1171]
Rating: +3 (from 5 votes)
VN:F [1.9.22_1171]
Rating: 4.8/10 (6 votes cast)

By Khaled Diab

Young Palestinian activists are drawing inspiration from the civil rights movement, but are reluctant to redefine their struggle along similar line.

Wednesday 28 March 2012

A hip bar in Ramallah named after a famous cocktail where friends and lovers come to hang out and chill is probably not the most obvious place to meet a young Palestinian revolutionary. While around the world people do drink and drive for change, outsiders tend to view Palestinians as straight-laced teetotallers, especially since the rise of Hamas, but judging by the number of watering holes in Ramallah, the truth is another country.

Taybeh, Palestine’s only domestically produced beer, even once had as its motto, “Taste the revolution”. And armed with a large glass of Taybeh, I had come to get a taste of what a new generation of savvy young Palestinian activists were brewing.

Zaid Shuaibi couldn’t be further from the traditional Western image of the wild-eyed Arab fanatic. He is soft-spoken, measured, understated and seems at harmony with the mellow, subdued ambiance of our meeting place. Though only 22, his maturity and depth cannot be measured in simple years.

Shuaibi, who I have met a number of times, spent the first half of his life in Saudi Arabia before his family returned to Ramallah, where he has lived ever since. Despite the hardships they‘ve endured, they have no regrets about having resettled in their native land.

Zaid discovered his passion for political activism at Birzeit university, though he emphasises that, despite his left-leaning, secular views, he is not aligned to any particular political party or current, partly as a demonstration of his independence and partly because he finds none of the established parties is fully satisfactory.

As a sign of his dedication to the Palestinian cause, he gave up the prospect of pursuing a career with an international agency in order to free himself up for his activism. He now works as an outreach coordinator for the Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions (BDS) campaign and is closely involved with the Palestinian youth activist movement.

Speaking with this young activist is inspiring and encouraging on so many levels. He and his co-resistors belief in peaceful protest, and the creative new techniques they are employing, especially after the disaster of the second intifada, that non-violence is perhaps the most powerful weapon in the Palestinian arsenal. Their recognition of the need for major, internal Palestinian reform is also timely and necessary.

Nevertheless, the odds they are up against can seem depressingly insurmountable. The situation on the ground is changing rapidly and, in many ways, perhaps irreversibly, as Israel’s settlement express train continues largely unhindered. This has caused a sense of inertia among Palestinians, to which even creative young activists can succumb. There is a widespread sense that the two-state option is dead, or at the very least comatosed in intensive care, and any possible Palestinian state will not only be small and lack territorial congruity, but will also not enjoy true sovereignty or independence.

But Shuaibi and many other activists, even though they believe in a single, democratic state for all Israelis and Palestinians, are reluctant or unwilling to act on this conviction now and fight for one now by transforming their struggle into a civil rights movement for full and equal citizenship, which I personally believe is the most effective way forward, at least for the foreseeable future. Of course, Palestinians deserve an independent state, but what they’re likely to get, if anything, is a virtual state, a state on paper, or, worst of all, a continued state of denial of their rights.

I know that, after so many decades of struggle and their rapidly shrinking prospects of independent statehood, the idea of becoming “Israelis” sits uncomfortably with most Palestinians, but with full enfranchisement they will be able to leave their imprint on the Israeli system, change it from within and gradually transform it into a state for all its citizens.

But given the worsening situation since the Oslo years, when Palestinians and Israelis regularly met and co-operated, and in light of the traditional Arab discourse regarding “non-normalisation”, not only does the idea of becoming Israelis not appeal, but positions are hardening even towards the idea of dealing with Israelis. Although I admit I could be wrong, I feel this refusal is not only a case of meeting wrong with wrong but is also counterproductive.

Working with Israeli activists and challenging and courting Israeli public opinion is, in my view, crucial, because Israel holds most of the cards and, after decades of waiting, the idea that the international community will come galloping in on its white steed to deliver the Palestinians their rights looks, it is safe to say, highly improbable.

That said, Palestinian and Israeli activists are increasingly resisting the occupation together, as demonstrated in so many cases, such as the joint protests against the Israeli separation wall, and a sizeable minority do recognise the importance of co-activism. Moreover, today’s young Palestinian activists are borrowing from the tactics of the American and South African civil rights movements. And the next logical step, once enough admit that the two-state solution is dead in the water, would be to adopt the objectives as well as the tactics of civil rights.

It is largely up to Palestinians and Israelis to come to some sort of accommodation on their own, and this requires direct engagement. And, as the weaker party, the most powerful weapon the Palestinians possess is people power.

And inspired by the popular mass movements that have emerged across the region, Palestinian activists are rediscovering the spirit of the largely peaceful first intifada which succeeded in changing so much (yet so little). But can they heal the internal rifts within Palestinian ranks, agree on a reinvented effective strategy and inspire the masses to take action?

Khaled Diab: How do you feel, as a Palestinian, about all the restrictions on your movement?

Zaid Shuaibi: When I head from Ramallah to another town, I’m struck by a strange sensation. Sometimes I am close to tears when I think that I have to make a two-hour detour because I’m not allowed to take a certain road or to pass through Jerusalem. You feel confined; you’re on your land and you can’t wander freely. This is terrible. You always feel deficient or incapable. To live in this land, you need to be super-human, you can’t just be an ordinary person.

I can sympathise. Here I am, a foreigner, and I can visit you from Jerusalem but you can’t come to visit me in Jerusalem. I have the freedom to travel all over the land, but you have trouble travelling both domestically and abroad.

Indeed, it’s our country and we can’t move around it, but any foreigner has the freedom to travel around.

While we’re on the subject of freedom of movement, there were the Freedom Riders which you were involved in. How successful would you say the initiative was?

The Freedom Riders had several objectives. It was a movement to link between the civil rights movement in America and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, or part of it, because our struggle is not a civil rights movement. Our conflict is multifaceted.

