Safeguarding Arab media heritage… in Israel

 
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By Khaled Diab

The world’s largest Arabic-language press archive is located in Israel. Should Arabs use it or boycott it?

Wednesday 6 June 2012

Some vintage Egyptian newspapers. Photo: ©Khaled Diab

After a lively encounter at Tel Aviv University with the renegade Israeli historian Shlomo Sand, author of the bestselling The invention of the Jewish people, I met a friend, the young Israeli Arabist and historian Ofir Winter who has a profound interest in Egypt and is researching Arab perceptions of Israel.

“I have a surprise for you. It’s one of the university’s hidden gems,” he told me as he led me to a poorly lit and rarely visited corner of the campus. Our destination: the university’s Arabic press archives which, its curators claim, is the largest collection of Arab print media in the world.

Pleasantly surprised by the unexpected visit from an Egyptian, the two Michaels who seem to be temporarily in charge following the untimely death of the archive’s founder Haim Gal proudly showed me around, including a couple of the seven massive halls containing some 24,000 boxes of publications of all sorts dating back to the 1950s. In the archive’s main hall was row upon row of leading and obscure Arab publications – not just newspapers and political journals, but also lifestyle and women’s magazines – not to mention Turkish and Persian titles.

Since the Tunisian and Egyptian revolutions erupted last year, the archive’s resource-strapped team, mostly made up of volunteers, has struggled to keep up with the explosion in new publications that have emerged, especially online. “New titles are coming out all the time and we have to be fast in downloading them because some don’t stay online for long,” explained one researcher as she clicked away at her computer.

One of the Michaels showed me an item that seemed to hold pride of place in the collection, even though it was only a facsimile, the first-ever edition of Egypt’s oldest newspaper still in print, al-Ahram, dated 5 August 1876. Instead of the paper’s famous masthead featuring the three pyramids of Giza, the original showed only two pyramids and the Sphinx. Unlike today’s bulky version, issue one was one large sheet folded into four pages. It is also very difficult to read for the modern eye, because it contained no columns or headlines.

“The most exciting materials I found there were the October magazines from the time of Sadat’s peace initiative,” Winter tells me. “I was moved deeply when I saw images of Sadat arriving at Haifa port in September 1979, with happy Israeli children waving the flags of both Egypt and Israel.”

Of course, the very existence of this archive is likely to arouse suspicion in the minds of some Arabs, who are bound to view it as an intelligence-gathering apparatus. The archive’s management itself insists that it is a resource open to all academics, though the media and the government are welcome to consult it. Academics from Jordan, Iraq, Palestine and other Arab countries are also among its clients, despite the Arab boycott of Israel.

“I don’t know the exact motives of its founders,” admits Winter. “But maybe, just maybe, you can interpret this huge archive as an attempt to bridge the qualitative distance (or isolation) between Israel and the Arab world quantitatively.”

But this message of building bridges is likely to get lost amid the ding of the call for an international cultural and academic boycott of Israel. Omar Barghouti, who wrote a widely praised book on the subject of boycott, divestment and sanctions, calls on “every conscientious academic and academic institution to boycott all Israeli academic institutions because of their ongoing deep complicity in perpetuating the occupation and other forms of oppression”. Yet Barghouti holds a master’s degree in philosophy from Tel Aviv University, which he acquired after co-founding the Palestinian Campaign for the Academic and Cultural Boycott of Israel – a contradiction he has refused to explain.

Although many Israeli academics are complicit in perpetuating the inhumane status quo, others are not. For instance, Sand, who I had come to meet, can hardly be described as an apologist for Israeli oppression, was friends with Palestine’s national poet Mahmoud Darwish, insisted that the Arabic version of his book should be published in Ramallah and not Cairo or Beirut, and advocates transforming Israel, in the framework of the two-state solution, into a truly democratic state for all its citizens.

Yet Sand finds himself in the bizarre situation of being effectively under boycott. “They will not invite me to Ramallah because I teach at Tel Aviv University,” he told me. “Any pressure that is not terror is welcome. But be careful. You have started to boycott the most liberal segment of the Israeli political culture.”

While I support a targeted economic boycott against Israel to ensure that the outside world does not bankroll the occupation and oppression of Palestinians, I find a blanket cultural or academic boycott to be unfair and counterproductive. Far better would be two parallel campaigns: one to boycott Israeli peacebreakers and another to embrace and engage with Israeli peacemakers.

This article first appeared in The National on 5 June 2012.

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The battle for the soul of the Arab man

 
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By Khaled Diab

The polarised debate over Arab women overlooks the fact that men can be victims of the patriarchy too and their identity is a cultural battlefield.

Friday 18 May 2012

‘Why do they hate us?’ was the controversial question posed by the Egyptian-American columnist Mona Eltahaway in the hotly debated May/June issue of Foreign Policy magazine. “Until the rage shifts from the oppressors in our presidential palaces to the oppressors on our streets and in our homes, our revolution has not even begun,” writes Eltahaway. “Name me an Arab country, and I’ll recite a litany of abuses fuelled by a toxic mix of culture and religion.”

Although Eltahawy’s essay is, sadly for Arab women, factually accurate and I agree with almost everything she says, I find myself differing with her about what she omits to say.

To borrow her own words, Eltahaway’s essay, despite the substantial space available to her, does not move beyond reciting a long “litany of abuses” without making any attempt to depict the complexity of the situation and highlight the grey areas. Largely missing from her analysis are the diverse shades of opinion and attitudes across the Arab world, and the very real gains made by Arab women in many countries, especially in the professional and educational spheres.

As a long-time admirer of Eltahawy’s journalism and activism, I find it hard to fathom why liberal, empowered Arab women who have challenged discrimination in every walk of life hardly feature in her article, though she does mention some who have resisted the abuse of “virginity tests” and forced marriage, or defied the Saudi ban on female driving.

Her loaded ‘why do they hate us’ question also turns a blind eye to a highly inconvenient reality for advocates of gender equality like myself: many Arab men and women do not regard traditional gender attitudes to be a sign of hatred, but rather of love and respect. In an interesting turning of the tables, conservative Arabs are reciprocating the Western interest in the subordinate position of Arab and Muslim women by setting up think tanks to examine the “oppressed” status of the Western woman.

Weird, you say? Yes, until you consider that many conservatives in the West hold similar views of their societies, as reflected by the recent so-called “war on sex” launched by many of the candidates in the Republican primaries. And I’m sure many Haredim women in Israel do not regard a “dignified” dress code or the erasure of women’s faces from billboards or de facto gender segregation on some buses, with women forced to sit in the back, as signs of their inferiority.

In fact, you could say that one major factor behind the patriarchal orders durability and longevity, which survives to some degree even in the more egalitarian West, is its ability to co-opt and condition certain women into accepting and even embracing the status quo and linking the status of some women to the oppression of others.

This brings me to another breed of Arab men completely absent from Eltahawy’s essay: those who believe in women’s rights and have stood shoulder to shoulder with women in their quest for (greater) equality. In fact, perhaps the first advocate for greater rights for women in Egypt was Qasim Amin who echoed Eltahawy more than a century ago in his The Liberation of Women (1899). “Throughout the generations our women have continued to be subordinate to the rule of the strong and are overcome by the powerful tyranny of men,” he wrote. “The inferior position of Muslim women is the greatest obstacle that prevents us from advancing toward what is beneficial for us.”

It would also seem that just as women have become a political football in the culture war between a hegemonic West and a defensive Arab world, it is my view that men have too. Western discourse, especially in conservative circles, tends to focus on the Arab man as a woman-hater or terrorist, ignoring the liberal breed of Arab men I mentioned above. Meanwhile, in a supposed bid to defend their culture against the onslaught of modernity, as well as to protect the patriarchal privileges they enjoy, conservative Arab elites talk up traditional gender roles and mock and demonise men who deviate from them either as weaklings or Western stooges.

Moreover, one factor behind the enduring presence of patriarchy in the Arab world is what the academic Deniz Kandiyoti called the “patriarchal bargain” in which the Ottomans, British and French bought the submission of men by offering them absolute power over women. Arab dictators like Mubarak have played similar tricks. As one Egyptian feminist put it to me: “If you can’t control your income, the fate of your family or the politics of your country, then you will try to control what you can, that is the private sphere.”

In addition, though women are the traditional patriarchy’s greatest victims, many men suffer too. After all, the patriarchal order is in place primarily to serve the interests of the top dogs, the alpha males, with the beta and gamma males often oppressed severely, as the beatings and rapes of young male protesters in Egypt clearly illustrate.

Traditional concepts of manhood can also hurt those men unwilling or unable to live by them. The gap between the regular Arab man, the “average Mo”, and the Arab myth of manhood is bound to breed feelings of inadequacy, because, in societies – where many women have become men’s equal and even surpassed them in schools, universities and the workplace – the chasm between fantasy and reality is a yawning one.

Moreover, it can leave impressionable men who hold no grudge against women and have no objections to living in equality with them unwilling to do so publicly to avoid mockery from their peers and superiors. As long as conservative circles continue successfully to equate female emancipation with male emaciation, capitulation to foreign powers and the loss of cultural authenticity, the quest for gender equality will stall.

What we need are mainstream, “average Mo” role models who demonstrate that believing in gender equality squares with being a man, and that empowering women also empowers men and society as a whole. And this is one lesson that the revolutionary youth in Egypt and Tunisia who have inspired the Arab world can teach over time.

This article first appeared in The Jerusalem Post on 15 May 2012.

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Civil rights and wrongs in the Palestinian struggle

 
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By Khaled Diab

Young Palestinian activists are drawing inspiration from the civil rights movement, but are reluctant to redefine their struggle along similar line.

Wednesday 28 March 2012

A hip bar in Ramallah named after a famous cocktail where friends and lovers come to hang out and chill is probably not the most obvious place to meet a young Palestinian revolutionary. While around the world people do drink and drive for change, outsiders tend to view Palestinians as straight-laced teetotallers, especially since the rise of Hamas, but judging by the number of watering holes in Ramallah, the truth is another country.

Taybeh, Palestine’s only domestically produced beer, even once had as its motto, “Taste the revolution”. And armed with a large glass of Taybeh, I had come to get a taste of what a new generation of savvy young Palestinian activists were brewing.

Zaid Shuaibi couldn’t be further from the traditional Western image of the wild-eyed Arab fanatic. He is soft-spoken, measured, understated and seems at harmony with the mellow, subdued ambiance of our meeting place. Though only 22, his maturity and depth cannot be measured in simple years.

Shuaibi, who I have met a number of times, spent the first half of his life in Saudi Arabia before his family returned to Ramallah, where he has lived ever since. Despite the hardships they‘ve endured, they have no regrets about having resettled in their native land.

Zaid discovered his passion for political activism at Birzeit university, though he emphasises that, despite his left-leaning, secular views, he is not aligned to any particular political party or current, partly as a demonstration of his independence and partly because he finds none of the established parties is fully satisfactory.

As a sign of his dedication to the Palestinian cause, he gave up the prospect of pursuing a career with an international agency in order to free himself up for his activism. He now works as an outreach coordinator for the Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions (BDS) campaign and is closely involved with the Palestinian youth activist movement.

Speaking with this young activist is inspiring and encouraging on so many levels. He and his co-resistors belief in peaceful protest, and the creative new techniques they are employing, especially after the disaster of the second intifada, that non-violence is perhaps the most powerful weapon in the Palestinian arsenal. Their recognition of the need for major, internal Palestinian reform is also timely and necessary.

Nevertheless, the odds they are up against can seem depressingly insurmountable. The situation on the ground is changing rapidly and, in many ways, perhaps irreversibly, as Israel’s settlement express train continues largely unhindered. This has caused a sense of inertia among Palestinians, to which even creative young activists can succumb. There is a widespread sense that the two-state option is dead, or at the very least comatosed in intensive care, and any possible Palestinian state will not only be small and lack territorial congruity, but will also not enjoy true sovereignty or independence.

But Shuaibi and many other activists, even though they believe in a single, democratic state for all Israelis and Palestinians, are reluctant or unwilling to act on this conviction now and fight for one now by transforming their struggle into a civil rights movement for full and equal citizenship, which I personally believe is the most effective way forward, at least for the foreseeable future. Of course, Palestinians deserve an independent state, but what they’re likely to get, if anything, is a virtual state, a state on paper, or, worst of all, a continued state of denial of their rights.

I know that, after so many decades of struggle and their rapidly shrinking prospects of independent statehood, the idea of becoming “Israelis” sits uncomfortably with most Palestinians, but with full enfranchisement they will be able to leave their imprint on the Israeli system, change it from within and gradually transform it into a state for all its citizens.

But given the worsening situation since the Oslo years, when Palestinians and Israelis regularly met and co-operated, and in light of the traditional Arab discourse regarding “non-normalisation”, not only does the idea of becoming Israelis not appeal, but positions are hardening even towards the idea of dealing with Israelis. Although I admit I could be wrong, I feel this refusal is not only a case of meeting wrong with wrong but is also counterproductive.

Working with Israeli activists and challenging and courting Israeli public opinion is, in my view, crucial, because Israel holds most of the cards and, after decades of waiting, the idea that the international community will come galloping in on its white steed to deliver the Palestinians their rights looks, it is safe to say, highly improbable.

That said, Palestinian and Israeli activists are increasingly resisting the occupation together, as demonstrated in so many cases, such as the joint protests against the Israeli separation wall, and a sizeable minority do recognise the importance of co-activism. Moreover, today’s young Palestinian activists are borrowing from the tactics of the American and South African civil rights movements. And the next logical step, once enough admit that the two-state solution is dead in the water, would be to adopt the objectives as well as the tactics of civil rights.

It is largely up to Palestinians and Israelis to come to some sort of accommodation on their own, and this requires direct engagement. And, as the weaker party, the most powerful weapon the Palestinians possess is people power.

And inspired by the popular mass movements that have emerged across the region, Palestinian activists are rediscovering the spirit of the largely peaceful first intifada which succeeded in changing so much (yet so little). But can they heal the internal rifts within Palestinian ranks, agree on a reinvented effective strategy and inspire the masses to take action?

Khaled Diab: How do you feel, as a Palestinian, about all the restrictions on your movement?

Zaid Shuaibi: When I head from Ramallah to another town, I’m struck by a strange sensation. Sometimes I am close to tears when I think that I have to make a two-hour detour because I’m not allowed to take a certain road or to pass through Jerusalem. You feel confined; you’re on your land and you can’t wander freely. This is terrible. You always feel deficient or incapable. To live in this land, you need to be super-human, you can’t just be an ordinary person.

I can sympathise. Here I am, a foreigner, and I can visit you from Jerusalem but you can’t come to visit me in Jerusalem. I have the freedom to travel all over the land, but you have trouble travelling both domestically and abroad.

Indeed, it’s our country and we can’t move around it, but any foreigner has the freedom to travel around.

While we’re on the subject of freedom of movement, there were the Freedom Riders which you were involved in. How successful would you say the initiative was?

The Freedom Riders had several objectives. It was a movement to link between the civil rights movement in America and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, or part of it, because our struggle is not a civil rights movement. Our conflict is multifaceted.

At the same time, it was a movement against Egged buses because it acquired a contract in Holland. A movement has emerged in Holland to try to cancel this contract as part of the divestment drive.

We thought that we should highlight how the racial discrimination that was prevalent in America 60 years ago is present here.

I think that we succeeded abroad. We managed to convey the picture to the outside world of how our freedom of movement is restricted and how we are not free to visit Jerusalem. However, domestically, we confronted some difficulties.

Within Palestinian society?

Yes, in Palestinian society.

In what way?

We sometimes face the difficulty of persuading people to adopt new ideas, especially those coming from abroad. There are those who feel we are blindly emulating others. But we do not feel that what we did was blind copying.

When it comes to boycotting, people think, for example, that we’re imitating South Africa. It’s true there are similarities with South Africa but the boycott movement has been around for a very long time in Palestine – from the 1930s or even before. General strikes and public disobedience, and boycotting the occupation and the settlements, have long been a part of the Palestinian struggle.

Can you explain a little about the Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions (BDS) movement? There are those who are not familiar with it, so can you tell us what your objectives are and how it works?

In 2004, a group of intellectuals and academics began calling for a cultural and academic boycott of Israel. Then, in 2005, the call for a wider BDS campaign was launched by a coalition of Palestinian civil society which urged the international community to boycott Israel because it is a racist and apartheid country.

The approach was similar to that pursued in South Africa. Just like the world boycotted South Africa because it infringed on the rights of the Africans there, we, as Palestinians, are calling for the same thing.

This was the starting point of the campaign, and the momentum has grown year after year.

We have witnessed numerous successes, such as the Freedom Rides which, through small movements on the ground, linked the BDS with the youth movement.

What other successes has the BDS campaign achieved?

A major success we scored in the Arab context was when Saudi Arabia excluded the French company Veolia from a tender for the Haramain railway link which was worth $10 billion because of the company’s involvement in the Jerusalem light rail project which passes through East Jerusalem. This is in violation of international law because it was operating in occupied territory.

This is just one of many recent achievements. Others include artists. For instance, a singer called Lara Fabian was going to perform in Lebanon but Lebanese activists called for a boycott against her because she had sung a song in Hebrew on Israel’s 60th anniversary and expressed her love of Israel… and she decided not to come.

We feel that people who do not acknowledge our rights as Palestinians and support Israel should be boycotted and isolated.

You describe the situation here as “apartheid”. But there are those who say that, despite similarities, the system here is different to South Africa.

The way I see it is that the Palestinian-Israeli conflict is complex and multifaceted. It is not only an apartheid system in the South African mould nor is it simply an Israeli occupation or military presence. It is a mixture of imperialism, colonialism and apartheid.

Here, there is a system of racial segregation imposed on us in the West Bank. There is segregation on the roads in the shape of the Israeli bypass roads and the roads set aside for Palestinians. That’s one.

Palestinians within Israel, the Arabs of 1948, are discriminated against and treated as third-class or fourth-class citizens.

But legally they have more or less equal rights.

Yes, but there are discriminatory laws.

What do you say to those Israelis who claim that Palestinians in Israel have more rights than Arab citizens in most Arab countries?

That has nothing to do with it. You can’t compare a Palestinian in Israel with an Arab living under the tyranny of a dictator: one has had his land stolen and the other is living under the repression of a dictator. Both are wrong.

Just because their situation is better than that of people in other Arab states that does not mean they should be told to shut up. They have rights.

If they consider themselves to be the only democracy in the Middle East, then they must believe in full equality between citizens regardless of their national background or beliefs, origin or ethnicity. And this does not happen in Israel.

Is the boycott you’re calling for a general one or a targeted one.

They are different boycott campaigns. First of all, we don’t call for the boycotting of individuals. We call for the boycotting of institutions – that’s in respect to the outside world. Internally, we call for the boycotting of Israeli products and the boycotting of normalisation encounters, under the so-called umbrella of the “peace process”. Encounters like this create a sense of equality between the oppressor and the victim.

Most people oppose the blockade of Gaza because it constitutes collective punishment. How do you ensure that your boycott is not collective punishment?

Here, there is a big difference. We cannot draw equivalence between the victim and the tormentor. I always start with this principle. Israel is the tormentor and the occupier, so it has to be punished, as an apartheid nation, a nation that practises racial discrimination and as an occupier, and as a country that does not recognise the rights of Palestinians.

Now if we look at the question in terms of effectiveness. You said that Palestinians have, since the 1920s or 1930s, been engaging in boycotts and, of course, the Arab world as a whole has boycotted Israel for decades, although this has lessened in recent years. In terms of results, what has all this achieved?

You can’t just look at it as a weapon. It is also a question of principle. You don’t want to deal with the state of the occupier. Moreover, a boycott is only one part of the process. You also need international pressure against the country you are boycotting.

Look at the example of South Africa, the boycott campaign and international pressure showed the apartheid regime that the world was opposed to it and it also led to South Africa’s isolation.

But there are those who suggest that the boycott played only a marginal role and that civil disobedience and the mass protest movement spearheaded by the ANC, as well as the inherent faults and unsustainability of the system, were the main factors in the collapse of apartheid.

In my view, the BDS campaign is, in itself, not enough, but it is a crucial component of the struggle. Of course, popular resistance also has to be a part of the struggle. International pressure is part of the struggle. International law is part of the struggle. It’s all connected. Getting our house in order as Palestinians is also part of the struggle.

Every struggle has its own character. There are different factors at play. But what’s certain is that a boycott does have an impact, and Israel sees it as a strategic threat because they know if the boycott movement grows, it will lead to Israel’s international isolation.

In your personal view, do you see a difference between an economic and a cultural boycott?  Personally, before coming here, I didn’t buy any Israeli products, and here I limit my purchases so as not to aid the occupation. But what I don’t really understand is the rationale for a blanket cultural boycott. For example, if there are people in Israeli civil society who are willing to enter into dialogue with Palestinians, why boycott them?

I’ll tell you my personal view, because I’m only involved in the BDS and not the cultural and academic boycott. So I prefer not to comment on it.

I just want to hear your personal view. For example, in a column you wrote in al-Masry al-Youm, you praised the success of protesters in cancelling a meeting between Palestinian and Israeli activists in Jerusalem.

There are plenty of Israelis who are partners in our struggle and who recognise our rights as Palestinians. They recognise, for example, the right of return. They recognise that we have rights as Palestinians living under occupation. They also believe in equality and the existence of the Palestinian people. People like that who come to struggle alongside us are not the target of the boycott. Debates are also not the subject of boycott, because this does not count as normalisation.

The aim of most of these so-called dialogues is to give the impression that there is an exchange going on, but this happens without the recognition of our rights, without the acknowledgement that there is a people being oppressed. They try to suggest that the conflict can be resolved through dialogue, but the issue is much larger than this. I don’t see that dialogue has resolved anything.