At the same time, it was a movement against Egged buses because it acquired a contract in Holland. A movement has emerged in Holland to try to cancel this contract as part of the divestment drive.

We thought that we should highlight how the racial discrimination that was prevalent in America 60 years ago is present here.

I think that we succeeded abroad. We managed to convey the picture to the outside world of how our freedom of movement is restricted and how we are not free to visit Jerusalem. However, domestically, we confronted some difficulties.

Within Palestinian society?

Yes, in Palestinian society.

In what way?

We sometimes face the difficulty of persuading people to adopt new ideas, especially those coming from abroad. There are those who feel we are blindly emulating others. But we do not feel that what we did was blind copying.

When it comes to boycotting, people think, for example, that we’re imitating South Africa. It’s true there are similarities with South Africa but the boycott movement has been around for a very long time in Palestine – from the 1930s or even before. General strikes and public disobedience, and boycotting the occupation and the settlements, have long been a part of the Palestinian struggle.

Can you explain a little about the Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions (BDS) movement? There are those who are not familiar with it, so can you tell us what your objectives are and how it works?

In 2004, a group of intellectuals and academics began calling for a cultural and academic boycott of Israel. Then, in 2005, the call for a wider BDS campaign was launched by a coalition of Palestinian civil society which urged the international community to boycott Israel because it is a racist and apartheid country.

The approach was similar to that pursued in South Africa. Just like the world boycotted South Africa because it infringed on the rights of the Africans there, we, as Palestinians, are calling for the same thing.

This was the starting point of the campaign, and the momentum has grown year after year.

We have witnessed numerous successes, such as the Freedom Rides which, through small movements on the ground, linked the BDS with the youth movement.

What other successes has the BDS campaign achieved?

A major success we scored in the Arab context was when Saudi Arabia excluded the French company Veolia from a tender for the Haramain railway link which was worth $10 billion because of the company’s involvement in the Jerusalem light rail project which passes through East Jerusalem. This is in violation of international law because it was operating in occupied territory.

This is just one of many recent achievements. Others include artists. For instance, a singer called Lara Fabian was going to perform in Lebanon but Lebanese activists called for a boycott against her because she had sung a song in Hebrew on Israel’s 60th anniversary and expressed her love of Israel… and she decided not to come.

We feel that people who do not acknowledge our rights as Palestinians and support Israel should be boycotted and isolated.

You describe the situation here as “apartheid”. But there are those who say that, despite similarities, the system here is different to South Africa.

The way I see it is that the Palestinian-Israeli conflict is complex and multifaceted. It is not only an apartheid system in the South African mould nor is it simply an Israeli occupation or military presence. It is a mixture of imperialism, colonialism and apartheid.

Here, there is a system of racial segregation imposed on us in the West Bank. There is segregation on the roads in the shape of the Israeli bypass roads and the roads set aside for Palestinians. That’s one.

Palestinians within Israel, the Arabs of 1948, are discriminated against and treated as third-class or fourth-class citizens.

But legally they have more or less equal rights.

Yes, but there are discriminatory laws.

What do you say to those Israelis who claim that Palestinians in Israel have more rights than Arab citizens in most Arab countries?

That has nothing to do with it. You can’t compare a Palestinian in Israel with an Arab living under the tyranny of a dictator: one has had his land stolen and the other is living under the repression of a dictator. Both are wrong.

Just because their situation is better than that of people in other Arab states that does not mean they should be told to shut up. They have rights.

If they consider themselves to be the only democracy in the Middle East, then they must believe in full equality between citizens regardless of their national background or beliefs, origin or ethnicity. And this does not happen in Israel.

Is the boycott you’re calling for a general one or a targeted one.

They are different boycott campaigns. First of all, we don’t call for the boycotting of individuals. We call for the boycotting of institutions – that’s in respect to the outside world. Internally, we call for the boycotting of Israeli products and the boycotting of normalisation encounters, under the so-called umbrella of the “peace process”. Encounters like this create a sense of equality between the oppressor and the victim.

Most people oppose the blockade of Gaza because it constitutes collective punishment. How do you ensure that your boycott is not collective punishment?

Here, there is a big difference. We cannot draw equivalence between the victim and the tormentor. I always start with this principle. Israel is the tormentor and the occupier, so it has to be punished, as an apartheid nation, a nation that practises racial discrimination and as an occupier, and as a country that does not recognise the rights of Palestinians.

Now if we look at the question in terms of effectiveness. You said that Palestinians have, since the 1920s or 1930s, been engaging in boycotts and, of course, the Arab world as a whole has boycotted Israel for decades, although this has lessened in recent years. In terms of results, what has all this achieved?

You can’t just look at it as a weapon. It is also a question of principle. You don’t want to deal with the state of the occupier. Moreover, a boycott is only one part of the process. You also need international pressure against the country you are boycotting.

Look at the example of South Africa, the boycott campaign and international pressure showed the apartheid regime that the world was opposed to it and it also led to South Africa’s isolation.

But there are those who suggest that the boycott played only a marginal role and that civil disobedience and the mass protest movement spearheaded by the ANC, as well as the inherent faults and unsustainability of the system, were the main factors in the collapse of apartheid.

In my view, the BDS campaign is, in itself, not enough, but it is a crucial component of the struggle. Of course, popular resistance also has to be a part of the struggle. International pressure is part of the struggle. International law is part of the struggle. It’s all connected. Getting our house in order as Palestinians is also part of the struggle.

Every struggle has its own character. There are different factors at play. But what’s certain is that a boycott does have an impact, and Israel sees it as a strategic threat because they know if the boycott movement grows, it will lead to Israel’s international isolation.

In your personal view, do you see a difference between an economic and a cultural boycott?  Personally, before coming here, I didn’t buy any Israeli products, and here I limit my purchases so as not to aid the occupation. But what I don’t really understand is the rationale for a blanket cultural boycott. For example, if there are people in Israeli civil society who are willing to enter into dialogue with Palestinians, why boycott them?