Let’s look at it from another perspective. In the absence of dialogue, what is the alternative? Do you think that you can reach peace without the Israeli side? Do you believe that you can achieve your rights as a Palestinian without Israeli involvement?

If we want to reach peace through negotiations, this will not happen with the current balance of power, with the Palestinians the weak side and the Israelis the powerful one.

I’m not talking about the political systems. I mean a dialogue between the two peoples, not the leadership. Do you think it would be useless?

Personally, I find that our 20-year experiment with negotiations and dialogue did not bring about any results. All the dialogues that took place did not result in anything. On the contrary, our situation has actually deteriorated.

But the dialogue you’re talking about was between the leadership and not between the people.

No, there was lots of normalisation and there were a lot of civil society organisations involved. It happened at many levels, and no single level achieved any of our demands as Palestinians.  These exchanges only succeeded in providing cover for Israel.

So what you’re trying to say is that this BDS movement is based on bitter experience.

Through experience, we’ve learnt that dialogue does not lead anywhere. On the contrary, it gave an impression to the world that Palestinians and Israelis are talking so relations between them must be normal and they can achieve peace. But ultimately what has happened is that the occupation has deepened its grip and the settlements have grown over the 20 years of negotiations, as has the stealing of water and the killing of Palestinians, as well as the creation of realities on the ground. There is no hope in dialogue.   

What does the youth movement see as the solution? What strategy have you got? You criticise the Palestinian leadership for not having a strategic vision. How do you intend to change the situation and what is your strategy?

Personally, this is how I see the situation. In the coming period, Palestinians need to focus on a number of issues. Firstly, the PLO must be restructured on the basis of Palestinian National Council elections, which represents all Palestinians everywhere in the world. This will restore the PLO’s legitimacy, and it will also restore the voice of the refugees, who represent 60-70% of the Palestinian people. At the moment, all the Palestinian leadership is illegitimate and unelected.

Secondly, there is popular resistance. We are going through an important period in our national history similar to the first intifada, which showed that popular resistance has a huge impact. The peaceful Arab revolutions have given momentum to peaceful Palestinian resistance.

Thirdly, there is the boycott campaign. Fourthly, there is the Arab dimension to the Palestinian cause. Our cause is not just Palestinian-Israeli, it is also Arab-Israeli. We must restore the Arab dimension of the struggle. If it remains defined as Palestinian-Israeli, then the balance of power will always be against us because Israel is far more powerful.

You just mentioned the refugees. I have noticed in recent months that Palestinian discourse has begun to focus a lot on the right of return. What does the “right of return” mean to you and how can it be achieved?

We call for the return of the refugees according to UN resolution 194. We do not ask for more.

And how old is this resolution?

It’s from 1948.

And we’re now in 2012. Many of these homes have disappeared. You have a lot of Palestinian villages and towns from 1948 that are no longer on the map. So, I’d like to know what does “return to their homes” mean? 

In my opinion, “return”, according to the resolution and how I see justice, means that those who were forced out of their villages have the right to return to the village from which they were displaced.

And if this village no longer exists?

The features may have changed but the land is still there. The place where the village or town stood is still there. The refugee has the right to choose: he can return to the original spot or not. Or he can choose to return to another spot or even to stay away – that’s each refugee’s individual choice. This is an individual right, not a collective one, and it does not become void with time.

Do you mean just the people who were displaced, or their children and grandchildren and great-grandchildren?

Yes, and great-great-grandchildren. The way I see it is, if the Jews say that our right to the land goes back 3,000 years and based on that we can return, that means that our right to return is sacred.

Let’s say the Jews gave up what they call the Law of Return would you be willing to give up the right of return?

I don’t believe in this Law of Return.

I’m not asking you whether you believe in it. I’m asking you if the Israelis said from now on this land is for all the people who live on it, whether Palestinian or Israeli Jew, or others, those who are actually on the ground.

You mean a single state for all?

Yes.

I am for the one-state solution in which everyone lives without discrimination and in equality. But there are rights for the Palestinians who have been wronged. Before we move towards the one-state solution, these rights must be restored. These are the right of return, the ending of the occupation, the dismantling of the settlements. Afterwards, we can live together in a single state.

You say the right of return is timeless. Let’s assume that this conflict carries on for another 500 years, would the distant descendants of those who were expelled still have a right of return?

Yes.

So how would this differ from Zionist ideology?

I don’t wish to philosophise about the situation. We didn’t invent our right of return. In addition, there is clear precedence in international law. I’m not demanding anything outside the law.

Ok, let’s look at it from another angle. Arabs accuse Israel of picking and choosing the elements of international law that suit it. There are Israelis too who accuse the Arabs of picking and choosing. They say that the Palestinians and Arabs rejected the UN partition plan of 1947 and declared war. So, they argue, why do Arabs insist of implementing resolution 194 when they rejected resolution 181?

They also didn’t accept the partition plan.

Why? They agreed to it?

But they occupied all of Palestine.

But they agreed to it before the war. They say we accepted it but the Arabs went to war.

The 1947 partition plan was unjust to the Palestinians. It allocated more than half the land to the Jews, even though the Arabs were the majority and the land was originally theirs.

That’s my point. UN resolutions are not sacred or set in stone. They need to be analysed to see how realistic, just and practical they are.

Yes, UN resolutions need to be analysed. There are resolutions which are taken to champion the wronged, like resolution 194. Despite its noble aim of helping the wronged, it was never implemented. But just resolutions like this must be implemented and we should not abandon them just because the balance of power is against us.

And what do you think of compensation?

It is up to the individual refugee to choose whether they want compensation or to return wherever they want to in historic Palestine.

In the context of the two-state solution, if Israel said the refugees can have the right to return to pre-1967 Palestine with a compensation package, would that be acceptable?

I can’t give you an opinion on this because I am not a refugee and so I can’t speak on their behalf.

On a pragmatic level, do you think the right of return is achievable in the foreseeable future?

Everything is possible. There were those who believed that Mubarak would rule indefinitely. Even with all that’s happened to us since 1948, we have not forgotten our rights, and we are ready to defend our rights. Another 10 or 20 years can pass but we will remain steadfast.

You say that you believe in the one-state solution. But you say that you must gain all your rights first before. So, that means you don’t believe in a gradual solution?

What do you mean?

For example, if you believe in a one-state solution, why don’t you transform the Palestinian struggle into a civil rights movement? Why don’t you start demanding Israeli citizenship? Why don’t you demand full and equal rights with Israelis? Won’t that lead to a single state?

I’ll tell you my personal opinion. Currently, we are at a stage of struggle. Personally, I believe in the one-state solution. But for the moment, the issue isn’t whether we should have one or two states. The situation at the moment is not conducive for that solution.

Personally, I think, on the contrary, now is the time to make that choice. You have to decide: do you want a piece of land to call your own or do you want your rights as people.

Personally, I don’t want to live under Israeli rule. Why should I live in an Israeli state?

Well, Israelis also fear that, in the one-state scenario, they will end up as second-class citizens under Palestinian or even Islamic rule. What will guarantee their rights in a single state?

What I believe in is a single state built on equal rights, where the constitution guarantees each people its rights.

So what’s to stop you from demanding citizenship and full and equal rights?

Personally, as Zaid, I don’t believe I’d be able to live under Israeli rule.

Is it because of the name of the state?

It’s not just the name of the state. It all needs to be approached gradually. It’s not just whether the state should be called Israel or Palestine. In my view, it’s important that I live in a country that is Palestine. I don’t want to be a dreamer but I do have a dream of living in my own land where I can go where I like.

But if you demand full and equal rights, you’ll be able to go where you like, and you’ll be able to vote in elections, and you’ll be able to choose your representative, and you’ll be able to help determine the direction of the state.

Under which system should I demand my equal rights? Under the current Israeli system?

Yes.

You mean the current unjust system.

Well, you did your own Freedom Rides. In the days when the original Freedom Riders were campaigning in America, the system there was unjust, but when they entered the system, they were able to make it fairer.

But there’s a difference. As I said before, we shouldn’t confuse the civil rights movement in America with our struggle. There, it was a question of civil rights. Here, it is not just civil rights. Here, there is more. There is a military occupation. Here, there is land theft.

But what’s the most powerful way to confront this occupation? If you’re an enfranchised member of society, won’t you be better positioned to end the occupation?

No, not in this way.

I’m not saying this will happen in a year or two. It will take many long years. But nothing can be built in a day or two.

When I look at the situation, the first thing I see is that Israelis don’t even accept your presence on the land. I mean, you’re not welcome here, so how do you expect them to give you full citizenship? They keep on evicting you and pushing you off the land, and you tell me that if I demand citizenship, I’ll be able to end the occupation? Their project, the Zionist project, wants us off the land, how do you then expect them to accept our presence here as equals? They believe that they are better than us. They believe that this is their land.

But changing any discriminatory system needs time and effort. For example, in South Africa…

I’ll tell you what.

Let me just finish what I have to say. You often compare the situation here to South Africa during the Apartheid era. Well, let’s complete the analogy. In South Africa, you also had a group of outsiders, white Europeans, who came and occupied and colonised the land, segregated the people, and placed themselves as the rulers. The black Africans, the original inhabitants of the land, during their struggle for their rights did not demand a separate country, they demanded equality. So, if you say there is apartheid here like there was in South Africa, and you’re following the South African boycott model, why not go all the way and also demand your civil rights.

I’ll reiterate my point. We were pushed off our land. Yes, there are elements in common between Apartheid South Africa and here, but that does not mean that the two situations are identical. Every struggle has its own characteristics. We have 1.5 million Arabs in Israel. Let them give that 1.5 million equal rights first, so that I, as a Palestinian, can be convinced that there is room for us to ask for equality.

But you can look at it from another angle. If you, as West Bank Palestinians, demanded citizenship like the Palestinians within Israel, and you added your voices to theirs, you’ll have enough clout in the system to be able to make it fair and equal.

And do you think Israel will allow you to become a majority and change the entire system?

I’m not saying change the entire system. I’m saying make it a fair system.

You need to realise that here we have two peoples with enormous differences between them and a longstanding conflict. It’s not easy to just come and say we’ll demand citizenship, become the majority and then change the system.

You don’t need to be the majority. Even as a sizeable minority, you’ll have a far better position than this disenfranchisement. You’ll also have constitutional rights that cannot be violated by others.

Well, I have a suggestion: why can’t a new system that is fair to all be built from scratch.

But this fair, new system won’t just fall out of the sky and say “Here I am, take me.”  You can only reach this new system gradually.

The way I see it is that activism and the boycott are part of the process of building this fair system. That way, you isolate Israel and force it to take action.

So, you don’t think that, if you were an Israeli citizen, you would be able to play a more effective role as an activist than if you stay outside the system?

You’re talking to me as if Israel is ready to give us citizenship.

I’m not saying Israel is ready. I’m saying you should demand these civil rights.