I’ll tell you my personal view, because I’m only involved in the BDS and not the cultural and academic boycott. So I prefer not to comment on it.

I just want to hear your personal view. For example, in a column you wrote in al-Masry al-Youm, you praised the success of protesters in cancelling a meeting between Palestinian and Israeli activists in Jerusalem.

There are plenty of Israelis who are partners in our struggle and who recognise our rights as Palestinians. They recognise, for example, the right of return. They recognise that we have rights as Palestinians living under occupation. They also believe in equality and the existence of the Palestinian people. People like that who come to struggle alongside us are not the target of the boycott. Debates are also not the subject of boycott, because this does not count as normalisation.

The aim of most of these so-called dialogues is to give the impression that there is an exchange going on, but this happens without the recognition of our rights, without the acknowledgement that there is a people being oppressed. They try to suggest that the conflict can be resolved through dialogue, but the issue is much larger than this. I don’t see that dialogue has resolved anything.

Let’s look at it from another perspective. In the absence of dialogue, what is the alternative? Do you think that you can reach peace without the Israeli side? Do you believe that you can achieve your rights as a Palestinian without Israeli involvement?

If we want to reach peace through negotiations, this will not happen with the current balance of power, with the Palestinians the weak side and the Israelis the powerful one.

I’m not talking about the political systems. I mean a dialogue between the two peoples, not the leadership. Do you think it would be useless?

Personally, I find that our 20-year experiment with negotiations and dialogue did not bring about any results. All the dialogues that took place did not result in anything. On the contrary, our situation has actually deteriorated.

But the dialogue you’re talking about was between the leadership and not between the people.

No, there was lots of normalisation and there were a lot of civil society organisations involved. It happened at many levels, and no single level achieved any of our demands as Palestinians.  These exchanges only succeeded in providing cover for Israel.

So what you’re trying to say is that this BDS movement is based on bitter experience.

Through experience, we’ve learnt that dialogue does not lead anywhere. On the contrary, it gave an impression to the world that Palestinians and Israelis are talking so relations between them must be normal and they can achieve peace. But ultimately what has happened is that the occupation has deepened its grip and the settlements have grown over the 20 years of negotiations, as has the stealing of water and the killing of Palestinians, as well as the creation of realities on the ground. There is no hope in dialogue.   

What does the youth movement see as the solution? What strategy have you got? You criticise the Palestinian leadership for not having a strategic vision. How do you intend to change the situation and what is your strategy?

Personally, this is how I see the situation. In the coming period, Palestinians need to focus on a number of issues. Firstly, the PLO must be restructured on the basis of Palestinian National Council elections, which represents all Palestinians everywhere in the world. This will restore the PLO’s legitimacy, and it will also restore the voice of the refugees, who represent 60-70% of the Palestinian people. At the moment, all the Palestinian leadership is illegitimate and unelected.

Secondly, there is popular resistance. We are going through an important period in our national history similar to the first intifada, which showed that popular resistance has a huge impact. The peaceful Arab revolutions have given momentum to peaceful Palestinian resistance.

Thirdly, there is the boycott campaign. Fourthly, there is the Arab dimension to the Palestinian cause. Our cause is not just Palestinian-Israeli, it is also Arab-Israeli. We must restore the Arab dimension of the struggle. If it remains defined as Palestinian-Israeli, then the balance of power will always be against us because Israel is far more powerful.

You just mentioned the refugees. I have noticed in recent months that Palestinian discourse has begun to focus a lot on the right of return. What does the “right of return” mean to you and how can it be achieved?

We call for the return of the refugees according to UN resolution 194. We do not ask for more.

And how old is this resolution?

It’s from 1948.

And we’re now in 2012. Many of these homes have disappeared. You have a lot of Palestinian villages and towns from 1948 that are no longer on the map. So, I’d like to know what does “return to their homes” mean? 

In my opinion, “return”, according to the resolution and how I see justice, means that those who were forced out of their villages have the right to return to the village from which they were displaced.

And if this village no longer exists?

The features may have changed but the land is still there. The place where the village or town stood is still there. The refugee has the right to choose: he can return to the original spot or not. Or he can choose to return to another spot or even to stay away – that’s each refugee’s individual choice. This is an individual right, not a collective one, and it does not become void with time.

Do you mean just the people who were displaced, or their children and grandchildren and great-grandchildren?

Yes, and great-great-grandchildren. The way I see it is, if the Jews say that our right to the land goes back 3,000 years and based on that we can return, that means that our right to return is sacred.

Let’s say the Jews gave up what they call the Law of Return would you be willing to give up the right of return?

I don’t believe in this Law of Return.

I’m not asking you whether you believe in it. I’m asking you if the Israelis said from now on this land is for all the people who live on it, whether Palestinian or Israeli Jew, or others, those who are actually on the ground.

You mean a single state for all?

Yes.

I am for the one-state solution in which everyone lives without discrimination and in equality. But there are rights for the Palestinians who have been wronged. Before we move towards the one-state solution, these rights must be restored. These are the right of return, the ending of the occupation, the dismantling of the settlements. Afterwards, we can live together in a single state.

You say the right of return is timeless. Let’s assume that this conflict carries on for another 500 years, would the distant descendants of those who were expelled still have a right of return?

Yes.

So how would this differ from Zionist ideology?

I don’t wish to philosophise about the situation. We didn’t invent our right of return. In addition, there is clear precedence in international law. I’m not demanding anything outside the law.

Ok, let’s look at it from another angle. Arabs accuse Israel of picking and choosing the elements of international law that suit it. There are Israelis too who accuse the Arabs of picking and choosing. They say that the Palestinians and Arabs rejected the UN partition plan of 1947 and declared war. So, they argue, why do Arabs insist of implementing resolution 194 when they rejected resolution 181?

They also didn’t accept the partition plan.

Why? They agreed to it?

But they occupied all of Palestine.