Let me say that, at this juncture, the situation is not conducive to demanding civil rights. Before civil rights, there are other rights that must be acquired, the rights of the people who were wronged. I don’t see that becoming part of Israel’s racist system is the solution for overturning the racist system. In fact, you would be giving it legitimacy by enabling them to say that it is a democratic system. It could enable them to remain in control because they are the stronger side which dominates the economy and the other centres of power in the country. If you enter the system, you will enter it as the weaker party.

Ok, you say that you believe in the one-state solution. So how do we reach it?

There is no clear vision for how this should be done. I can tell you that as an individual I believe in equal rights, but the details of how to achieve it is not at all easy. It is a very complicated matter. And we haven’t reached the point yet where the one-state solution is feasible. Most people still support the two-state option.

I can say, speaking as Zaid, that I would rather live in a Palestinian state built on 22% of the land than in a hegemonic Israeli state where we are excluded from all the centres of power.

On the subject of equal rights, there are a lot of Israelis who are terrified of the one-state “monster”. They are afraid, like has occurred with Jews before in history, that they would become an oppressed group or minority within this state.  Do you think these fears are exaggerated?

If there is a decent legal system that respects all, everyone will be equal. The PLO, when it was first established, called for a single state of equal citizens. This is something that the Palestinians have called for historically.

As for Israeli fears, naturally everyone wants to protect their own, but Israel tends to inflate matters. Take, for example, the fear of Iran, or Islamism.

I think we need to make a distinction between the state and the people. The Israeli state may exploit fears to advance its goals but the Israeli people are afraid. I’ve spoken to Israelis and their fear is genuine.

When they overcome this fear, we can then move towards the one-state solution.

And are there Palestinian fears regarding the one-state solution?

A lot of Palestinians fear that they will become second or third-class citizens. But the way I see it, we have either the two-state or the one-state option, that is if the leadership adopts it. In the two-state scenario, the Palestinians will remain weak. In a single state, if Palestinians are not granted equal rights, it will become an apartheid state. But you can then fight for your rights. I believe that achieving our rights requires activism. And activism in a single state might be preferable to having a separate state which is hobbled by agreements that strip it off the right to have a military and permit an Israeli military presence on our land – which is what is being proposed at present.

I don’t see this solution as being better than a single state. Palestinians have to overcome their fears and be courageous in the pursuit of the one-state solution.

Palestinians abroad are in favour of the one-state solution. They often try to push us in that direction and tell us “It’s the time”. But they are living far away. For me, here on the ground, I don’t see that it’s the time.

Well, that’s another important point. Your movement speaks of the importance of the Palestinian diaspora but, at the same time, it is you who are living the reality on the ground. They have their circumstances and you have yours. Like what happened after the first intifada, though it was led by Palestinians here, the exiled leadership came and took everything over. Why, then, shouldn’t part of your strategy be that every Palestinian community fight for its rights where it is and let the future bring what it brings?

When I believe in the rights of Palestinian citizens, then I also believe they have to be treated humanely wherever they are. Just because they were expelled from their land that does not mean they should be discriminated against. At the same time, there is the fear that assimilation within the societies where they live will lose them their identity.

But there is another fear: if this conflict goes on for another hundred years, then it would be unfair for them to stay like this.

I’m with you. I believe that they have to live a decent life of equality. Refugees must enjoy equal rights but they must not become, say, Lebanese citizens and lose their Palestinian identity. That is what I’m against.

Also, it is not just up to the Palestinians here to decide the fate of the struggle. After all, the majority of Palestinians live in exile. I can’t make the decision for them whether they should return or not. I don’t have the right to say that I don’t want the refugee in, say, Lebanon to come back.

So, in your view, in the absence of full recognition of the right of return, the conflict will not be resolved?

It won’t be resolved in a fair and just manner.

But Israel is likely to continue rejecting this. Does that mean the conflict will go on forever?

No. I believe that continued activism, including the BDS campaign, will force Israel to give us our rights. When Israel feels that it is losing, when it pays the price for its occupation and racism, and the price for expelling the Palestinians, then things will be different.

But couldn’t it be that if Israel feels cornered, it will become more violent and oppressive and more persistent in the course it is following? If we look at other regimes that were isolated as pariahs, like North Korea or Iraq, the system there became more oppressive under siege.

Israel gains its legitimacy and strength from the countries it deals with and the United Nations. International isolation would hit Israel where it hurts. It may become more oppressive for a while, but this can’t last. Israelis are always afraid of delegitimisation. Israel was a country established by an international resolution, so it needs international political support, otherwise its existence will be perceived as illegitimate.

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International Women’s Day: Empowering the average Mo

 
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By Khaled Diab

Arab men who do not fit the traditional ideal of manhood are often regarded as inferior, and this stereotype holds back the emancipation of women.

Thursday 8 March 2012

The feminist cause in the Arab world has generally progressed less than in the West, particularly in the last few decades of rapid Western emancipation.Last year, the egalitarian mass protests that marked the eruption of the Arab Spring looked like they might finally change all that. In Tunisia and Egypt, women from a wide range of backgrounds and walks of life stood shoulder to shoulder with men as equals in the battle against tyranny and for dignity and freedom. “Attitudes toward women are better among the young generation, particularly the middle class, to which most of the politically active women belong,” notes Egyptian feminist and activist Gihan Abou Zeid.

Although women are treated as relative equals by the revolutionary youth movement that has orchestrated the two revolutions, the Muslim conservatives that have made the greatest gains in parliamentary elections in Tunisia and Egypt do not share such enlightened views, although Tunisia Islamists are more progressive than their Egyptian counterparts. And in Egypt, the most troubling development for women has been the unexpected success of the ultra-conservative Salafists who tend to believe that women should neither be seen nor heard.

The reasons that the Arab Spring has not yet blossomed into a summer of gender equality are many and complex. They include the conservative Islamic current that has swept society in recent decades, the discrediting of the Arab model of secularism and suspicion of “Western imports”, and the fact that revolutionising deeply ingrained social attitudes takes far longer to take hold than instigating changes to the political structure.

In addition, one oft-overlooked cultural factor is that, in the bid to invent the new Arab woman, her complement, the new Arab man, has often flown beneath the radar. While independence-seeking Arab women often have clear and positive role models to aspire to in their quest for emancipation, the men in their lives are often left swimming against the tide of popular perception.

Over the years, I have met legions of Arab men who resist female emancipation not out of any abstract objection to gender equality but out of peer pressure and fear of what their families, workmates or neighbours will think of them. Where progressives have failed to capture the imagination of the masses, conservative myth-makers have worked tirelessly to idealise and idolise the vision of invincible, insurmountable manhood. With some brilliant exceptions, television soap operas tend to be the Arab world’s strongest bastion of traditionalism and overt, unsubtle moralising, particularly during the fasting and feasting month of Ramadan.

One hit series which took the Arab world by storm was the Syrian soap opera Bab el-Hara (Alleyway Gate). Set in French-mandate Syria between the two world wars, it paints a sentimental and nostalgic picture of a society peopled by brave and gallant men and their dutiful and obedient women. Director Bassam al-Malla said he intended to create nostalgia for “a world with values, honour, gallantry … and the revolutionary spirit”.

But the world Bab el-Hara attempts to recreate never existed in the first place. “The series conceals all those women who had a political and cultural presence in the Syrian street at that time,” writes Juhayina Khalidiya, in a feminist critique of the TV programme, published in as-Safir newspaper (in Arabic). She notes that expunging such revolutionary women from the narrative is, first and foremost, unfair to their legacy.

This same airbrushing of the heroic and pivotal role women have played in the transformation of society is occurring as we speak among the conservative forces, particularly Islamists, working to hijack the Arab Spring. “The attitude towards women has not been impacted by the historic victory,” says Marwa Rakha, and Egyptian author, broadcaster and blogger. “Men chanted slogans against them like: ‘Men want to topple feminists’ and ‘Since when did women have a voice?’ They were asked to go home and obey God. They were let down by the average Egyptian man and woman alike.”

In addition to the undoubted insult to women this denial of their role represents, the gap between the Arab man, the “average Mo”, and the Arab myth of manhood is bound to breed feelings of inadequacy, because the chasm between fantasy and reality is a yawning one. In the more secular Arab countries, women make up their fair share of the labour force, hold top professional and political positions, often perform better academically than their male peers and refuse the deferential role their grandmothers and great-grandmothers took for granted.

This gap between ideal and reality carries echoes of England from the 19th and up to the first half of the 20th century. In his book The English, Jeremy Paxman writes that British men were “uneasily aware of the injustice of denying women a full role in society”. As if commenting on Bab el-Hara, he notes that: “The stronger the challenge [to the male order], the more vociferous the evangelism about how the family was the cornerstone of the safe and ordered society.”

In contrast to the idealised “real men” of the past in Bab el-Hara, another hit Ramadan series distorts the contemporary reality by depicting the modern man as weak, indecisive and dominated by the women in his life. Yehia el-Fakharani, one of Egypt’s most accomplished actors, abandoned his normal roles of the sophisticated lawyer, MP or professor, to play that of a 60-year-old mummy’s boy in “Yetraba fi Ezzo”.

In the series, his character, Hamada Ezzo, is completely dependent on his mother for direction in every aspect of his life. “This kind of negative character is one of the causes of our falling behind the technologically advanced nations … We see his type frequently in our midsts as Egyptians and Arabs,” the London-based Arabic daily, al-Hayat, quoted el-Fakharani as saying.

He went on to express his belief that the coming generation had to be more hardworking and conscientious to keep up with the times and not depend on past glories. While it is hard to fault this sentiment, the choice of a man living under his mother’s thumb as a parable for the times is telling.

This soap is an odd way to inspire the young generation. If that was truly the writer’s aim, why not, instead of fixating on a nearly-retired man’s subservient relationship with his mother, challenge the rigid and stifling pecking order that keeps the young from reinventing society or the prejudices that keep the female half of the population from fulfilling their full potential?

In real life, Yehia el-Fakhrani is quite an admirable picture of the modern man, a middle-aged “metrosexual”, which makes his pandering to this warped view all the more confounding. He is gentle, caring, considerate and tolerant, while the women in his life are intelligent and successful. His wife, for instance, wrote a critically acclaimed TV drama chronicling the reign of King Farouq.

As long as conservative circles continue successfully to equate female emancipation with male emaciation, the quest for gender equality will stall. Although Arab cinema and literature have carried plenty of examples of modern, progressive men, particularly in the 1960s and 1970s, the problem is that these tend to be quite westernised, and hence alien to your average Arab man on the street.

What we need are mainstream, “average Mo” role models who demonstrate that believing in gender equality squares with being a man, and that empowering women also empowers men and society as a whole.

More articles on gender issues can be found here and here.

This is an updated version of a column which appeared in The Guardian’s Comment is Free on 26 October 2007. Read the related discussion.

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Can Hizbullah reinvent itself?

 
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By Amira Mohsen Galal

As Hizbullah sides with its brutal backers in Damascus, are the Shi’ite movement’s days numbered or can it regain its popularity and credibility?

Monday 27 February 2012

Photo: ©K. Maes

Many of the idealistic, youth-driven uprisings in the Arab world have been manipulated to serve a much bigger regional game, pitting revolutionary against counter-revolutionary forces, not to mention in-fighting between revolutionaries, with international powers vying to maintain or enhance their influence in the region.

The age-old rivalry between Russia and the West is being played out in the Middle East, pitting the largely Sunni Muslim Arab states against Russia’s satellite in the region, Iran. An important player bridging the gap between Shi’ite Iran and the Arab Sunnis is Lebanon’s Shi’ite resistance movement Hizbullah.

Hizbullah has enjoyed enormous popularity across the entire region, where it is perceived by many as the champion of the Arab cause, successfully standing up to the bully in the playground, Israel. There was a time when the portrait of Hassan Nasrallah hung on the walls of homes and cafes from Baghdad to Casablanca. Yet, following the relatively cool reception of Nasrallah’s speech on 16 February , one got the distinct impression that the Lebanese resistance leader may not enjoy the same popularity he once did with the Arab masses.

A simple explanation might be Hizbullah’s unequivocal support for Bashar el-Assad’s regime in Syria.  In a speech broadcast by al-Manar on 25 May 2011, Nasrallah declared his group’s strong support for the Assad regime. He hailed Syria for its support of the resistance movement in Lebanon and Palestine. Many have been unable to comprehend why the former champions of the resistance would side with the regime against the people, especially considering their unreserved support for the uprisings in Egypt, Tunisia and Bahrain. This has eroded the party’s popularity not only among Sunnis in Syria, who dominate the opposition, but also in the Arab world at large as regional tensions intensify between Shi’ite Iran and the predominantly Sunni Arab states.

Ironically, the very cause which won Hizbullah respect from thousands across the region also lost them the support of their own people. Throughout the 1990s, the Lebanese, regardless of sect, were united behind Hizbullah’s resistance to the Israeli occupation of South Lebanon and again, in 2006, when Israel threatened re-invasion. Critics point to Hizbullah’s reluctance to disarm as the main source of national instability. Samir Geagea, a veteran Lebanese politician and senior figure in the 14 March Alliance, asserted that: “The ones who are involving Lebanon [in crises] are those wielding power outside the Lebanese state,” demanding that Hizbullah lay down its arms and integrate itself with the official Lebanese army and government.

In a similar vein, Hizbullah has alienated many followers by becoming embroiled in a petty tit-for-tat exchange with the 14 March coalition over the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, which was charged with investigating the 2005 assassination of former Prime Minister Rafiq el-Hariri.  In the past, many, regardless of their politics, had respected Nasrallah for his commitment to his cause and ability to avoid entanglement in party politics.

Though not Hizbullah’s fault, as such, the persisting devastation of the socio-economic condition and  infrastructure of South Lebanon has also served as a harsh reminder, to the organisation’s critics, of the consequences of war.

In The Asia Times, Sami Moubayed, describes Hassan Nasrallah’s total withdrawal from public life in Lebanon in recent years, choosing, instead, to address his supporters on live television rather than the massive public rallies for which he has been famed. His disappearance has been due to security fears. However, this has made it difficult for followers to connect with him. It is also now harder to draw in new supporters from across the Arab and Islamic worlds.

Despite its somewhat dented popularity, Hizbullah is still massively important on a strategic level.

In a speech broadcast by al-Manar on the 25 August 2011, Nasrallah named Syria as a vital ally in the region. “Syrian support has been crucial. A great deal of the Iranian support comes through Syria. If it had not been for the will of Syria, even the Iranian support would have been blocked,” he claimed.  So, it is reasonable to assume that the fall of the Assad regime would serve as a tremendous blow to Hizbullah, and would also act as the catalyst for a power struggle within the country. A regime in Syria based on the Sunni Muslim majority would most likely be friendly to Hizbullah’s local rivals in the 14 March coalition. Such a regime would likely also develop good ties with regional powers opposed to the Hizbullah movement over sectarian and political issues.

A post-Assad Syria may prompt Hizbullah, in order to ensure its political survival, to integrate fully into the Lebanese politics and military. Since its inception, Hizbullah has proven itself to be a resilient, relevant, military and political force within Lebanon as well as across the Middle East. The organisation has already undergone many changes, but can it continue to transform itself and achieve success in being perceived as a legitimate political actor participating in Lebanese government?

Political integration is problematic for Hizbullah, since it must balance its need to be a legitimate actor within Lebanon’s political system with its continued insistence on ‘resistance’ to Israel, despite Israel’s withdrawal and the growing domestic opposition to the movement’s confrontationalism. In addition, Hizbullah must contend with the question of whether greater integration into the Lebanese political landscape will advance or set back its ability to represent the interests of the politically and economically marginalised  Shi’ite community. Though difficult, achieving a balance of these various interests is not impossible, although Hizbullah may have to update its stance on various issues if it is to succeed.

Hizbullah finds itself in the unenviable position of choosing between its Iranian financial backer and its Arab popular support base. The Shi’ite movement may need to tone down its fiery rhetoric and work harder at integrating itself further into Lebanese mainstream politics without becoming enmeshed in petty disputes and factionalism. This is by no means an easy task, but it is one that Hizbullah will have to rise to if it is to maintain its significance and standing.

 

This article is published here with the author’s consent.

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Admiring the enemy

 
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By Khaled Diab

Despite the ugly war of words between Israelis and Arabs, Israel does also get some good press in the Arab world and has some surprising admirers.

Friday 24 February 2012

There has been widespread outrage in Israel over reports that Palestinian state television had aired a show “glorifying” the two Palestinians who, in 2011, had brutally murdered five members of the Fogel family, including their three children. The aunt of Hakim Awad, the young man who had led the attack on the Israeli settlement, described her nephew as a “hero and a legend.”

In 2011, the Itamar massacre was harshly condemned by Arabs, including the Palestinian Authority, media and many local Palestinian residents, despite their anger at the presence of the settlement, which is not only built on occupied land but also on large tracts of private Palestinian land.

So why did the murderers’ relatives, amid such widespread censure, choose to describe the killers as “heroes”?

“This happens in every society. And it is more acute in societies, though, that are in great emotional conflict, like Palestinians and Israelis,” said Ray Hanania, the Palestinian-American stand-up comic and columnist who writes for the Jerusalem Post. “These relatives are no different to the relatives and friends of Baruch Goldstein, who murdered scores of Palestinians praying at a mosque.”

Nor were they very different to the Israeli readers who reacted with gloating and glee to a recent bus accident which claimed the lives of numerous Palestinian schoolchildren.

But it was not just the Awad family that glorified the killers, according to Israeli media reports, the show’s host did so too. However, according to Tel Aviv University researcher and historian Ofir Winter, “The TV broadcaster did not praise them, but rather gave their relatives a platform to greet them, which is sad and very problematic, but it’s not the same thing as actually praising them.”

The programme in question is called For You and helps the relatives of the 4,000-or-so Palestinians – mostly political prisoners –in Israeli prisons to connect with their loved ones, and circumnavigate the difficulties involved in obtaining the necessary permits.

 In the immediate wake of the killings, there were reports of celebrations in some Palestinian communities, including fireworks and the distribution of sweets.

But is this really any different to the thousands of “pilgrims” who have visited Baruch Goldstein’s grave, many singing and dancing or even kissing the gravestone, with fans describing him as a “saint” and a “hero of Israel,” despite widespread Israeli revulsion and condemnation of Goldstein’s murder of 29 Muslim worshippers?

Despite the brutal murder of civilians, including children, about a third of Palestinians, blinded by their hatred of the Israeli settlement enterprise and the occupation, looked favourably on the Itamar attack, according to one opinion poll.

Likewise, charged up with anger at Palestinian rocket attacks from Gaza, 9 out of 10 Israeli Jews, a survey found, supported “Operation Cast Lead”, despite the deaths of up to 1,440 Palestinians, including between 314 and 431 children, and the wholesale destruction of the Strip’s infrastructure.

While deriving satisfaction from such misfortune and tragedy is truly perverse, it is a clear indication of how this bitter, protracted conflict has warped people’s humanity on both sides, and this is often mirrored in the media.

But that’s not the entire story. There is a growing minority of Arab journalists – a similar process is also taking place in Israel – who courageously refuse to fall prey to this simplistic us-and-them dichotomy, despite regular character assassinations. However, Israelis are mostly unaware of this and generally have the impression that the Arab media only demonises Israel and its people.

While this is true of some segments of the media, others strive for balance. “There have been some significant changes in the Arab discourse on Israel since the 1967 war, the peace with Egypt and the Oslo agreements,” says Winter, who is also an accomplished Arabist.

In fact, anger at the occupation notwithstanding, there has been a kind of de facto partial “normalisation” of Israel in the media. Not only is Israel now referred to by name rather than the “Zionist entity” of yesteryear, news coverage often takes a neutral and non-emotive tone. One of the trailblazers in this regard has been al-Jazeera which, despite allegations by the Israeli government of anti-Israel bias, regularly hosts Israeli guests and explores other aspects of Israeli society.

One recent example was a documentary, entitled Jerusalem SOS, which featured Jewish and Arab volunteer paramedics in Jerusalem who cross the geographical and psychological divisions in the city to save lives.

In addition, when Israel is viewed beyond the prism of the conflict, it is often held up as a model to emulate. This may surprise many ordinary Israelis and Arabs alike, but this is what Winter, in collaboration with Uriya Shavit of Tel Aviv University, found by analysing a wide range of content dating back to the 1970s.

In fact, Israel is often used by the opposition to highlight “the failures of Arab regimes,” explains Winter. For example, the recent prisoner exchange involving Gilad Schalit evoked not only joy in Arab quarters but a certain amount of soul-searching regarding the thousand-to-one arithmetic of the swap. “You are lucky in your nation, Gilad,” wrote Iqbal Ahmed in the Kuwaiti daily al-Qabas. “In the Arab world, it is the state that kills, arrests and disappears its sons and daughters.”

Different groups focus on different aspects of the Israeli experience. Some Islamists use Israel’s identity as a “Jewish state” to argue that religion can go hand-in-hand with modernity, prosperity and democracy, while certain secularists point to Israel’s embrace of “western values,” such as science and technology and gender equality, as part of the secret of its success in contrast to the Arabs’ failure.

The Iraqi-German writer Najm Wali, who wrote a book about his travels through Israel, once asked on al-Jazeera: “How did Jews from all over the world manage to build such a dynamic country?” Answering his own question, Wali put it down to Israel’s ingrained pluralism.

Fascinatingly, an audio recording uncovered by Winter, apparently of the popular TV theologian Yusuf al-Qaradawi, who some have accused of anti-Semitism, expressed, back in the 1990s, admiration for the achievements of Israeli democracy: “We hope that our countries will become like this country [i.e. Israel].”