But they agreed to it before the war. They say we accepted it but the Arabs went to war.

The 1947 partition plan was unjust to the Palestinians. It allocated more than half the land to the Jews, even though the Arabs were the majority and the land was originally theirs.

That’s my point. UN resolutions are not sacred or set in stone. They need to be analysed to see how realistic, just and practical they are.

Yes, UN resolutions need to be analysed. There are resolutions which are taken to champion the wronged, like resolution 194. Despite its noble aim of helping the wronged, it was never implemented. But just resolutions like this must be implemented and we should not abandon them just because the balance of power is against us.

And what do you think of compensation?

It is up to the individual refugee to choose whether they want compensation or to return wherever they want to in historic Palestine.

In the context of the two-state solution, if Israel said the refugees can have the right to return to pre-1967 Palestine with a compensation package, would that be acceptable?

I can’t give you an opinion on this because I am not a refugee and so I can’t speak on their behalf.

On a pragmatic level, do you think the right of return is achievable in the foreseeable future?

Everything is possible. There were those who believed that Mubarak would rule indefinitely. Even with all that’s happened to us since 1948, we have not forgotten our rights, and we are ready to defend our rights. Another 10 or 20 years can pass but we will remain steadfast.

You say that you believe in the one-state solution. But you say that you must gain all your rights first before. So, that means you don’t believe in a gradual solution?

What do you mean?

For example, if you believe in a one-state solution, why don’t you transform the Palestinian struggle into a civil rights movement? Why don’t you start demanding Israeli citizenship? Why don’t you demand full and equal rights with Israelis? Won’t that lead to a single state?

I’ll tell you my personal opinion. Currently, we are at a stage of struggle. Personally, I believe in the one-state solution. But for the moment, the issue isn’t whether we should have one or two states. The situation at the moment is not conducive for that solution.

Personally, I think, on the contrary, now is the time to make that choice. You have to decide: do you want a piece of land to call your own or do you want your rights as people.

Personally, I don’t want to live under Israeli rule. Why should I live in an Israeli state?

Well, Israelis also fear that, in the one-state scenario, they will end up as second-class citizens under Palestinian or even Islamic rule. What will guarantee their rights in a single state?

What I believe in is a single state built on equal rights, where the constitution guarantees each people its rights.

So what’s to stop you from demanding citizenship and full and equal rights?

Personally, as Zaid, I don’t believe I’d be able to live under Israeli rule.

Is it because of the name of the state?

It’s not just the name of the state. It all needs to be approached gradually. It’s not just whether the state should be called Israel or Palestine. In my view, it’s important that I live in a country that is Palestine. I don’t want to be a dreamer but I do have a dream of living in my own land where I can go where I like.

But if you demand full and equal rights, you’ll be able to go where you like, and you’ll be able to vote in elections, and you’ll be able to choose your representative, and you’ll be able to help determine the direction of the state.

Under which system should I demand my equal rights? Under the current Israeli system?

Yes.

You mean the current unjust system.

Well, you did your own Freedom Rides. In the days when the original Freedom Riders were campaigning in America, the system there was unjust, but when they entered the system, they were able to make it fairer.

But there’s a difference. As I said before, we shouldn’t confuse the civil rights movement in America with our struggle. There, it was a question of civil rights. Here, it is not just civil rights. Here, there is more. There is a military occupation. Here, there is land theft.

But what’s the most powerful way to confront this occupation? If you’re an enfranchised member of society, won’t you be better positioned to end the occupation?

No, not in this way.

I’m not saying this will happen in a year or two. It will take many long years. But nothing can be built in a day or two.

When I look at the situation, the first thing I see is that Israelis don’t even accept your presence on the land. I mean, you’re not welcome here, so how do you expect them to give you full citizenship? They keep on evicting you and pushing you off the land, and you tell me that if I demand citizenship, I’ll be able to end the occupation? Their project, the Zionist project, wants us off the land, how do you then expect them to accept our presence here as equals? They believe that they are better than us. They believe that this is their land.

But changing any discriminatory system needs time and effort. For example, in South Africa…

I’ll tell you what.

Let me just finish what I have to say. You often compare the situation here to South Africa during the Apartheid era. Well, let’s complete the analogy. In South Africa, you also had a group of outsiders, white Europeans, who came and occupied and colonised the land, segregated the people, and placed themselves as the rulers. The black Africans, the original inhabitants of the land, during their struggle for their rights did not demand a separate country, they demanded equality. So, if you say there is apartheid here like there was in South Africa, and you’re following the South African boycott model, why not go all the way and also demand your civil rights.

I’ll reiterate my point. We were pushed off our land. Yes, there are elements in common between Apartheid South Africa and here, but that does not mean that the two situations are identical. Every struggle has its own characteristics. We have 1.5 million Arabs in Israel. Let them give that 1.5 million equal rights first, so that I, as a Palestinian, can be convinced that there is room for us to ask for equality.

But you can look at it from another angle. If you, as West Bank Palestinians, demanded citizenship like the Palestinians within Israel, and you added your voices to theirs, you’ll have enough clout in the system to be able to make it fair and equal.

And do you think Israel will allow you to become a majority and change the entire system?

I’m not saying change the entire system. I’m saying make it a fair system.

You need to realise that here we have two peoples with enormous differences between them and a longstanding conflict. It’s not easy to just come and say we’ll demand citizenship, become the majority and then change the system.

You don’t need to be the majority. Even as a sizeable minority, you’ll have a far better position than this disenfranchisement. You’ll also have constitutional rights that cannot be violated by others.

Well, I have a suggestion: why can’t a new system that is fair to all be built from scratch.

But this fair, new system won’t just fall out of the sky and say “Here I am, take me.”  You can only reach this new system gradually.

The way I see it is that activism and the boycott are part of the process of building this fair system. That way, you isolate Israel and force it to take action.

So, you don’t think that, if you were an Israeli citizen, you would be able to play a more effective role as an activist than if you stay outside the system?