Why? “There, it is the people who govern. There, they do not have the ‘four nines’ which we know in our countries,” he added, referring to the 99.99 percent of the vote with which Arab dictators often used to “win” elections.

Given all this oft-grudging admiration of Israel’s social, scientific and economic achievements, it is perhaps unsurprising that the Arab media reacted positively to last year’s tent protests – dubbed the “Israeli Spring” – which were at least partly inspired by the Arab uprisings, with some activists even calling Rothschild Avenue their own “Tahrir Square.”

What all this highlights is that, even if a certain amount of anti-Semitism exists in the Arab world, the majority of Arab hostility and distrust toward Israel stems from to its treatment of the Palestinians.

As Arabs battle to win their freedom from their dictators and Israelis struggle to preserve theirs against the extremists in their midst, it is time for moderates on both sides to find common cause and work together to find a just resolution to the Palestinian question and enable Israel to enter the new Middle Eastern fold as a respected and valued neighbour.

A shorter version of this article appeared in The Jerusalem Post on 22 February 2012.

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The Arab media paradox

 
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By Khaled Diab

Despite the general Arab decline in the press freedom rankings, the region’s media have, in many ways, actually become freer.

Monday 13 February 2012

Since the Arab quest for freedom from authoritarian rule rippled out across the Middle East and even beyond from the unlikely epicentre of Tunisia, the region’s hopes and aspirations for freedom and dignity have never been higher, at least since the end of colonial rule.

Against this backdrop, Reporters Without Borders’ latest Press Freedom Index (PFI) makes for a depressing and demoralising reality check – at least at first sight.

“The Arab world was the motor of history in 2011 but the Arab uprisings have had contrasting political outcomes so far,” the independent media watchdog said. “Most of the region’s countries have fallen in the index because of the measures taken in a bid to impose a news blackout on a crackdown”

The highest ranking Arab country is Lebanon (93), which is just behind regional leader Israel (92). This means that, given all the tied positions, around 100 countries have, according to the PFI, freer media.

On a relatively successful note, Tunisia, which provided the spark of hope which fired up the so-called Arab Spring and has since managed a fairly smooth transition to greater democracy, has risen 30 positions from 164th to 134th.

In contrast, my native Egypt – which captivated the world with its “Tahrir” spirit – has plummeted 39 positions to stand near the bottom of the global league at 166, sandwiched between Laos and Cuba.

Reporters Without Borders puts this down to “attempts by Hosni Mubarak’s government and then the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces [SCAF] to rein in the revolution’s successive phases”. These tactics included the arrests and convictions of Egyptian journalists and bloggers, not to mention the harassment of foreign journalists.

And at a certain level this relegation is justified. “The Egyptian media grew inside the dictatorship system, which shaped its values, principles, views and its performance, so we shouldn’t expect to see serious change in media performance [so quickly],” argues Gihan Abou Zeid, an Egyptian activist and columnist. “The window to our freedom of expression is sadly still narrow.”

“Abuses against the freedom of the press have increased significantly,” says Wael Eskandar, a young Egyptian journalist based in Cairo who has been closely following the revolution. “In every paper, there is a military censor… Reporters and media personnel are targeted during their coverage of important events on the streets.”

 

Eskandar sites as an example how talk show host Reem Maged and her guest activist and journalist Hossam el-Hamalawy were summoned by SCAF due to on-air accusationsthat the military, which has tried to portray itself as the protector of the revolution, had attacked protesters.

That said, Eskandar feels that his profession has become “more meaningful”. “Politics is now at the forefront of people’s thoughts and the opposition is real,” he reflects. He also admits to feeling freer, despite the obvious dangers of harassment and even prosecution by a military court. “At times like these, it’s worth the risk,” he says.

For all its strengths, the PFI is imperfect and incomplete because it is based on the subjective scoring assigned by various observers, which means that countries with a more critical culture could score more poorly than countries which are less critical.

It also does not take into account qualitative criteria, such as the actual content, as well as the plurality, accuracy and scope of the reporting and commentary in the media. Reporters Without Borders admits as much. “The index should in no way be taken as an indication of the quality of the media in the countries concerned,” the watchdog notes in its methodology.

What this boils down to is that the index can provide a misleading impression about the nature of the media in a given country. For example, someone who is unaware of the nature of the media in the region could easily conclude that Saudi Arabia (158th) enjoys greater media freedom than Egypt because it is eight positions higher in the index.

But this couldn’t be further from the truth. In many ways, it piles on insult to the injury already experienced by the dynamic segments of the Egyptian media which first faced down Mubarak’s state security apparatus and then SCAF’s military crackdowns, epitomised by the likes of dentist-turned-novelist-and-revolutionary-columnist Alaa al-Aswany whom Foreign Policy named its top global thinker for 2011. In contrast, most of their Saudi colleagues refused or have failed to rock the boat in the kingdom’s stagnant and closely controlled media.

Moreover, just because the regime hounds and intimidates journalists and tries to curb their freedom, that does not mean that it has been particularly successful in its endeavour. Sure, most of the state-owned media remains the loyal lapdog of whoever runs the show, whether it’s a pre-revolution dictatorship or a post-revolution junta.

But, in Egypt, it is really a  tale of two media, with the independent media breaking significant new ground, not only since the revolution but also in the years running up to it.

Although self-censorship remains something of a problem even in the independent media, as demonstrated by the controversy over the shelving of an entire print run of Egypt Independent, the revolution has galvanised legions of journalists and media personalities to take on SCAF as they did Mubarak.

Many Egyptian journalists and media personalities express a newfound pride in their vocation and an irrepressible determination to carry on exposing the truth. For instance, late last year, al-Tahrir TV’s talk show host, the hard-talking Doaa Sultan, dedicated a special episode of her talk show to mount a scathing if melodramatic attack on the Egyptian military and the media and political forces, including the Muslim Brotherhood, which it has co-opted as a fig leaf for its rule.

Moreover, there is a third pillar to Egypt’s media landscape that has overshadowed even the independent media, the social and citizen media, which spearheaded the revolution and refuses to be put down. A good example of this is the defiant blogger Maikel Nabil Sanad who, despite having spent more than 300 days behind bars (including at least 80 on hunger strike), was not cowed into silence. On his release, he said: “We have one enemy, the military regime and its political dictatorship … It is imperative that we bring [it] down.”

And that sense of defiance is Egypt’s greatest hope for the future.

 

This article was published in The Guardian‘s Comment is Free section on 9 February 2012. Read the related discussion.

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The power of Palestinian ingenuity

 
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By Khaled Diab

Outsiders are more likely to associate Palestine with statehood-pending than patent-pending, but innovation is crucial to building a better future.

Monday 16 January 2012

Photo: ©Khaled Diab

An integrated ‘smart’ system that manages all the devices in your home and business seamlessly. A robot that automatically turns the soil in your garden and waters the plants. Low-cost retinal scanners. Although these innovations may sound run-of-the-mill in Tokyo or Silicon Valley, in tiny, remote Ramallah, they represent the cutting-edge in Palestine’s emerging knowledge sector.

Now into its sixth edition, the ‘Made in Palestine’ fair seeks to change all this by putting Palestine on the global innovation map, before it even makes it on to the world’s political map. The annual exhibition and conference is organised by al-Nayzak, an NGO that works to nurture and incubate the creative and innovative potential of Palestinians from a young age.

But can Palestinian innovators match the success scored by their neighbour, rival and occupier, Israel, which has risen to become the region’s scientific and innovation powerhouse?

Many of the exhibitors and innovators I spoke to in Ramallah were hopeful. Some pointed out that the bumpy road to Palestinian and Arab innovation was already paved with a fair number of good inventions and ideas, but these often did not see the light of day, due to bureaucracy, a shortage of financing, and the absence of a strong industrial and research base.

“The state of Palestinian innovation is similar to that of the Arab world in general,” believes Ahmed Maani, who developed the Tsunami which, despite its destructive name, uses ultrasound to repel insects rather than kill them. “We have thousands of Arab innovators, and tens of thousands of innovations, but they remain neglected and marginalised.”

The situation Maani describes was well summed up in the UN’s sobering Arab Human Development Report, which stated that Arab countries only invested 0.4% of their collective GDP in R&D, compared to 2-3% in the industrialised world.

“But above all, Arab societies and peoples still live with the mentality of the defeated and do not trust any Arab technology,” notes Maani who, despite dedicating six years of his life to developing his latest product, often sees it marketed among Palestinians as being made in Israel because Palestinians do not believe that they can produce any quality products.

Photo: ©Khaled Diab

The Palestinians have a number of specific factors in their favour and challenges which hinder them. To its advantage, the Palestinian population is among the best-educated in the Arab world. In addition, its large, diverse and extensive diaspora can, as the Jewish diaspora has demonstrated next door, play a pivotal role in both fuelling innovation and financing it. Moreover, if the conflict is ever resolved, the Israelis and Palestinians could become natural partners in business and innovation.

However, for the time being, the Israeli occupation is possibly the biggest single inhibitor of Palestinian innovation and economic development in general. Noting that investing in Palestinian innovation requires “a certain type of intrepid and foolhardy investor”, Maani points to the additional challenges of the restrictions on Palestinian movement, the small size of the Palestinian market and the difficulties and associated high costs involved in exporting.

That said, the circumstances of the occupation can also stimulate the creativity of the ingenious Palestinians. For example, the young innovator Ibrahim Nassar from Hebron, inspired by the movement restrictions Palestinians face, came up with a device which can be used by doctors to diagnose and monitor, via the mobile phone network, heart patients remotely with complete accuracy and reliability.

More generally, Palestinians are planning to wean themselves off their expensive and unreliable dependence on Israel for their energy needs through green investment and innovation. This preoccupation was reflected in many of the Made in Palestine innovations: compressed-air and solar-powered cars, a wind turbine made of recycled material, recycled car oil and solar-powered water desalination.

In the broader context, the Palestinian authority views economic development, partly founded on innovation, as a top priority and a prerequisite for statehood. What has become known as “Fayyadism”, after the Palestinian Prime Minister Salam Fayyad, posits that the first step on the path to statehood is through changing the Palestinians own state of being and building a de facto state-in-waiting.

“Creativity, innovation and excellence are vital tools in the hands of young people building the future of Palestine,” Fayyad said at Made in Palestine’s award ceremony, where an automated potato planter rolled away with the top prize.

But Fayyad admitted that this required wide ranging reforms, including greater support for innovators, the creation of a culture which values innovation, and narrowing the skills gap between the education system and the job market.

This article first appeared in The National on 12 January 2012.

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Egypt’s middle-class cyberheroes

 
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By Osama Diab

Social networking and blogging voices the dreams and aspirations of the young and middle-class in Egypt, leaving other underrepresented groups as marginalised as ever.

Friday 25 November 2011

News of the prominent and outspoken Egyptian-American journalist Mona Eltahawy’s arrest and assault, which left her with two broken wrists, spread around the twittersphere at something approaching the speed of light, and then was picked up and covered by most major news outlets. Of course, this level of attention is unsurprising as Eltahawy is not only a brave journalist and campaigner, she is also well-known and admired both among Arab secularists and among liberals in the West.