You’re talking to me as if Israel is ready to give us citizenship.

I’m not saying Israel is ready. I’m saying you should demand these civil rights.

Let me say that, at this juncture, the situation is not conducive to demanding civil rights. Before civil rights, there are other rights that must be acquired, the rights of the people who were wronged. I don’t see that becoming part of Israel’s racist system is the solution for overturning the racist system. In fact, you would be giving it legitimacy by enabling them to say that it is a democratic system. It could enable them to remain in control because they are the stronger side which dominates the economy and the other centres of power in the country. If you enter the system, you will enter it as the weaker party.

Ok, you say that you believe in the one-state solution. So how do we reach it?

There is no clear vision for how this should be done. I can tell you that as an individual I believe in equal rights, but the details of how to achieve it is not at all easy. It is a very complicated matter. And we haven’t reached the point yet where the one-state solution is feasible. Most people still support the two-state option.

I can say, speaking as Zaid, that I would rather live in a Palestinian state built on 22% of the land than in a hegemonic Israeli state where we are excluded from all the centres of power.

On the subject of equal rights, there are a lot of Israelis who are terrified of the one-state “monster”. They are afraid, like has occurred with Jews before in history, that they would become an oppressed group or minority within this state.  Do you think these fears are exaggerated?

If there is a decent legal system that respects all, everyone will be equal. The PLO, when it was first established, called for a single state of equal citizens. This is something that the Palestinians have called for historically.

As for Israeli fears, naturally everyone wants to protect their own, but Israel tends to inflate matters. Take, for example, the fear of Iran, or Islamism.

I think we need to make a distinction between the state and the people. The Israeli state may exploit fears to advance its goals but the Israeli people are afraid. I’ve spoken to Israelis and their fear is genuine.

When they overcome this fear, we can then move towards the one-state solution.

And are there Palestinian fears regarding the one-state solution?

A lot of Palestinians fear that they will become second or third-class citizens. But the way I see it, we have either the two-state or the one-state option, that is if the leadership adopts it. In the two-state scenario, the Palestinians will remain weak. In a single state, if Palestinians are not granted equal rights, it will become an apartheid state. But you can then fight for your rights. I believe that achieving our rights requires activism. And activism in a single state might be preferable to having a separate state which is hobbled by agreements that strip it off the right to have a military and permit an Israeli military presence on our land – which is what is being proposed at present.

I don’t see this solution as being better than a single state. Palestinians have to overcome their fears and be courageous in the pursuit of the one-state solution.

Palestinians abroad are in favour of the one-state solution. They often try to push us in that direction and tell us “It’s the time”. But they are living far away. For me, here on the ground, I don’t see that it’s the time.

Well, that’s another important point. Your movement speaks of the importance of the Palestinian diaspora but, at the same time, it is you who are living the reality on the ground. They have their circumstances and you have yours. Like what happened after the first intifada, though it was led by Palestinians here, the exiled leadership came and took everything over. Why, then, shouldn’t part of your strategy be that every Palestinian community fight for its rights where it is and let the future bring what it brings?

When I believe in the rights of Palestinian citizens, then I also believe they have to be treated humanely wherever they are. Just because they were expelled from their land that does not mean they should be discriminated against. At the same time, there is the fear that assimilation within the societies where they live will lose them their identity.

But there is another fear: if this conflict goes on for another hundred years, then it would be unfair for them to stay like this.

I’m with you. I believe that they have to live a decent life of equality. Refugees must enjoy equal rights but they must not become, say, Lebanese citizens and lose their Palestinian identity. That is what I’m against.

Also, it is not just up to the Palestinians here to decide the fate of the struggle. After all, the majority of Palestinians live in exile. I can’t make the decision for them whether they should return or not. I don’t have the right to say that I don’t want the refugee in, say, Lebanon to come back.

So, in your view, in the absence of full recognition of the right of return, the conflict will not be resolved?

It won’t be resolved in a fair and just manner.

But Israel is likely to continue rejecting this. Does that mean the conflict will go on forever?

No. I believe that continued activism, including the BDS campaign, will force Israel to give us our rights. When Israel feels that it is losing, when it pays the price for its occupation and racism, and the price for expelling the Palestinians, then things will be different.

But couldn’t it be that if Israel feels cornered, it will become more violent and oppressive and more persistent in the course it is following? If we look at other regimes that were isolated as pariahs, like North Korea or Iraq, the system there became more oppressive under siege.

Israel gains its legitimacy and strength from the countries it deals with and the United Nations. International isolation would hit Israel where it hurts. It may become more oppressive for a while, but this can’t last. Israelis are always afraid of delegitimisation. Israel was a country established by an international resolution, so it needs international political support, otherwise its existence will be perceived as illegitimate.

VN:F [1.9.22_1171]
Rating: 4.8/10 (6 votes cast)
VN:F [1.9.22_1171]
Rating: +3 (from 5 votes)
Tags: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,

Related posts

Hebron settlers: “I don’t like Tel Aviv, does that mean we should tear Tel Aviv down”

 
VN:F [1.9.22_1171]
Rating: +1 (from 1 vote)
VN:F [1.9.22_1171]
Rating: 9.0/10 (1 vote cast)

By Khaled Diab

 Hebron settlement is as important as Tel Aviv, Israel is obliged to protect it and what Arabs lost in war should not be returned, says spokesman.

Monday 9 January 2012

Khaled Diab: What I’m gathering from what you’ve been saying is that you feel there’s a lack of understanding, comprehension and empathy and, even sympathy, towards your community and its aspirations. But how about if we turn the tables, do you feel your community understands and comprehends and empathises with mainstream concerns, such as, for example, you said that you were about 800 people here, yet you need several hundred, or a couple of thousand, soldiers to protect your presence here? Quite a lot of mainstream Israelis are relatively bitter about that. And how about the wider concerns, that your presence here has a humanitarian impact on the Palestinian population of Hebron.

David Wilder: That’s a big question, so let’s chop it up. Let’s start with the first part of the question. In terms of the military. First of all, it’s important to understand that the community here is here with the… the community here was re-established with the express consent and approval of the Israeli government. In other words, it’s not a pirate community. So, it’s real, it’s official, it’s not, you know, where somebody came in and they put up a tent, and then we grew and reached…

But the early settlers after the 1967 war, weren’t they like that?

We first came back… we came in 1968. People rented a hotel and then the Israeli government moved them to a military compound, and they lived there for two and a half years. After that, Kiryat Arba was established by the Israeli government, by Moshe Dayan, and they moved up there.

In 1979, a group of women and children moved into Hebron, to Beit Haddasa, which was a Jewish building, it was built by Jews in 1893 as a medical clinic which was used by both Jews and Arabs in Hebron. At that time, it was empty. The prime minister then, Menachem Begim, wasn’t overjoyed that they were there but he didn’t throw them out. He made their living conditions extremely difficult, but he didn’t expel them.

In 1980, following a terrorist attack here, when six men were killed, the Israeli government voted and re-established officially a Jewish community in Hebron. And a lot of, not all of, the buildings… but some of the buildings here, the rebuilding or the renovations, were done with funding from the Israeli government. So it’s something that’s real and official, ok.

The fact that there are people who don’t like it, you know. I don’t like Tel Aviv, does that mean we should tear Tel Aviv down and throw everybody out? No. I like this; they like that.

In terms of the military presence here, the Israeli military, or the Israeli government, has policies whereby they protect Jews wherever they are. And there are Jews here, so they also have to be protected. When I came to Israel in 1974, you didn’t have in Jerusalem security guards at bus stops, checking people getting on buses to make sure they’re not carrying bombs to blow up people on the bus. It’s a tremendous outlay to have security people at bus stops, you know, but Israel did it because it was a necessity. And the same thing is true in Hebron.

First of all, I’m not responsible for the fact that there are only 850 people here. The property that we have is full. If we’re allowed to build in Hebron on the property that we own, then we could have more people here. If we could buy from Arabs that want to sell us property, we could have more people. But as you’re very much aware, PA law says that Arabs who sell property to Jews will be summarily executed – it’s a capital crime [Ed: the PA has not actually executed anyone for this offence]. And they do it, so most Arabs, they’re not looking, you know, for all those virgins up there in the sky, so they don’t do it, because they’re not really interested in getting killed. It’s a very difficult procedure.

The military that is here have several different functions. They’re here to protect me, for sure. They’re also here to protect you, and all the other people that come here to visit, because we have a lot of people that come in to visit. Today, there’s a group of 400 people here.

But, as far as I’m concerned, the most important role of the military here has absolutely nothing to do with us. When Hebron was divided in 1997, the Hebron Accords, Israel pulled out of most of the city. It was given entirely to Arafat, and we pulled everything out. When we did that, the other side of Hebron turned into a terrorist nest, and you had people running around Israel from Hebron blowing themselves up, in Tel Aviv and Be’er Sheva and Haifa. There was a soccer team, a football team, in Hebron that they all turned into suicide bombers. There was an article about them in Newsweek.

In other words, when there was no Israeli intelligence, no Israeli security, on the other side of the city, it just, you know, it turned into a breeding ground for terrorism. And the same thing happened in Jenin. It happened in other places. And it cost us. It cost us a lot of lives. The Israeli military, as far as I’m concerned is here at least as much for, if not more, to protect the people in Tel Aviv than they are to protect me. Because if they can prevent someone from building a bomb and getting out to Tel Aviv or wherever they want to go to blow themselves up, then that’s certainly no less important than making sure that I’m safe and you’re safe. And that takes soldiers, you know.

Well, you can say that, if we pulled out of all of Hebron. Great! Well, then let’s just look at… if we want to learn a little bit from our recent past, we did that in Gush Katif. We pulled out of Gush Katif and we got 10,000 rockets back into Israel from what we gave them.

And you regard that as a pullout? I mean, the military is still in there.

They pulled out. They pulled out entirely.

Yes, but the military presence of Israel is still there. There’s the whole no-man’s-land. There’s the perimeter. There’re regular raids. The borders and economy are controlled by Israel.

No, no, of course not. The only reason you have raid is stop them throwing rockets at us. When we pulled out, the idea was… the Europeans invested a lot of money there. The Israelis who were down there, they had initiated and developed tremendous flower industries and the Europeans bought a lot of the hothouses that they used, which were… I don’t understand the field at all, but they were very sophisticated… So that the Arabs who then inherited what we left would be able to use them, and they destroyed them. They took them apart; they destroyed them.

When Israel pulls out of areas, they’ve turned into terrorist bases which have wreaked havoc in Israel proper, ok. I’m not talking about what they try to do in Hebron. I’m talking about what they try to do to people in Tel Aviv – and that, I think, is a major reason why the military is here and why the numbers have to be where they’re at.

So that’s the first part of the question. The other part of the question is dealing with… you asked me about, you know, well, there are people that don’t like us here… So, there are people that don’t like us, so what?

The concept of Hebron – i.e. Jews with horns and tails who breathe fire and eat one Arab for breakfast and two for lunch and three for dinner with the blood dripping off from your moustache from the one you’ve just finished – that’s the vision that people have. And they come in and it’s not like that. When I used to give tours… I still give tours but a different kind of tour… We would start in Kiryat Arba and the bus would come in and I’d just go around Kiryat Arba in the bus before coming down here into Hebron. And I used to watch people’s faces, and they didn’t believe it. They didn’t believe they were in Kiryat Arba, because Kiryat Arba is a settlement, and you know what a settlement is, a settlement is some tents, right? But that’s what people thought, that was the vision they had.