When Alaa Abdel-Fattah, the Egyptian political activist and blogger, was arrested, my Facebook newsfeed, in a matter of minutes, was dominated by posts condemning his arrest. Profile pictures were changed to a Guevara-style silhouette version of his picture in solidarity with the young activist. He was quickly portrayed as the ultimate freedom fighter and the symbol of resistance. He indeed is. Abdel-Fattah comes from a family of political activists and has been an active force of resistance against Mubarak’s tyrannical rule for nearly a decade. He extensively blogged and participated in numerous protests against the ousted and the current regimes.

Despite my empathy with Alaa Abdel-Fattah as a fellow blogger who fell victim to his opinions, he is neither the only nor the most vulnerable victim of Egypt’s successive ruthless regimes, including the current transitional military junta. Khaled Said, Mina Daniel, Maikel Nabil Sanad, and now Abdel-Fatah, have all caused online uproars following their arrest or killing. They are most definitely and without doubt victims, but so are tens of thousands of others whose cases go unreported because Egypt’s middle-class, educated online activists fail to identify with them.
Egypt’s internet demographics explain the selectivity of victims, heroes and symbolic figures in the country’s online struggle for democracy. The internet penetration rate is still a low 20%, which means that if you are a member of Egypt’s online population, you are most likely a member of an educated middle-class in a big metropolis, mainly Cairo and Alexandria.
There is also about a 65% chance that you’re a male, and about a 90% chance you’re aged between 13 and 34. In order to be an active contributor in cyberspace, you also require a certain level of technological expertise, such as video-editing and blog-managing skills, which again would probably be higher among educated, male and young users.
Even among active internet users, there are still different levels and shades of contribution – not everyone contributes equally or has the same impact. In 2006, a study carried out by Forrestry Survey found that only 13% of internet users are active creators or users generating, rather than just viewing, content, while the majority of users were described as ‘passive spectators’ (33%) and ‘inactive’ users (52%). In other words, the majority of internet users are there to view content with a very minimal contribution of opinion, information, etc.
What this means is that people who play an active role online are a tiny percentage, not just of the population at large but even of internet users. They are mainly young, middle-class, urban and predominantly male. Looking at these figures, it is no surprise that the revolution’s cyberheroes match the profile of the typical Egyptian Facebook user.

The background of the majority of social networkers dictates the narratives and views you find in Egyptian cyberspace.  This explains why it is very hard to find accounts of  other victims from different backgrounds in Egypt’s shanty towns and rural areasAge, gender, residence and social status are all factors that confine online participation and lobbying power to certain groups.
Online activism did undoubtedly play a big role in educating, raising awareness and mobilising people in the build-up to the Arab revolts of earlier this year. But if we have more men than women, urban  than rural people, young than old online, then these groups are better-positioned than others to mobilise, express their opinion and lobby policy-makers, even if young people have yet to make it in large numbers into mainstream politics. This poses a challenge to the whole idea that new social media are more empowering compared to traditional media outlets.
If empowerment is restricted to certain groups of people, then social media kind of loses its perceived altruistic nature. Even the very idea of media empowerment was also introduced in cyberspace by those very people empowered by the media. This participatory media was  utilised by educated online communities to make up for the lack of democracy in the real world. Being unable to vote or affect public policy for decades has made the internet a haven for those who long for political rights and desire to play an active part in shaping their own future and the public policy of their country. Therefore, an old, illiterate farmer’s wife in a Nile Delta village will probably be a lot more sceptical about how Facebook can empower her.
In a way, this is reminiscent to when only white male Protestants were allowed to vote in the United States – a strategy employed to shape public policy in favour of a certain privileged group. Even though it is logistically and practically impossible to connect every Egyptian to the internet and get them to participate equally, especially when the illiteracy rate is still as high as 30% and nearly half the population lives below the poverty line. However, we can still find some consolation in the fact that more and more people are coming online every day. The number of internet users is expected to rise exponentially by 2012, which will enable more people to learn some of the 21st century’s tricks of grassroots, bottom-up campaigning.

This article is published here with the author’s consent. ©Osama Diab. All rights reserved.

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Special focus: Arab Spring

 
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The Chronikler has devoted considerable attention to the political, social, economic and cultural dimensions of the Arab Spring. Follow our ongoing coverage here.

De paradox van de Egyptische revolutie

April 2013 – De Egyptische revolutie was een geval van collectieve en spontane genialiteit. Maar dit succes in het verkopen van de opstand kwam op een prijs.

كيف يمكن لنجاح  الثورة المصرية أن يُفشِلها؟

مارس ٢٠١٣ – استطاعت الثورة المصرية من خلال قوة الصورة إلغاء الصور النمطية التي كانت قد ترسخت في الأذهان وتكونت عنا، و لكن هناك ثمن لا بد أن يدفع في المقابل

Tahrir Square: For the sake of the forsaken

February 2013 – For ordinary Egyptians, Tahrir is now a terrifying black hole, but for its marginalised occupiers, it is a liberator from political and social tyranny.

Reading between the lines of the Middle Eastern media

February 2013- Despite its bottom ranking in the Press Freedom Index, the Middle Eastern media is freer than it appears at first sight.

Egypt’s women of mass destruction

February 2013 – Does a gaff about rural women’s breasts belie the belief among Egypt’s new Islamist leadership that women are the source of all society’s ills?

The naked truth about Egypt’s body politic

January 2013 – One young woman’s daring nude protests are unlikely to emancipate Egyptian women, but will they actually hurt the cause of freedom and equality?

Egypt’s rebels without a pause

December 2012 – The failure of Egypt’s new leaders to address the needs and aspirations of young people means the revolution will not stop until there is real change.

News of revolution (part III): Televising the life and death of an Egyptian president

November 2012 – Anwar Sadat was the first Egyptian leader to exploit television’s propaganda power – and even his assassination was unwittingly televised.

Disempowering Egyptian citizens

October 2012 – Despite its democratic aspirations, Egypt’s draft constitution excludes millions of Egyptians from enjoying full citizenship.

News of revolution (part II): Voice of the Arabs or Nasserist mouthpiece?

October 2012 – The Voice of the Arabs steered Egypt from isolationism and towards a pan-Arabist vision in which Nasser was the anointed leader of the Arab world.

News of revolution (part I): How the nascent print media gave birth to Egyptian nationalism

September 2012 – The spread of print media in the 19th century played a profound role in shaping modern Egyptian nationalism and its quest for full independence.

Minority voices in Upper Egypt

September 2012 – A publisher in Luxor who happens to be Christian shows how Egypt’s majority and minorities, despite growing tension, share similar dreams and fears.

Aanslag op Amerikaans consulaat in Benghazi valt niet uit de lucht

September 2012 – De aanslag op het consulaat in Benghazi was geen verrassing. De voortekens waren al lang zichtbaar.

The Mubarak regime’s legalised robbery

September 2012 – Since the ‘Mubarak mafia’ were not outlaws but were the law, proving that Egypt’s lost billions were ill-gotten is an elusively difficult challenge.

Egypt’s needs are human, social and educational, not religious, says Islamist MP

August 2012 – Member of Parliament for Luxor AbdulMawgoud Dardery believes religion is a “personal issue”, and government’s job is to focus on collective challenges.

Egypt without the hype… and away from Cairo

August 2012 – Contrary to the distorted and Cairo-centric media view of Egypt, Egyptians have an extraordinary breadth of views about  revolutionising their country.

The liberation of exile

July 2012 – My father’s secret police file reveals that my newly wed parents were right to flee Egypt. But I’m grateful for the liberation of “exile”.

Policing the beard

July 2012 – In Egypt, beards have gone from indicating piety to symbolising political affiliation. Police neutrality requires officers to remove their facial hair.

Egypt’s Mursi and the risk of friendly fire

July 2012 – By courting his rivals, Egyptian President Mohamed Mursi could turn former allies into foes and bring to the fore the divisions among Islamists.

The paradox of military-backed civilian rule

June 2012 – Supporting a military dictatorship to impose secular ideals is paradoxical and will only perpetuate and entrench the presence of the deep state.

Egypt: from revolution to evolution

June 2012 – Egypt’s next president likely to be against the revolution, so revolutionaries must forge a viable opposition and push for social and economic change.

Egyptian presidential election: Anti-revolution v counterrevolution

June 2012 – Should Egyptians side with the anti-revolutionary military old guard or the counterrevolutionary Islamist vanguard when choosing their next president?

Revolution: the ‘third way’ in Egypt

June 2012 – With little representation in official politics, Egypt’s revolutionary forces must continue to create a political third way on the streets.

Egyptian presidential election: A young revolutionary’s voting dilemma

May 2012 – Should a young revolutionary seize his last chance to vote for a president or is the true struggle for radical change in Egypt on the streets?

From the Chronikles: My plan for a democratic Egypt

May 2012 – With the right president, Egypt could rid itself of nepotism and inequality to become a prosperous and egalitarian society.

Egyptian presidential election: Who should the revolution vote for?

May 2012 – Egyptian revolutionaries dream of electing a president who emerged from Tahrir square, but should they vote for pragmatism or principle?

High time for a fly-in to Syria

May 2012 – Though risky, a civilian fly-in to Syria will send out a clear message that the world cannot stand idly by while ordinary people are slaughtered.

The battle for the soul of the Arab man

May 2012 – The polarised debate over Arab women overlooks the fact that men can be victims of the patriarchy too and their identity is a cultural battlefield.

Mustafa Barghouti: “We are heading towards a Palestinian Spring”

May 2012 – Palestinian reformer Mustafa Barghouti on the demise of the peace process, the death of the two-state option and the dawning of the Palestinian Spring.

Confessions of a would-be Egyptian revolutionary

April 2012 – Returning to Egypt for the first time since the revolution, an expat desktop rebel discovers the inspirational, the troubling and the simply bizarre.

Egypt needs fundamental, not fundamentalist rights

April 2012 – Egypt’s new constitution should focus on democracy, equality and human rights, not religious identity or military budgets.

‘Reel’ freedom in East Jerusalem

March 2012 – The reopening of a landmark East Jerusalem cinema could provide local Palestinians with a much-needed dose of ‘reel’ freedom.

Admiring the enemy

February 2012 – Despite the ugly war of words between Israelis and Arabs, Israel does also get some good press in the Arab world and has some surprising admirers.

The Arab media paradox

February 2012 – Despite the general Arab decline in the press freedom rankings, the region’s media have, in many ways, actually become freer.

Detained Egyptian musician vows: “I will not be silenced” about police brutality

February 2012 – Mohammed Jamal, the lead singer of the popular Egyptian indie band Salalem, tells The Chronikler his story about a night of hell in police custody.

Egyptian football violence: Between hooliganism and state thuggery

February 2012 – The deadly battle of Port Said may be another attempt to make a return to a police state the most attractive option for Egypt.