And a lot of Israelis who come in, not for a political tour, they can ask questions if they like, but forget the politics, just the historical element, the religious element, what Hebron means to the Jewish people, whether you’re religious or you’re not religious, it doesn’t make any difference. Everybody has a heritage, and they see it and they hear a little bit, and all of a sudden (clicks fingers): this isn’t what they taught me about Hebron. And it’s a totally different image. And that’s when mainstream Israelis who say may be we shouldn’t be here start saying, may be we should be. And we’ve had that happen.

It happened not so long ago. A major Israeli television entertainment personality was here and, after he was here, he said, yeah, there are problems with the community here and there, but we can’t leave Hebron, you know, and that happens when people see it, when they’re here, when they start to feel it a little bit. And we see that happen time and time and time again. It’s not an isolated kind of a thing.

To touch on something you said in passing about the taboo amongst Palestinians towards selling property to Israeli Jews. How does the community here and other groups among the Jewish community feel about selling land to Arabs, Palestinians? Look, if a Palestinian came and asked to buy your land…

Ok, look, there’s a major difference between what I like and what I don’t like and what is legally acceptable. I can say that I don’t like it, I can even oppose it, but the Supreme Court just ruled, up north in one of the moshavim, that when they had a tender to buy property, there was an Arab couple that wanted to buy and the community wouldn’t let them, the Supreme Court said you have to let them, you have to sell it to them, cuz they’re no different than anybody else.

Legally, according to PA law, which is based on Jordanian law, an Arab that sells property to a Jew is to be killed. Israeli law doesn’t say that. There can be reasons why yes and why know; there can be security elements; there can be all sorts of elements.

We used to have here, many years ago… They were building outside here, and there were Arab workers. One day, an Arab came inside here, with a gun, and he pulled them all together and told them if you come back here tomorrow, I’ll kill you. That was an Arab telling the Arabs. The next day nobody showed up.

In other words, there can be differences of opinion – pro, for, against, whatever – and that’s all legitimate. But when you take that and legalise it, and you say the law is…

But isn’t there a law, a form of legalisation, that says Israel officially owns all the land of Israel, like the Israeli government…

I wish that was true, but it’s not. I mean, you can ask me religiously what I believe, but in terms of what’s on the books, the president of the Supreme Court ruled, much to my own personal differing of opinion or opposition, but she’s the president of the Supreme Court, not me – at least, for a little while longer, she is. She ruled that any land that’s not registered as being owned by the Israeli government or the state of Israel belongs to the Arabs. Now I don’t know where she gets that from. But it’s just the opposite of what you just said.

There is land that’s owned by Arabs, I know that, and there’s land that isn’t. There’s land that’s owned by Jews, that’s owned by Arabs, there’s state-owned land. In any country in the world, there’s state-owned land.

And you think land captured by conquest is legitimate property?

You’re asking about…

Like what, for example, the international community regards as occupied territory?

Like the Jordanian conquest of 1948. The land that they took in 1948 by conquest. Is that legally theirs or not?

Or the land that Israel took in 1967. I mean, in all cases.

First of all, you see one of the anomalies of the conflict today is that there’s almost a given that violence, or different levels of violence, committed by one side is legitimate and accepted and understood and justifiable, and from the other side it’s not. There are consequences. If somebody declares war, or forget the war, if somebody walks into my office, and I start beating them up. You walked into my office just now and you said, my name is Khaled, and I jump on you and start hitting you, and you sue me, ok. You sue me for a million shekels. You take me to court. Then I’m going to have to pay the consequences for beating you up. May be you beat me up too. But I have to pay for what I did. It’s my problem. It might have hurt you, but I have to pay the consequences for what I did.

If somebody starts a war with you, then there are consequences for that. People can’t declare war and figure that even if they lose, they’re not going to have to pay a price. You know, when you say, as Nasser said, we’re going to throw them into the sea and, you know, he made a pact with the Syrians and the Jordanians, and he said, you know, let’s finish them off.

In 1967, the prime minister was Levi Eshkol…

But didn’t Israel start the 1967 war or don’t you regard that Israel started it?

I don’t know. The history books that I have say that Nasser closed the Straits of Tiran. That’s an act of war. The United Nations left. You know, that’s an act of war. The fact that he closed the Straits of Tiran, that he put a blockade on Israel, and said we’re going to throw you into the sea, formed a military pact with the Syrians and the Jordanians, I think that’s pretty much an act of war.

When Levi Eshkol was prime minister and he sent representatives from the state of Israel, including Golda Meir, to Hussein in Jordan saying to him, we don’t want anything, just leave us alone – we have enough to worry about up north and down south, just leave us alone. We’ll leave you alone, you leave us alone. And his response was to start shelling Jerusalem. He started shooting missiles from Jordan into Israel.

So, what, he thought he was going to do that and we were going to just ignore him? May be he thought that we would be finished, that they would defeat us and he would get everything. He wouldn’t just have East Jerusalem, he would get West Jerusalem too and a little bit more. But it didn’t work like that. You can’t start a war and expect that, if by chance you lose the war, it’s not going to cost you anything.

We came into Judea and Samaria and Gaza as a result of that war. And we stayed. Today, when people talk about the Geneva Convention and civilians and all of that, there are many different responses to all of those questions. The first one is, of course, if you want to say that we’re not allowed to be here, or that we’re occupying this, then who’s the legal owner, so to speak?

In other words, back in 1974 or 1975, Hussein relinquished all claims to Judea and Samaria. He said, I don’t want anything to do with it. It’s not mine any more.

But he relinquished them to the Palestinians, not to Israel.

No, he said, it’s not mine.

And he voted for the Palestinians, the PLO, as the representatives of the interests of the Palestinian people.

But that doesn’t mean just because he said so that it belongs to them. I mean, like, you know. The questions involved… I mean, legally, I don’t have any problems with international law. I mean, there are no problems. But if we take a place like Hebron, ok, and we take… I mean, right now, there was a… You know, for 700 years, Jews and Christians had no access to Machpelah, the Tomb of the Patriarchs.

Is that true?

Oh, yeah, unfortunately it’s true. In the year 1267… In 1260, the Mamluks pushed out the Crusaders. The Crusaders came in about 1100. And, ironically, the Crusaders in Hebron threw out the Jews. It was the first time I know of in a long, long time that there hadn’t been Jews in Hebron.

In 1260, the Mamluks threw out the Crusaders and let the Jews back in. The Mamluk emperor was a guy called Baybars and he closed off Temple Mount and, as an aside, he closed of Machpelah. He said, it’s a mosque. And for 700 years, we couldn’t go inside. There used to be stairs on the eastern wall. Jews could go up to the seventh step. That’s as far as we could go. They started to let Christians back in in the early to middle 1900s. Jews couldn’t go in. And for hundreds and hundreds of years, there were stairs on the eastern wall and Jews could go up to the seventh step.

And it’s only since we came back, is that side accessible to anybody. Anybody who wants to can go in. There are different sides, and this for this, and that for that, but anybody that wants to can go inside, with very, very few exceptions. Today, and you can read it, I’m writing about it now, the Arab mayor of Hebron… I say it to people all the time, but nobody really believes it, but now he’s said it… He said it, you know, and it was printed by, in Time magazine, by a writer who’s not a big friend of ours, so if he writes that’s what they said, then I think he’s accurate. The Arab mayor of Hebron today says that if he ever controls it, he won’t let Jews back in. He says it’s a mosque, always has been, always will be. He said, you know, we’ve been there as a mosque since, you know, 1260 or 1400 or whatever date.

If we’re not here, then there’s no access. It’s gone.

So, you feel yourselves to be guardians of the Jewish heritage of Hebron?

We… Let’s put it this way, if there wasn’t a Jewish community in Hebron today, it doesn’t matter whether I’m here or somebody else is here, if there wasn’t a Jewish community in Hebron today, Machpelah would’ve been lost a long time ago. We would’ve lost Machpelah in 1997. Arafat demanded it then, and they wouldn’t give it to him. And the people who wouldn’t give it to him weren’t rightwing extremists like me, they were leftwing extremists. Bu they were the ones running the show, and they took to Arafat the numbers, and they said this is how many Jews are visiting and how many Arabs are visiting. We can’t give it away, we can’t give it to you, there are too many Jews that go visit, and those numbers keep growing.

Part I – The art of peace

Part II -  From secular America to religious Hebron

Part III – “We are not extremists”

Part V – Palestinian people do not exist, are “PR bluff”

Part VI – Living with Palestinian “dhimmis”

VN:F [1.9.22_1171]
Rating: 9.0/10 (1 vote cast)
VN:F [1.9.22_1171]
Rating: +1 (from 1 vote)
Tags: , , , , , , , , , , ,

Related posts

Flower power in Gaza

 
VN:F [1.9.22_1171]
Rating: 0 (from 0 votes)
VN:F [1.9.22_1171]
Rating: 0.0/10 (0 votes cast)

By Khaled Diab

The Dutch have employed some novel flower power to persuade Israel to relax its embargo on Gaza. Now it’s time to end the blockade.

February 2009

Valentine’s Day – that festival of naff consumerism and kitsch infatuation – is not an occasion close to our heart. Love is a year-round ethereal pursuit and efforts to box it in on a particular day or package it in the form of cards, chocolates and flowers does not appeal.

But this year, I’m feeling a little more charitable towards old Saint Valentine after he made a foray into the Middle East. While Gazans, living amid the rubble of the recent Israeli invasion, are unlikely to be celebrating Valentine’s this year, the festival could mark a small step towards breaking the siege under which they live.

Literally, in a display of flower power in action, the Dutch government persuaded Israel to loosen its blockade of Gaza and let through a shipment of Valentine’s carnations destined for the Netherlands – the first exports from Gaza in a year.

The Dutch Foreign Minister Maxime Verhagen decided that the best way his country could start to mend fences was to say it with flowers. “The Netherlands would like to help the Palestinians pick up the pieces and give them a chance for a better future through Israeli-Palestinian economic co-operation,” he said.

It may surprise many to learn that the Netherlands, the world’s foremost flower trader, is importing carnations from Gaza, where more things seem to go boom than bloom. However, prior to the Israeli embargo, Gaza had a blossoming flower industry.

With its mild coastal climate and well-drained soil, the Gaza Strip is ideal for commercial flower cultivation. As a reflection of this, there are more than a hundred small flowers farms across the Gaza Strip, and they employ some 7,000 farm workers. But Israel has barred even this harmless cash earner – a wilting wreath on the tombstone of the Gazan economy.

“Shame on Israel. But shame on the Palestinian Authority, too… And shame on the European Union, because they have done nothing either. Why are they standing back in silence and allowing this to happen to us. Tell me – what is the security risk in exporting flowers?” asked one despondent farmer last year.

The Gaza Flower Growers’ Association estimates that the Strip used to export some 40 million flowers a year – other estimates are as much as double that. “We had to feed the flowers to the animals because we couldn’t export them,” said Mohammed Khalil, the association’s head. “We are afraid of losing our reputation in Europe and are afraid to plan ahead.”

While the 25,000 flowers that have been let through are hardly going to make much of a difference to the desperate situation in Gaza – which is grappling with mass unemployment, severe food shortages and a $2 billion tab for the recent destruction – the gesture does carry a symbolic value which highlights, somewhat poetically, the human tragedy Israel’s longstanding blockade has triggered.

Now it’s time for Israel to realise that showing a little bit of love for Valentine’s is not enough; it, and the international community, must break the stranglehold on Gaza and end the embargo. Likewise, Egypt must open its borders crossing, too.

This column appeared in The Guardian Unlimited’s Comment is Free section on 14 February 2009. Read the related discussion.

This is an archive piece that was migrated to this website from Diabolic Digest

VN:F [1.9.22_1171]
Rating: 0.0/10 (0 votes cast)
VN:F [1.9.22_1171]
Rating: 0 (from 0 votes)
Tags: , , , , ,

Related posts