February 2012 – Mohammed Jamal, the lead singer of the popular Egyptian indie band Salalem, tells The Chronikler his story about a night of hell in police custody.

Social responsibility goes digital

February 2012 – Information technology is being hailed as the new face of socially responsible business.

Papa’s got a secondhand car…

February 2012 – Is buying a secondhand car after nine months of contemplation akin to becoming a father or a lover?

Egyptian football violence: Between hooliganism and state thuggery

February 2012 – The deadly battle of Port Said may be another attempt to make a return to a police state the most attractive option for Egypt.

Foreigners without an agenda

January 2012 – State-sponsored conspiracy theories have been bad for foreigners in Egypt. But Egyptians must not succumb to xenophobia and must be open to the world.

The Egyptian revolution as a historical event

January 2012 – In the social media age, revolutions will no longer be followed by the constructing of a national identity based on just one “universal” truth.

التغلب على الخوف، الخطوة الاولى لنساء مصر

قبل الثورة لم يكن سهلا ان نتخيل نساءا تتحدى سلطة الاب او الزوج وتخرج للتظاهر لكننا وجدنا نساءا واجهن الموت والخوف ,وتلك هى الخطوة الاولى لمواجهة اى غبن

Revolution@1: The Egyptian army’s mutiny against the people

January 2012 – Egypt’s junta and its army of collaborators have betrayed the Egyptian revolution, but the people will rise again.

Revolution@1: Egypt must learn from 1952

January 2012 – Like in 1952, the army is trying to silence opposition with the Muslim Brotherhood’s help. But can the Tahrir mentality stop history from repeating?

Defining Egyptian democracy: “Not like America and not like Iran”

December 2011 – Provincial Egyptians believe that moderate Islamists can construct an Egyptian model of democracy that respects their traditions and identity.

Secular Egypt: dream or delusion?

December 2011 – Is Egypt on the road to theocracy or will it manage to build a secular, pluralist democracy?

Egypt’s general discontent

November 2011 – As millions of Egyptians cast their first democratic vote in decades, recent upheavals confirm that Egypt’s military is the biggest threat to freedom.

Egypt’s middle-class cyberheroes

November 2011 – Social networking and blogging voices the dreams and aspirations of the young and middle-class in Egypt, leaving other groups as marginalised as ever.

Egypt: a country raped by its guardians

November 2011 – Dear generals, you are like a therapist abusing rape victims, so don’t be surprised when Egyptians revolt against your cruelty.

The sacred right to ‘insult’

October 2011 – Jailing Egyptians for insulting religion and the military goes against the revolution’s spirit, and violates people’s secular and sacred rights.

Islamist-driven democracy is not a snowball in hell

October 2011 – Islamists are not all Osama bin Laden and secularists are not all Atatürk . They can work together to achieve democracy.

Law and order in Libya

October 2011 – Muammar Gaddafi once lived above the law, but his killers must not be permitted the same impunity to get away with murder. Justice must be done, even for fallen despots.

Libya needs true people power

October 2011 – Gaddafi and his corrupt ‘jamahiriya’ may be gone, but Libyans should not give up on the dream of a direct democracy for the masses.

Opposing the Egyptian opposition

October 2011 – The ornamental ‘official opposition’ in Egypt is as dangerous as the authoritarian regime itself.

Should Arabs treat Erdoğan as a hero?

September 2011 – Recep Tayyip Erdoğan received a hero’s welcome across the Arab world. But should Arabs welcome or be weary of Turkey’s greater engagement in the Middle East?

Are we now ‘friends’ of al-Qaeda in Libya?

September 2011 – Belgium was one of the ‘Friends of Libya’ in Paris. But does the prime minister realise that these Libyan ‘friends’ include a former al-Qaeda fighter?

9/12: Turning over a new leaf in the Middle East

September 2011 – On the 10th anniversary of the day after 9/11, it is high time to trash the ‘clash of civilisations’ theory and the ‘war on terror’ and start a new chapter in the West’s relationship with the new Middle East.

The danger of an elected dictatorship in Egypt

September 2011 – The army is giving Egyptians a stark choice: choose freedom and endure anarchy, or choose stability and put up with us.

Lessons in revolt

September 2011 – Although designed to instil loyalty to the regime, Egyptian schools have been breeding grounds for rebellion and revolt.

Egypt and Israel: cold peace or cold war?

September 2011 – Relations between Israel and post-revolution Egypt are proving tetchy – but ordinary people hold the keys to peace.

Egyptian in the holy land

September 2011 – As a rare Egyptian in Jerusalem, I have felt something akin to being a B-list celebrity.

A tale of two media

August 2011 – Egypt’s independent media have earned their revolutionary stripes, while the state’s mouthpieces have simply switched allegiance to the ‘new emperor’. But which model will endure?

The Arab Spring’s bottom line

August 2011 – The Arab uprisings are not just about democracy and dignity. But with domestic and global economic crises, how likely are they to deliver on bread and butter issues?

Egypt, Israel and Palestine: towards the promised land of peace?

August 2011 – It is high time for Israelis and Palestinians – with grassroots support from Egyptians – to unlock their latent people’s power and forge a popular peace.

Indiana Hawass and the pharaoh’s curse

August 2011 – Zahi Hawass may liken himself to Indiana Jones, but the minister of antiquities is one artifact of the old regime Egyptians want to live without.

David Miliband: revolution v extremism

July 2011 – Britain’s former foreign minister David Miliband has high hopes for the Arab revolutions.

From Arab spring to summer of love in Egypt?

July 2011 – The Egyptian revolution awoke hopes of a new era of gender equality and of greater sexual liberty. But how likely is Egypt to have its own summer of love?

No revolution for Egyptian women

July 2011 – Despite the political earthquake that has rid Egypt of its patriarch-in-chief, attitudes to gender remain largely the same. Now women must stand up for their rights.

Atheists: Egypt’s forgotten minority

July 2011 – Egyptian atheists and religious sceptics are a minority that exists in reality but not in official statistics.

Hostility to the West may shape Egyptian politics

June 2011 – Islamists and Arab Socialists share a history of clashing with foreign influences.

I was harassed and I’m stupefied!

June 2011 – Until the revolution in social attitudes comes, women should face their harassers with a loud voice and a shebsheb (a slipper).

18-day social revolutions do not exist

June 2011 – Tackling harassment requires much more than a political revolution: it needs a social movement that restores people’s dignity and promotes equality.

Which comes first: Palestine or the Palestinians?

June 2011 – Rather than grant them statehood, Palestinian plans to go to the UN could backfire. Instead, come September, the Palestinians should formally hand over control of the Occupied Territories to Israel and demand full citizenship.

Diversity without adversity

June 2011 – Can Israelis and Palestinians learn something about building bridges between divided communities from the Egyptian revolution?

The fall of Egypt’s symbol of progressive Islam

May 2011 – Joining itself with an authoritarian regime caused harm to the millennium-long history of al-Azhar University.

Egypt’s counter-revolutionary bogeyman

May 2011 – Fear of retaliation from the old regime shouldn’t be used to limit Egyptians’ hard-won freedoms and attack peaceful protesters.

Reinventing the Palestinian struggle

May 2011 – Inspired by the Arab spring, a new generation of Palestinians plan to fight the occupation with olive branches.

How African is the Arab revolution?

April 2011 – Though the ‘Arab’ revolution started in North Africa, most debate has focused on the Arab world, but what about the rest of Africa?

Defiantly delusional

March 2011 – Muammar Gaddafi and Silvio Berlusconi have something in common: delusions of grandeur that keep them desperately holding on to the reins of power.

Mobile revolution in the Middle East

March 2011 – “You won’t fool the children of the revolution.” Especially not if they’re Twittering away on their mobile phones.

New Egypt, new media

March 2011 – Egyptians will no longer tolerate paying for the state-run newspapers that peddled Hosni Mubarak’s propaganda.

Should Egypt’s next president be old guard or vanguard?

March 2011 – Amr Moussa is very popular with Egyptians, but should Egyptians play it safe with the best of the old guard or choose someone from the vanguard.

No country for old generals

March 2011 – In addition to withdrawing from the political front line, the army must also leave justice to the legal system.

The Muslim Brotherhood: empowered by its weakness

March 2011 – The revolution in Egypt succeeded because it had no Islamist face, and the Muslim Brotherhood has benefited from maintaining a soft presence.

An Arab model for democracy

February 2011 – The time is ripe to crystallise a creative vision for Egyptian democracy, one that can perhaps be used as a model by other Arab countries.

Mazel tov Egypt

February 2011 – There are Jews who refuse to succumb to fear and would like to extend their warm congratulations to Egyptians on the occasion of their revolution of hope.

Freedom from fear

February 2011 – The Egyptian revolution could usher in freedom to the Middle East, but Arabs and Israelis must break free of the chains of prejudice, history and fear.

Diary of Dictator M, aged 82¾: fight, not flight

February 2011 – In the second leaked extract from his secret diaries, President M is enraged by what he sees as an unpresidented act of cowardice and treachery.

From political revolution to social evolution

February 2011 – To truly succeed, Egypt’s revolution needs to trigger a profound evolution in every strata of society.

Political idealism triumphs over Egypt’s cruel political reality

February 2011 – The power of an idea proved stronger than tanks, water cannons and bullets.

The Arabic for freedom

February 2011 – By toppling their dictator, Egyptians have made history, but now they need to ensure that this revolution does not become a footnote in their history.

Open letter: Mubarak, we loathe you

February 2011 – Mr Mubarak, you have the extraordinary knack for snatching mediocrity from the jaws of greatness. But the Egyptian people will write their own future.

Dispatch from Tahrir: Fighting Egypt’s petty dictators

February 2011 – Outside the utopian bubble of Tahrir, petty dictators are filling the security void.

Why Mubarak shouldn’t stay until September

February 2011 – If Mubarak’s security apparatus tightens its grip on power, Egypt will turn into a North Korean-style dictatorship.

When the revolution comes…

February 2011 – A democratic Egypt will not go to war with Israel, but for the cold peace to thaw, Israel must ends its occupation.

Diary of Dictator M, aged 82¾: a panicked call for Tunisia

February 2011 – In the first leaked extract from President M’s diaries, he calms an alarmed fellow dictator in Tunisia.

The death throes of Arab dictatorships

February 2011 – Will the unfolding popular revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt lead to the region’s dictators falling one after the other like dominos?

The Jasmine Revolution

February 2011 – Tunisia’s revolution will spread the scent of its jasmine to oppressed nations all over the region.

America’s missed opportunity in Egypt

1 February 2011 – There’s no reason to believe that the uprising will bring radical Islamists to power – so why isn’t the US supporting it?

Mubarak: the life and times of a dictator

February 2011 – To grasp the enormity of the change undergoing Egyptian society, it is well worth considering that the majority of Egyptians have never known another president than Hosni Mubarak.

Egypt’s other Mubaraks

February 2011 – The imminent fall of Egypt’s dictator should embolden Egyptians, especially the young, to deal with the mini-Mubaraks holding Egyptian society back.

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